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ABSTRACT 
For twelve months, from March 1984, the British coal industry was 
embroiled in a highly political industrial dispute, initially provoked by the 
sudden announcement of the closure of Cortonwood Colliery. 
The aims of this thesis are -
a) to identify some of the ethical and theological issues raised by 
the dispute; 
b) to document the involvement of the different levels of the 
Christian church in the dispute; 
c) to identify patterns of theological thought and action; 
d) to discern what lessons there are to be learnt for the church. 
After giving a brief factual background to the dispute, attention is turned 
to the different parties to the dispute and their understanding of events, 
with key ethical issues raised by the dispute being identified. 
The focus then shifts to the various attempts of the churches at regional 
and national level to respond to the events and issues of the dispute being 
described. Clergy, churchmembers and mining people from several pit 
communities in Durham and South Yorkshire have been interviewed and the 
results are summarised. The church responses are then analysed using a 
typology adapted from that devised by Drs D.G.A. Koelega in the 
report 'Unemployment: Work for the Church' (Driebergen, 1986) and issues 
raised by the responses are discussed further. 
Overall, it was concluded that the more the church became involved in 
ministering to those caught up in the dispute the more she was able to 
promote discussion of the underlying ethical issues. However, the church 
response was weakened by lack of communication between the various 
denominations, and the church would have made a more distinctly Christian 
response if she had concentrated more on probing the underlying ethical 
issues rather than on trying to produce specific peace formulas. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From spring 1984 until spring 1985 there was a bitter dispute within the 
coal mining industry in Britain. Strike action was taken by a considerable 
number of miners for many months and the dispute raised many questions 
about the conduct of industrial disputes. The Christian Church became 
embroiled in the dispute at many levels; church members were on strike, 
ministers were spotted on the picket line, bishops' comments on the 
dispute made the headlines. 
The aims of this thesis are -
a) to identify some of the ethical and theological issues raised by 
the dispute; 
b) to document the involvement of the different levels of the 
Christian church in the dispute; 
c) to identify patterns of theological thought and action; 
d) to discern what lessons there are to be learnt for the church. 
The first task was to understand the recent history of the coal-mining 
industry in Britain and the events which led up to this dispute, as well as 
the actual events of the strike. The reasons for the mining dispute were 
complex and have been a matter of considerable debate. The first two 
chapters of this thesis will give a brief background to the dispute and 
describe the main events during its course. 
In chapter 3 attention will be be paid to the different parties to the 
dispute and their understanding of the strike. This chapter will attempt to 
identify the ethical issues which were raised by the dispute and will point 
to later sections which consider the response of the churches. 
Chapter 4 documents the attempts of the churches at regional and national 
level to respond to the events and issues of the dispute. The sources for 
this chapter include the national press and the church press, as well as 
papers, letters and sermons written during the course of the dispute. 
Chapter 5 examines the response of the local churches, particularly in the 
Durham and South Yorkshire area. In these areas clergy, churchmembers 
and mining people have been interviewed in order to build up a picture of 
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the church response. In these interviews I have worked with the Working 
Party set up by the Sheffield Diocesan Board of Social Responsibility which 
has produced the report 1 The Church in the Mining Communities 1 • 
Although our spheres of interest were different we have been able to share 
much original material. 
The last chapter, chapter 6, analyses the church responses, drawing heavily 
on the work of Drs D.G.A. Koelega in the report 1 Unemployment: Work 
for the Church 1 , in order to discern any relationships between theological 
thought and action. Koelega has evolved a typology which he used to 
classify church responses to unemployment. This typology has required 
only minor adaptation in order to become a useful tool to analyse church 
responses to the coal dispute. This chapter also considers further the role 
of church leaders in a crisis such as the coal dispute, and the tension that 
exists between obtaining a speedy settlement to the dispute and a just 
settlement. These were two issues which troubled many church people 
during the course of the strike and influenced their response to it. 
Finally, the conclusions are drawn. These include the claim that the 
contribution of the churches during the coal dispute was greatly valued by 
the pit communities and the more the church became involved the more 
she was able to promote discussion of the underlying ethical issues. 
However, the church response was weakened by lack of communication 
between the various denominations, and the church would have made a 
more distinctly Christian response if she had concentrated more on probing 
the underlying ethical issues rather than on trying to produce specific 
peace formulas. 
Reference 
Koelega, D.G.A (1986) 
Unemployment: work for the churches. A survey of church 
resolutions, publications, projects and initiatives in the United 
Kingdom, Western Germany and the Netherlands. (Final Report, Part 
One: General Introduction and Summary of Results). 
Driebergen, Multidisciplinair Centrum voor Kerk en Samenleving. 
10 
CHAPTER 1 
Background to the 1984-5 Coal Dispute 
1.1 Introduction 
On the eve of the nationalisation of the coal industry (1 January 1947) 
there were just over 700,000 men employed in 980 pits (Adeney a Lloyd, 
p12). On the eve of the 1984-5 coal dispute there were 180,000 people 
(Heffer, pxii) employed in 179 pits (Wilsher et. al., p54). 
This massive reduction in manpower was a primary reason for the start of 
the dispute. The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) stickers read 
'Coal not dole' and this slogan summarised the essence of their protest. 
Set against a national unemployment rate of 11.6% (Central Statistical 
Office) the sudden announcement of the closure of Cortonwood colliery, 
followed rapidly by the announcement of a 4 million tonne reduction in 
production, which implied the closure of 20 pits and 20,000 redundancies 
(Wilsher et. al., p49-50) was too much for many miners to swallow, and 
protest action quickly escalated from the Yorkshire area to involve the 
majority of NUM members. 
However, the strike was not simply a protest against pit closures. Some 
believe that it was deliberately provoked by the Government, whilst others 
hold that Arthur Scargill, the President of the NUM, was attempting to 
stir up class warfare and bring down the Government. It is rare that 
there is a simple reason for any strike. Sometimes one particular 
grievance acts as a trigger, but attitudes which have developed beforehand 
also shape the type and extent of any industrial action. It is therefore 
necessary to examine the recent history and the future prospects of the 
coal industry, including its industrial relations, the pressures it was under 
from various quarters, and the impact of new technology. 
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1.2 The economic climate within wbicb the National Coal Board bad to 
work 
Since the nationalisation of the coal mines in 1947 there have been wide 
fluctuations in the demand for coal. At first the newly nationalised 
industry could not produce enough coal to meet the demand. The first 
Plan for Coal was drawn up in 1950 and set an output target of 240 
million tonnes a year to be realised through a massive investment 
programme (Wilsher et al., p5). Just as this target came within reach, the 
home consumption of coal plunged dramatically with the advent of cheap 
oil, natural gas and nuclear power. By 1974 annual output had been cut to 
113 million tonnes (Lloyd, pl3) and many high-cost pits were closed, even 
where they had large reserves (Wilsher et al., p20). 
With the outbreak of the Yom Kippur war in the Middle East in 1973 oil 
prices quadrupled. This led to a sudden increase in the demand for coal, 
but the run-down coal industry could not meet the market, so the industry 
once more embarked on an investment programme (Jenner, p66) and the 
1974 Plan for Coal was drawn up. The Plan was a tripartite agreement, 
endorsed by the Government, the National Coal Board (NCB) and the NUM, 
and output targets were set at 135 million tonnes by 1985 and 170-200 
million tonnes by the year 2000. 
The 1974 Plan envisaged that about 2 million tonnes a year of capacity 
would be lost through exhaustion (Adeney a Lloyd, p18), but although some 
pits closed, the loss was well short of that proposed because of the 
continued high demand for coal. 
By the end of the 1970's productivity had picked up and new capacity was 
coming on-stream. Then, suddenly, the market collapsed due to the 
combination of the world-wide recession and the increasing success of 
energy conservation which had been embarked on in response to the high 
oil prices (Adeney a Lloyd, p19). Having geared themselves up to steadily 
increase production, the NCB found themselves over-producing on a massive 
scale and coal stocks rose. The pressure to take remedial action was 
hastened by a change in Government and thus Government policy towards 
nationalised industries which "laid down that the NCB must break-even, 
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without an operating subsidy, by at the latest the financial year of 1983-
4" (Wilsher et al., p23). It was back to the drastic run-down policy of 
the 1960's, but now unemployment was much higher and pit closures 
would no longer go through on the nod. 
In February 1981, when the NCB Chairman, Sir Derek Ezra, outlined the 
implications of Government policy and estimated that "between 20 and 50 
pits would close over the next five years" (Adeney 5 Lloyd, p19), union 
reaction was to threaten a national strike ballot. The Government and the 
Board backed off a little and it was agreed to continue the 1972 review 
procedure before closing any pit (Lloyd, p5), thus slowing down the 
process. However, under Sir Norman Siddall's chairmanship of the NCB 
(1982-3) the pace of closure was gently stepped up with 20 pits and 
20,000 jobs lost (Lloyd, p12). Of those remaining, many were struggling 
to break even financially (Wilsher et al., p30). 
In 1983 Ian MacGregor took over Chairmanship of the NCB. He agreed with 
the Department of Energy's view that the basic objective of the NCB 
"must be to earn a satisfactory return on its assets, after payment of 
social grants" (MacGregor, p133), and this was to have implications for the 
rate of pit closures. 
1.3 Changes in Mining Technology and their implications 
Thirty years ago coal was hacked out of the seams with a pick. By the 
mid 1980's extraction was a technologically sophisticated operation. There 
had been three significant changes. First, power-loading, which involved 
the use of "powered hydraulic roof support, the rotary cutter and the 
armoured conveyor belt" (Wilsher et al., p7), was in common usage by the 
1960's. Secondly, the 1980's saw introduction of the mine operating 
system (MINOS). MINOS is "a computer system whose aim is to 
monitor and direct all activities in the pit from a control room on the 
surface" ( Callinicos and Simons, p40). Thirdly, alongside the 
implementation of MINOS there has been the creation of super-pits, such 
as the new Selby complex and the grouping of sixteen pits in the Barnsley 
area into three complexes with shared facilities. All this has led to 
massive increases in productivity, reductions in manpower and considerable 
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deskilling of the remaining tasks; for instance, the grouping in Barnsley has 
"enabled an optimization in resources such that output is increased by 21% 
and manpower reduced by 21%" (Winterton, p237). 
These huge productivity increases, at a time of falling demand for coal, 
have increased the pressure to close the less productive pits. No area 
would be free from job losses, but as MINOS investment has been 
concentrated in the central coalfields, the peripheral areas of Scotland, 
South Wales, Durham and Kent would bear the brunt of the pit closures as 
lack of investment in these areas meant that these pits were the least 
productive. 
Back in 1960, E.F. Schumacher, then an economic advisor to the NCB, was 
warning against referring to high-cost pits as 'uneconomic' as the concepts 
of 'economic' and 'uneconomic' cannot be applied to the extraction of 
non-renewable resources without great caution. Once a pit is closed the 
remaining reserves are effectively sterilized, as it is usually both dangerous 
and extremely expensive to re-open a closed colliery. 
Furthermore, the automated mining techniques are extremely wasteful. 
"The machinery depends upon large seams and cannot mine smaller ones. 
It also take out the centre of a seam and wastes the top and bottom in 
order to avoid including non-carbonous material, which would slow down 
production (Skirrow, p1). Schumacher has also questioned the morality of 
taking the best resources and leaving the worst and adds "it is surely a 
criminal policy if, in addition, we wilfully sterilize, abandon, and thereby 
ruin such inferior resources as we ourselves have opened up but do not 
care to utilize (Winterton, p239, quoting Schumacher). 
The new technology and restructuring of pits can also be criticised on 
health and safety grounds. As MINOS reduces down-time in machine-
cutting the face-workers are increasingly exposed to the existing hazards, 
particularly dust. It also means increased work-surveillance, more 
managerial control, deskilling and social isolation which will probably lead 
to more occupational stress and stress-related illnesses (Winterton, p240), 
and therefore become a potential source of malcontent amongst the 
workforce. 
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1.4 Industrial Relations in the Coal Industry 
Occurring alongside the formation of the NCB was the creation of the 
NUM which developed out of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain 
(MFGB). In the early days of nationalisation a year long strike would 
have been unthinkable, though local, unofficial strikes were commonplace. 
Nationalisation brought with it an elaborate structure of conciliation and 
consultation. Both sides agreed to arbitration machinery and the NUM 
passed a rule which meant that a two-thirds majority was required for 
strike action (Adeney and Lloyd, p13). The nationalised coal industry was 
a "symbol of consensus, a post-war bargain between organised labour and 
the establishment" (Adeney and Lloyd, p12). The 1984-5 coal dispute 
demonstrated very clearly that this consensus no longer held. 
In 1971 the NUM reduced the majority needed to sanction a strike to 55% 
(Crick, p49) and after the rejection of its pay claim the "first national 
coal strike since 1926 began ••••• on 9th January (1972)" (Crick, p53). This 
was the first step towards the breaking-down of the consensus. "By 
February (1972) the strike was hitting home, as a succession of power cuts 
showed" (Callinicos and Simons, p28). "The Government had called a 
State of Emergency and appointed a Court of Inquiry, under Lord 
Wilberforce, to look into the miners' case" (Crick, p62). The inquiry 
recommended wage increases averaging 27%. Two years later, the NUM 
were again using strike action to try to increase their pay but this time 
the economy was being threatened by inflation and the Conservative 
Government was determined to try to resist the NUM 's demands for fear 
setting the pace for a series of inflationary pay rises. However, after 
there had been an 81% vote in favour of the strike, the Prime Minister 
suspended parliament and called a General Election. 
The election returned Labour to office and the dispute was quickly settled 
with the miners receiving their pay increase. The return of a Labour 
Government heralded a new era of consensual industrial relations in the 
coal industry and the 1974 Plan for Coal, drawn up at a time when the 
demand for coal had resurged, painted a rosy future for the coal-industry. 
But the union, having achieved unity and proved that it was a force to be 
reckoned with, slowly began to lose power. Under the Social Contract, the 
only way to achieve reasonable pay rises was to negotiate local 
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productivity agreements. To avoid a showdown with the NUM the 
Government was prepared to collude in this, but the NUM Left was against 
an incentive scheme warning that it would mean "more deaths, more 
serious injuries, more pneumoconiosis" (Crick, p74) and that "it would 
reintroduce great differences in pay between areas and make it harder to 
achieve solidarity over industrial action in the future" (Crick, p75). 
Although 61.53% voted against local productivity schemes (Crick, p74), 
pressure from the areas of high productivity caused the National Executive 
Committee (NEC) of the NUM to give way, arguing that unofficial 
schemes were already widespread. The Left contested the NEC's decision 
in the High Court "seeking injunctions against any such local agreements" 
(Crick, p76), but lost. Within weeks all areas had negotiated productivity 
schemes. 
This internal wrangling set some important precedents; despite votes 
against the scheme by both Conference and the membership as a whole, 
Joe Gormley had used the power of Presidency and the support he had on 
the NEC to implement the scheme (Crick, p76). In 1984 the Left 
followed this precedent of by-passing the wishes of the union nationally by 
taking action area-by-area in order to escalate the industrial action (Crick, 
p76). Similarly, in 1977 the Left set a precedent by resorting to legal 
action to attempt to settle an internal dispute. In 1984, the right-wing 
pro-ballot miners followed suit by taking the Left to court accusing them 
of interpreting the rule book in their favour and working area-by-area. In 
1977 the judges upheld the implementation of the productivity schemes, 
despite the NUM vote against them, but in 1984 the judges were to find 
against the Left and its by-passing of democratic procedures (Crick, p76). 
And so, by the early 1980's, the strength of the NUM was in decline. The 
reversion to local settlements had taken away the bargaining power of the 
national union and, due to the savage reduction in the number of miners, 
the NUM was now financially and numerically weaker. The trade union 
movement as a whole was in retreat, with the 1978-9 'Winter of 
Discontent' reducing public sympathy for organised labour. Moreover, the 
1979 Conservative Government, acting on its election promises to curb the 
power of the unions, had passed the Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982, 
which reduced the legal immunities of trade unions. With an anti-union 
16 
Government who were suspected of wanting to seek revenge for their 1974 
defeat in office and with the appointment in September 1983 of an NCB 
Chairman who had a reputation for being tough with unions and a track 
record of pruning nationalised industries, combined with the election in 
April 1982 of Arthur Scargill, a militant member of the Left, as President 
of the NUM, the days of collaboration between the Government, the NCB 
and the NUM were numbered. It was surely only a matter of time before 
a major confrontation would take place. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Coal Dispute 
2.1 The beginning of the dispute 
From 31st October 1983 the NUM operated an overtime ban in order to 
exert pressure on the NCB to improve their pay award of 5.2% and to 
slowdown the closure programme (Wilsher et al., p35). By December, the 
NCB were still not prepared to increase their pay offer (Adeney and Lloyd, 
p80), despite the effect the overtime ban was having on the profit and 
loss account (Wilsher et al., p39), but the Chairman had agreed to discuss 
the state of the coal industry as a whole at the next meeting with the 
unions, a national consultative meeting. This meeting was originally 
scheduled for February but was then postponed until 6th March 1984. 
Meanwhile, the Board and the Government had been working on the 1984-5 
budgets and these "carried closure implications which marked a significant 
increase on the rate set by Siddall" (Adeney and Lloyd, p85). At the end 
of February, MacGregor saw each of the Area Directors to discuss their 
targets and assess the amount of trouble likely in each Area (MacGregor, 
p165). The cuts were to be concentrated in four of the regions: South 
Wales, The North East, Scotland and South Yorkshire. 
George Hayes, Area Director of South Yorkshire felt he could cut 
production by the necessary 500,000 tonnes by the loss of only one pit if 
that pit were Cortonwood and if it were closed by the end of April 1984 
(Wilsher et al., p42). He announced this at the South Yorkshire quarterly 
review meeting on 1st March 1984. (This meeting had originally been 
fixed to be after the national consultative meeting but was now to be held 
before it, as the latter had been postponed.) In making this announcement 
Hayes breached the normal procedure. He should have described the pit as 
having 'problems' (Adeney and Lloyd, p86) and then "asked for a 
reconvened meeting with the branch representatives present to discuss the 
matter more fully" (Wilsher et al., p44). By naming a closure date, Hayes 
seemed to be pre-empting the colliery review procedure, although he 
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11 insisted he wanted the procedure to go ahead 11 (Crick, p99). Certainly 
the NUM officials felt the procedure had been flouted and refused to 
attend further meetings (Wilsher et al., p44). Hayes also made clear that 
11 it was an overtly economic closure ••• there was no market for Cortonwood 
coal 11 (Adeney and Lloyd, p86), but men had only just been transferred to 
the pit from Elsecar on the understanding that Cortonwood had an 
expected life span of a further five years, and over £1 million had 
recently been invested in the pit (Adeney and Lloyd, p86). 
The closure announcement occurred on the Thursday. On the following 
Sunday, the traditionally moderate workforce of Cortonwood voted 
unanimously to fight the closure (Wilsher et al., p45). On Monday, 5th 
March, an NUM Area Council meeting was hastily convened and 11 voted to 
stop work 'as from last shift Friday 9th March to stop the action of the 
NCB to butcher our pits and jobs', and to call on other areas - and other 
unions - for immediate support 11 (Wilsher et al., p46), but half the pits in 
South Yorkshire were already out (Adeney and Lloyd, p86). They were 
protesting that 11 for the very first time ••• they were being asked to accept 
a purely economic closure in their area 11 (Wilsher et al., 43-4). 
At the national meeting on 6th March, MacGregor announced a cut in 
production by 4 million tonnes for 1984-5, and agreed with Scargill's 
conclusion that this would mean 20 pit closures. (Adeney and Lloyd, p87). 
At the meeting the Board would not give assurance that there would be no 
compulsory redundancies and it took a further two days before their 
already agreed and 11 extremely generous and improved package 11 was 
announced (Wilsher et al., pS0-1). Furthermore, it was only after 
intervention by Peter Walker, Secretary of State for Energy, that 
Cortonwood men were informed that their pit would go through the proper 
procedure before closure (Adeney and Lloyd, p86-7). 
Having previously spoken so much about the NCB having hit lists of pits 
they wished to close, and opposing commercially orientated closures, 
Scargill could hardly ignore the threat to Cortonwood, but would the NUM 
membership be prepared to fight? Three national ballots in the previous 
30 months had all rejected industrial action (Lloyd, p22), the most recent 
being in March 1983 when the Tymawr Lewis Merthyr pit was being 
threatened with closure. 
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2.2 The Strike Escalates 
Rule 43 of the NUM rule book states that 
"a national strike shall only be entered upon as the result of a ballot 
vote of the members taken in pursuance of a resolution of 
Conference and a strike shall not be declared unless 55% [this was 
replaced by 'a simple majority' at the Special Delegate Conference 
on 19 April 1984] of those voting in the ballot vote in favour of such 
a strike ••• " (Crick, p149-150). 
This rule had been used to authorise all previous national strikes. 
However, it was feared that the necessary majority would not be achieved, 
so the NUM's National Executive Committee (NEG) decided at its meeting 
on 8 March 1984, to endorse the requests they had received from Yorkshire 
and also Scotland, that their strikes be recognised under Rule 41 and "to 
give support to any other areas which wished to take similar action" 
(Crick, p101). 
Rule 41 "was primarily designed to give the national executive control over 
industrial action in individual areas" ( Wilsher et al., p53) but now the rule 
was being used to endorse area strikes which would hopefully escalate into 
a national strike. As Mick McGahey (Vice-President of the NUM) put it, 
"Area by area will decide and in my opinion it will have a domino effect" 
(Crick, p101). 
However, many areas decided to hold local ballots, but none achieved the 
necessary 55% majority (Ottey, p77-8). This vindicated the NEG's view 
that a national ballot would not produce a strike vote, but it meant that 
the only way to extend the strike was by picketing. This worked in South 
Wales and Durham, and also in North Nottinghamshire, until that area 
voted 3 to 1 to remain at work (Crick, p104). Subsequently, many 
Nottingham shire miners refused to be picketed out and their 'right to 
work' was ensured by a massive and controversial police operation (See 
section 3.5). 
By the middle of March, about 132 pits were on strike and 42 were still 
working ( Ottey, p76) and violence between striking miners, working miners 
and the police, especially in Nottinghamshire, was escalating. The NEG 
21 
was under pressure to call a national ballot, but although it seemed that 
a majority of the NEC supported this, when the motion was moved at 
their meeting on 12th April, Scargill ruled it out of order. He claimed 
that, as the matter had been discussed at the previous meeting, it could 
not be brought to a subsequent meeting (Crick, p106). Seven days later, a 
Special Delegates Conference (SDC) changed rule 43 so that only a simple 
majority was required to call a strike, but four separate motions calling 
for a ballot were each rejected (Crick, p106). And so "throughout the 
summer the miners' strike became a war between striking pickets and 
working miners, and between striking miners and the police" (Crick, plOB). 
The striking miners had few allies. Although both the National Union of 
Railwaymen ( NUR) and the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and 
Firemen (ASLEF) gave considerable support, the effect of their action 
was reduced by much coal being transported by lorry, whilst Bill Sirs, the 
General Secretary of the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation (ISTC) stated 
that he would not see his members' jobs "'sacrificed on someone else's 
altar' ••• and ••• ' the ISTC would unhestitatingly handle fuel supplies, 'scab' or 
otherwise, from any source that presented itself" (Wilsher et al., p85). 
For a short time it seemed that the miners also had the support of the 
dockers. ASLEF train drivers were refusing to cross the NUM picket just 
outside the Immingha m docks where the iron-ore for the Scunthorpe steel 
works was berthed. British Steel had brought in trucks to move the ore 
and at one point, on 6th July, the dock labour scheme was breached. The 
Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU) called a strike. But on 
20th July, whilst talks were afoot to resolve the dispute, angry lorry 
drivers ·at Dover forced their way onto ferries at Dover thus breaking the 
strike (Wilsher et al., p138-144). Within two days the strike was over, 
and when the dock scheme was more flagrantly breached at Hunterston, a 
few weeks later, the dockers refused to strike again (Adeney and Lloyd, 
p141-2). 
The NUM 's successes in 1972 and 1974 had been won with the help of the 
power workers who had refused to handle coal, and power cuts had 
resulted. This time the power unions were reluctant to take any 
supportive action. They "were undoubtedly influenced by a lack of a 
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ballot" (Adeney and Lloyd, p151), but with many miners working there 
seemed little point in taking costly sympathy action. 
The only other time the NUM had the advantage of other union support 
was when another of the mining unions, the National Association of 
Colliery Overmen, Deputies and Shotfirers (NACODS) fell into dispute with 
the NCB. NACODS men had continued to work during the dispute, but had 
pledged "moral, financial and industrial support for the NUM" ( Wilsher et 
al., pl65). However, by early autumn their relationship with the 
management had deteriorated to the extent that a strike ballot produced 
an 82.5% vote in favour of industrial action. The strike, due to 
commence on 25 October was called off at the eleventh hour when 
agreement was reached which dealt with NACODS grievances, both over 
their treatment during the dispute and over pit closures. It seemed that 
the NCB had agreed to the provision of a new independent review body to 
deal with pit closures with the promise that "full weight (would) be given 
to its findings" (Wilsher et al., p170). At this point the Trades Union 
Congress (TUG) intervened to see if the NUM would settle similarly, but 
Scargill was not impressed with the agreement with NACODS, and so the 
dispute continued (Wilsher et al., p170-176). 
The striking miners did, however, receive financial support from many 
trade unions, both from official funds and extra collections. The miners, 
too, were busy raising money in order to maintain themselves and their 
dependants. Those on strike received no strike pay or social security and 
their dependants received reduced supplementary benefit as they were 
deemed to be in receipt of £15 strike pay (Booth and Smith, p368). 
Within weeks of the commencement of the strike, most pits had a Miners' 
Support Committee or a Women's Support Group which provided meals and 
food parcels for those no longer drawing wages. 
2.3 Negotiations 
Throughout the strike there were long periods without negotiations. It was 
not until 8th June, almost three months into the strike, that an initial 
attempt at negotiations was made. At the first meeting the parties 
"reached some degree of accommodation" (Wilsher et al., p131) but 
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breakdown occurred on 13th June. In the intervening few days, MacGregor, 
in an interview with 'The Times', had spoken of the need to eliminate 
uneconomic capacity, affirmed the Board's right to manage and his 
intention to produce a new Plan for Coal, and had predicted that the strike 
was only half way through (Wilsher et al., p132). 
The second round of negotiations commenced on 6th July during which both 
sides produced a proposal to end the dispute and "they embodied a 
remarkably high degree of unanimity" (Wilsher et al., p135). The main 
stumbling block was the subject of uneconomic pits. The NUM draft 
stated that where "a colliery has no further minable reserves that are 
workable or which can be developed, there will be agreement between the 
Board and the union that such a colliery shall be deemed exhausted" 
(Wilsher et al., p136, quoting NUM draft). The NCB wanted it to read 
"beneficially developed". Despite searches for alternative phrases, 
agreement could not be reached on what was to prove to be the most 
attractive package to be offered to the NUM, and so the dispute 
continued. 
Negotiations in September started well but again stalled in the "attempt to 
define a third category of closures other than those on ground of 
exhaustion or safety" (Wilsher et al., p159). After the NACODS dispute 
had been settled in late October, negotiations ceased until the new year. 
Then Norman Willis, General Secretary of the TUG, acted as an 
intermediary between the NCB and the NUM but the promise that "no pits 
would close whilst the revised review procedure was being agreed" (Adeney 
and Lloyd, p216) was rejected by the NUM. 
By the middle of February 1985 the NUM 's position was very weak. The 
High Court had found in favour of two Yorkshire miners who had 
"questioned the constitutional validity of the strike" (Crick, plll) and the 
NUM's assets had been sequestrated. Also the NCB's back-to-work 
campaign was gaining momentum. On 28th February the Board claimed 
that "50.75% of the miners were back" (MacGregor, p357). In South Wales 
union leaders were calling for a "return to work in dignity but without 
agreement" (Wilsher et al., p249) and Durham leaders backed this call. 
On 3rd March the NUM delegate conference voted by 98 to 91 "for the 
dispute to be brought to an end without an agreement" (Wilsher et al., 
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p251). The NEC were asked to negotiate an amnesty for miners sacked 
during the dispute, but not to make it a prior condition to a march back. 
The march back occurred over the subsequent three days, but was 
somewhat chaotic, as Kent miners picketed some Yorkshire pits, and miners 
refused to cross the picket line. However, by the end of the week the 
41,000 strikers "who had stuck it out to the bitter end" (Wilsher et al., 
p255) had returned, and the strike was over. 
2.4 Reporting the Coal Dispute 
Recent research has concluded that "where the television audience has no 
direct experience of information, then the media - and especially television 
news - has a very powerful effect on beliefs" (Philo, 4.6.90). Since many 
people within the church had little first-hand experience of the coal 
dispute, then the media coverage of the dispute ·must be examined, 
particularly as it has been the subject of considerable criticism. 
MacGregor complained that the "overall presentation of the strike in 
favour of Scargill' s propaganda helped to prolong the dispute considerably" 
(MacGregor, p316) whilst many in the mining communities felt their case 
had been distorted or omitted altogether (Jones et al., back cover). 
MacGregor admitted that he reacted badly to aggressive questioning in 
front of TV cameras but felt that he was too often forced into an 
adversarial position. He accused the press of hero-worshipping Scargill 
because he gave them success in terms of prominent and lengthy articles 
(MacGregor, p299-300). Furthermore, news coverage was thought to be 
imbalanced: NUM pro-strike miners received more coverage each week 
(89 minutes) than the NCB and the working miners ( 49 minutes) and the 
amount of violence inflicted on pickets by the police was exaggerated 
because a disproportionate amount of it was shown (MacGregor, p315-6). 
The catalogue of complaints against media misrepresentation of the striking 
miners' cause is much longer and more detailed than this. It was the 
subject of a lengthy correspondence in the letter pages of 'The Guardian' 
and prompted the Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom to produce 
a booklet on the subject. There were three main areas of complaint. 
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First, distortion of fact. 'The Sun', 20.11.87, has been accused of 
deliberately distorting figures of working miners, when between its first 
and second editions it added 15,000 auxiliary workers to the number back 
at work (Schwarz, p124). The 6pm BBC News on 18 June 1984 presented 
the image that the violence outside the Orgreave Coke Works had been 
started and continued by the pickets, with the police acting merely in 
self-defence. However, the ITN news was making clear that the heavily 
armed police were responsible for some of the worst violence and this was 
part of a deliberate, carefully planned operation. By 9pm the BBC had 
modified its coverage so that it fell more in line with that of ITN and 
Channel 4 (Jones et al., p26-9). 
Secondly, use of loaded terms was commonplace. "The 'bloody,' 'bitter' 
pit 'war' was a well used phrase in the tabloid press" (Wade, p274). 
Many papers did not hesitate to make clear which side they supported by 
referring to the working miners as 'the brave', and contrasting 'the thugs' 
with good, decent workers, thereby giving a 'good versus evil' 
interpretation of events. The term 1 the miners' strike' was greatly 
preferred to the more neutral 'coal dispute'. Each time this term is 
used, the opinion that the miners are to blame for the stoppage is 
reinforced into the public consciousness (Philo, 16.2.85). Similarly, in 
reporting a £2billion loss by the Central Electricity Generating Board 
(CEGB), the ITN news headline blamed the miners' strike and later 
referred to a proposed increase in prices as a 'Scargill surcharge' (Philo, 
16.2.85). Other loaded phrases in regular use were 'uneconomic' pits, 
rather than pits 'said to be uneconomic', and 'new faces' rather than 
'strike-breakers' (Philo, 23.2.85). 
Thirdly, distortion can also occur through the omission of details. The 
press has been accused of virtually ignoring "the conflicting claims and 
philosophies underlying the dispute; the Government's constant behind the 
scenes management of the entire dispute ... ; the enormous support for the 
strike from the mining communities themselves, especially the role of 
women; the threat to civil liberties posed by the police role in the 
dispute" (Jones et al., p11). Similar complaints have been made about the 
broadcast coverage of the dispute. Alan Prothero, the Assistant Director 
General of the BBC, has defended the corporation's coverage of the 
dispute against accusations that it has been blind to the many issues that 
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are related to the strike, by pointing to BBC-2's 'Newsnight' and current 
affairs programmes which did probe many of the underlying issues. 
However, since the 6pm and 9pm news bulletins reach many more people, 
surely, these should be balanced in themselves? Furthermore, balance 
means more than equity in airtime and the BBC has been accused of 
taking "a singularly hostile stance to the striking miners" (Jones et al., 
p30). The British Film Institute's Broadcasting Research Unit has 
concluded that "Scargill has been treated much more as an adversary in 
interviews than has MacGregor" (Jones et al., p26). 
Overall Channel 4 's coverage of the dispute has received least criticism. 
It produces an hour long news broadcast each evening which means that 
there is time not just to present the news but to start to explore the 
issues which provoke the news. 
In general, the media tended "to assume that unions were strike-prone and 
conducted their interviews with the belief that strikes were wrong" (Wade, 
p237). Lord Reith certainly took this line when explaining the role of the 
BBC during the 1926 General Strike. He said that, "Assuming that the 
BBC is for the people and that the Government is for the people, it 
follows that the BBC must be for the Government in this crisis too" (Reith 
in Jones et al., p20). "By that logic all strikes harm the nation, 
particularly in an economic crisis and generally, therefore strikes are seen 
as being against the 'national interest'" (Jones et al., p20). 
It must, however, be pointed out that the NUM did not present their case 
well. Despite their President's expertise in handling the media, the NUM 's 
press office proved to be inadequate to the task before it. During the 
1972 and 1974 strikes the NUM Headquarters had been openly accessible to 
journalists but under the new President everything now had to go through 
the new press officer, Nell Myers (Adeney and Lloyd, p242). Journalists 
were hampered by the congested telephone system at the NUM 
headquarters and the regular unavailability of the Press officer, (Adeney 
and Lloyd, p246) and too often NUM campaign leaflets failed to reach the 
desks of journalists (Wade, p282). On the picket line journalists were 
hampered by NUM hostility and were occasionally the subject of violent 
attack (Adeney and Lloyd, p248). By contrast, the NCB employed 40 press 
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officers and it had acquired the reputation of the "best press department 
in private or public industry" (Adeney and Lloyd, p245). 
This, however, does not excuse all the complaints which the striking miners 
had against their media representation. There is little doubt that during 
the strike there were a worrying number of journalistic excesses which 
were due to an individual interpretation of events taking precedence over 
any attempt at objective news coverage. The coverage of the dispute by 
much of the church press avoided many of these excesses and provided its 
readership with a fair balance of articles. This will be examined further 
in section 4.2. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Ethical issues raised by the dispute 
3.1 Introduction 
The 1984-5 coal dispute was considerably more than a dispute between a 
group of workers and their management over a work related issue. At the 
surface it was a dispute about the right of a union to be consulted by 
their management. However, a pit closure often hits the local economy 
very hard, so at a deeper level it was about some communities fighting for 
their survival, and their dispute was primarily with the Government which 
lay behind the nationalised coal industry, and was thus held responsible for 
the prevailing high level of unemployment. There was also a dispute 
within a dispute, for the NUM was not united in its struggle; many miners 
continued to work throughout the strike, so, at another level there was a 
dispute between miner and miner over the conduct of the strike. There 
were also considerable tensions within the higher management of the NCB, 
and the relationship between the Board and the Government was, at times, 
uneasy. In addition, questions were asked about the behaviour of the 
police during the dispute. 
This chapter will examine the perspectives of the main groups which were 
in some way party to the dispute and will try to identify the ethical 
issues which were raised by the dispute. Brief references will be made to 
the way the church responded to some of these issues. The response of 
the churches to the dispute as a whole will form the substance of 
subsequent chapters. 
3.2 The Perspective of Striking Miners 
The main trigger for the strike was the announcement of the closure of 
Cortonwood colliery in a way that blatantly flouted the agreed procedure 
for pit closures (see section 2.1). Since management had recently given 
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assurances that there was at least five years' life left in the pit, the 
reason for closure was solely that of short-term economic prudence. 
The speech by Dave Douglass, (Samuel et al., p92-99) delegate of Hatfield 
Main pit in South Yorkshire, calling his branch to support the miners at 
Cortonwood, shows why so many did. Douglass spoke of Cortonwood being 
the acid test of loyalty to the union. Since the men at Cortonwood had 
been treated with utter contempt and the union had been told outright 
lies, they were fighting not just for Cortonwood, but also for managerial 
respect of the union. The fight was not just to save Cortonwood but, "If 
we accept that Cortonwood can close ••• then we can accept that ANY pit 
can close on economic grounds •••• Doncaster 's coal is too expensive, roughly 
half of Doncaster's pits produce coal DEARER than Cortonwood's. 
DON'T THINK OF THIS AS A FIGHT TO STOP CORTONWOOD CLOSING. 
IT'S A FIGHT TO STOP DONCASTER CLOSING" (op. cit., p93). 
Douglass also raised the fear that the coal industry might be privatised, 
quoting the example of the recent construction of a washery at Ferrymoor 
Ridings where outside contractors had been employed with union agreement. 
Then the union was informed that the washery would also be operated by 
an outside firm. "IF IT'S A WASHER TODAY, IT'LL BE A DRIFT THE 
DAY AFTER AND A DEEP MINE THE DAY AFTER THAT! We have been 
warned of the possible denationalisation and the return to private coal 
ownership. WELL HERE IT IS. THIRTY-SEVEN YEARS AGO THIS UNION 
DEFEATED THE COAL OWNERS AFTER TWO CENTURIES OF STRUGGLE. 
I HOPE NOBODY OF THIS GENERATION OF UNION MEN IS GONNA ROLL 
OVER AND LET PRIVATISATION COME CREEPING BACK!" (op. cit., p95). 
This argument illustrates the consciousness within miners of their roots and 
the conditions previous generations suffered underground. Their 
grandfathers had fought for nationalisation and it was not the remit of the 
present generation to concede that battle now. Furthermore, each job is 
regarded as a type of patrimony which an individual miner has not the 
right to give away by accepting redundancy; it belongs not to him but to 
the miner's posterity. Douglass, himself having been moved from the 
North East to Yorkshire, was well aware that miners cannot keep being 
moved on from one area to another. The fight was not just for individual 
jobs and pits but for the preservation of the local community and a whole 
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way of life. Ironically the miners were "defending precisely those 'old-
fashioned' values - 'Victorian values' - which, in other spheres, the Prime 
Minister (Margaret Thatcher) has made it her platform to defend: the 
dignity of work, the sanctity of the family, 'roots'" (op. cit., p5). From 
the striking miners' point of view the decision about the future of a pit 
should not be taken on the grounds of profitability alone. They saw the 
question as a moral question for a pit closure, particularly at a time of 
high unemployment, meant the way of life for the whole pit village was 
threatened. To ignore the social costs of pit closures was felt to be 
grossly irresponsible. The church very much grasped this point and 
stressed the need to include social costs in the equation defining an 
uneconomic pit; see especially, point 7 of the statement by the Roman 
Catholic Bishops (section 4.3.3), the proposal by the Welsh churches to end 
the strike (section 4.6) and the Archbishop of York's letter to the Durham 
miners (section 4.5). 
Not surprisingly, it was the regions which were most threatened by pit 
closures which were the most ready to take industrial action. Those who 
were the most ardent supporters of the strike saw themselves fighting for 
their industry and were insistent that personal greed for the generous 
redundancy terms must not be put before the corporate need of miners as 
a whole. However, many were realistic enough to realise that pit closures 
would not be put off indefinitely but, bound by loyalty to the union, they 
were not going to give in without a struggle. Furthermore, they were 
objecting to the way the NCB was going about pit closures. As the strike 
developed the style of management became a major issue of contention. 
A miner at Thurcroft explains; "The main issue turned out to be this thing 
'Management's right to manage'. We said 'No, we're the workers in this 
industry, we want a say in it'. When we started off the strike we said, 
'We don't want pit closures'. But the press totally exaggerated this thing 
about no pit closures. We understand that with an extractive industry 
some pits have to shut and others get the investment for the future. We 
wanted a proper say" (Gibbon and Steyne, p46). Section 3.4 discusses the 
NCB's understanding of their right to manage. 
However, for some miners there was more to the strike than internal 
industrial relations within the coal industry. Under Conservative 
Government the rights of individuals in employment had been steadily 
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eroded, including rights relating to employment protection, unfair dismissal, 
maternity leave and the closed shop (Catholic Church, p12-3). Also, 
secondary picketing had been made illegal and the Government produced a 
'Code of Practice on Picketing' which recommended that a maximum of six 
pickets be allowed at a workplace entrance (Mcilroy, pl03). The miners' 
leader, in particular, was thought to take the view that the strike was 
between the unions as a whole and the Government's trade union 
legislation (Adeney and Lloyd, p209). 
The relationship between employers and employees is an ethical issue. The 
Christian Church in Britain has played a part in supporting workers in their 
struggle to be properly protected from abuses of power by their overlords. 
Industrial relations in post-war Britain have been shaped by the general 
understanding, accepted by the church, of the need for negotiation and 
consensus between employees and employers. The church was to comment 
on aspects of industrial relations during the course of the coal dispute e .g. 
the debate in the General Synod of the Church of England on the report 
'Perspectives on Economics' showed that many in the church saw the 
manager's right to manage as being far from absolute (see further section 
4.3.2), the industrial chaplains, too, put the case for industrial relations to 
be conducted in a spirit of mutual respect (see section 4.4) and many 
church leaders criticised Government policy for undermining the post-war 
consensus, for redistributing wealth in favour of the rich and creating a 
sense of powerlessness amongst many (see section 4.5, especially remarks 
by the Archb ishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of Birmingham). 
However, the church made little comment during the dispute about the 
specific issue of the erosion of trade union rights. 
It is worth considering Arthur Scargill 's views and his impact on the strike 
further for, "It is a common belief in Government, in the Labour 
movement and in the NCB that Scargill, by sheer personal force, greatly 
prolonged the strike and greatly raised the stakes, that he, largely alone, 
turned the strike from what it might have been - a partial victory - into 
a complete defeat because he had to be beaten. He was the embodiment 
of the enemy within" (Adeney and Lloyd, p28). Certainly, by the sheer 
force of his personality, Arthur Scargill stamped his own mark on the 
dispute, and there is little doubt that his political ideology and his 
economic demands are heavily intertwined for he refuses to divorce wage 
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claims from political battles. There were some in the church who were 
very suspicious of Scargill' s 'marxist views'; in particular Francis Bridger 
who felt the church neglected the strong element of class struggle which 
underlay the miners' cause (see section 6.4) and the Roman Catholic 
newspaper, 'The Tablet' which nearly always referred to Scargill as a 
marxist when mentioning him in editorials (section 4.2). 
Scargill was elected President of the NUM in 1982 having campaigned 
heavily on a pledge to "fight the closure of 'uneconomic' pits and to call 
for strike action if necessary" (Crick, p93). In his two Presidential 
addresses prior to the dispute, he reiterated that, in his opinion, the 
union's prime responsibility was "to protect the coal industry from the 
ravages of the market mechanism, the short sightedness of politicians and 
the deliberate political decisions designed to destroy our industry, our jobs 
and communities" (Scargill, 1983, p349). If the strike led to the downfall 
of the Conservative Government, then that was very much in the miners' 
interests, but a Labour Government would not necessarily mean victory. 
Scargill has been very scathing of union leaders who abandon wages claims 
when a there is a Labour Government. Although many within the churches 
questioned Thatcherite values (see section 6.3), there were few who would 
have been prepared to support any attempt of the NUM to bring down 
the Government. 
Care does, however, need to be taken not to exaggerate 'the Scargill 
factor.' It must be remembered that the miners' leader holds democracy 
in great respect. He sees the NUM 's national conference as the supreme 
decision-making body and "its decisions 'binding on me, on the National 
Executive Committee and on the union as a whole"' (Adeney and Lloyd, 
p37 quoting Scargill, Presidential Address, 1982). It is his inability to 
compromise in pursuit of obtaining the demands of conference which causes 
Scargill to appear as the autocrat, but since he is the executor of NUM 
Conference decisions rather than the decision-maker, he cannot be held 
solely responsible for the happenings of the dispute. Scargill needs to be 
put into a totality which includes both officials and a highly politicised 
membership (Allen, p136) and whilst he may have done much to shape the 
views of his membership, it would be wrong to assume that he commanded 
the blind obedience of his members. 
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The arguments about the reasons for supporting the strike continued 
throughout the duration of the dispute both in the media, in the local 
communities and even within individuals. The perspective of striking 
miners was never a single perspective but had many facets and these 
changed as the dispute went on. Most miners saw themselves fighting to a 
greater or lesser extent for their jobs, their union and their community. 
As the dispute continued, the community element became stronger as the 
loss of wages began to bite and the whole community felt the effect of 
this. Those on strike received nothing, and supplementary benefit for their 
families was reduced because they were deemed to be in receipt of strike 
pay (Booth and Smith, p365). Virtually whole communities banded together 
to raise money in order to survive, and considerable energy was expended 
in providing communal meals and food parcels. The Government had 
justified its recent alterations in the rules pertaining to benefit payments 
to those involved in industrial disputes on the grounds that the provision of 
accelerated tax refunds to strikers and full supplementary benefit to their 
families created a fundamental imbalance in industrial relations in favour 
of employees (Booth and Smith, p368). For those struggling to feed 
themselves and their families, their right to subsistence was as 
fundamental as their right to strike, but as both the churches and some 
charities responded to the obvious hardship, the question was raised 
whether that was the proper use of charitable monies, when miners could 
immediately solve their financial problems by returning to work. Some 
felt that the church and charitable agencies have a duty to maintain a 
neutral stance in the face of an industrial dispute and the offering of 
relief to those on strike compromises this neutrality. This issue proved to 
be a major dilemma for many in the churches during the course of the 
coal dispute as will be seen in subsequent chapters (see especially sections 
4.7, 5.5, 6.2 and 6.4). 
3.3 The Perspective of Working Miners. 
At no point during the dispute was the NUM united in its stance against 
its employer, as many miners, particularly in Nottinghamshire, continued to 
work. These miners considerably undermined the stance of those on strike. 
Many of those who did strike felt betrayed by their working colleagues but 
those who worked felt that they had been betrayed by their union. 
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Why did so many miners refuse to join the strike? "The working miners 
arose as a phenomenon in reaction to the NUM's leadership's decision not 
to have a ballot" (Lloyd, p32). Perhaps it was not quite that straight-
forward but, certainly, the lack of a national ballot was a major factor in 
the decision to continue working. The NUM has always been a very 
democratic union and many miners feel they have a right to a ballot over 
any major issue particularly before taking industrial action. 
From the first day of the Yorkshire strike pickets had flooded into 
Nottinghamshire in an attempt to gain support there. Those from 
Thurcroft (Yorkshire) who picketed at the Bentinck colliery 
(Nottinghamshire) have described some of the reactions they had from men 
crossing the picket line: 
"We haven't voted yet." 
"If there were only six of you we wouldn't go in." 
"We've been told that if we come out on strike we shan't be able to 
claim any redundancy." (Gibbon and Steyne, p65) 
Looking back, there are many in the NUM, including some from Yorkshire, 
who believe "that it was a great mistake for the Yorkshire pickets to rush 
into Nottinghamshire that first week, before the Notts men had a chance 
to decide for themselves" (Crick, p102). It seems that the NUM 's failure 
to hold a national ballot, and the over-enthusiasm of pickets, raised a 
point of principle which some regarded as being of higher priority than the 
issue of pit closures. They thus continued to work. 
In the absence of a national ballot local union officials were often placed 
in a difficult position. Colin Bottomore, Branch Secretary at Bentinck, was 
in favour of the strike. He refused to cross a picket line until the Notts 
Area ballot but after the ballot he worked normally, though he upheld the 
over-time ban. He admits his dilemma, "There's always been a conflict in 
my own mind.... because I would have loved to have supported the men 
who were on strike but I wasn't elected to support the members on strike, 
I was elected to support the men at this colliery" (Samuel et al., p73). 
Roy Ottey sums up well the dilemmas facing many miners; they felt "torn 
between the justice of their right to a ballot and their loyalty to the 
union by not crossing picket lines" ( Ottey, p89-90) and he goes on to ask, 
"How can a man, exercising the right given to him in a ballot in his own 
area be called a 'scab' if he abides by the result and goes to work? 11 
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(Ottey, p123). The intimidation of working miners, and their right to go 
to work, was a major issue throughout the dispute. The next section 
examines the right to go to work more thoroughly. 
The violence on the picket-lines and the intimidation of miners who did 
not support the strike was heavily reported by the media and was almost 
as heavily condemned by the NCB, the Government, the opposition parties, 
many trade union leaders and also by the churches. Some ministers in pit 
villages went to great lengths to try to defuse potentially violent situations 
(see section 5.6) and many church leaders made pleas for reconciliation 
within mining communities. They also made some attempt to understand 
why such violence was occurring and also to point out that the vast 
amount of picketing was conducted peacefully (see sections 4.2, 4.3, 4.5 
and 5.4). However, over the issue of whether the strike was properly 
constituted the church authorities were reluctant to comment, though many 
church members muttered about the lack of a proper ballot. 
Another factor strengthening the resolve of some miners to continue 
working was the feeling that the NUM head office was serving only one 
part of the membership - the strikers - (Ottey, p96). Bottomore was one 
of the organisers of the May Day Rally in Mansfield which was an attempt 
to get the voice of working miners heard. Many also disliked Scargill and 
felt that he was "running the union for political ends" (Adeney and Lloyd, 
p261). 
It would, however, be wrong to assume that the miners who did not strike 
and those who organised the various working miners' groups were 
attempting to break their union or that they identified with the 
Thatcherite ideology. The Nottinghamshire Working Miners' Committee 
set down as one of its aims, "to reaffirm democracy within the NUM, but 
not to break it or replace it" (Adeney and Lloyd, p265). Many of the 
working miners resented the assumption that they supported the Coal 
Board's position" (Crick, p125) and even the new 'break-away' union, the 
Union of Democratic Mineworkers, "declared that it would remain loyal to 
the Labour Party and would wish to affiliate to the TUG" (Adeney and 
Lloyd, p276). 
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Within the coal industry the militancy of the miners varies from area to 
area, with Nottinghamshire being traditionally moderate. The geology of 
the coal-field contributes to the Notts attitude; "they've got better 
conditions, bigger seams, better strata, the lot." (Gibbon and Steyne, p47). 
This means that there have been fewer pit closures in the area and also 
that they receive much higher bonuses. Striking, therefore, means giving 
up more in order to achieve little which will be of direct personal benefit. 
There also seemed to be an air of realism in the area. A Bentinck miner 
explains why he voted against striking, "To my mind every colliery comes 
to the end of its days and everyone has been promised they'd be given a 
job if they wanted one or they could take redundancy with severance pay, 
so that was fair enough in my book" (Samuel et al., p82). Many of the 
miners were more than happy to take the "redundancy package which no 
other manual workers approached" (Adeney and Lloyd, p263) and either 
start a second career or enjoy their retirement. 
However, a further factor which could contribute to the reluctance to 
strike is the relationship between local management and miners. Dave 
Cliff (in Samuel et al., p86-92) has compared two adjoining pits in North 
Staffordshire; Hem Heath and Florence. "Their work-forces are drawn 
from the same catchment area; the Hem Heath workers enjoy better 
conditions and bonuses than their colleagues at Florence. Security of 
employment is far greater at Hem Heath, a local feeling that Florence 
may face closure in the next two or three years exists, and they both 
enjoy (or suffer) the same area leadership" (op. cit., p87). Hem Heath 
thus seems to be similar to the Nottinghamshire pits, whilst Florence 
resembles many in Yorkshire. However, it is Hem Heath which is the 
more militant of the two pits, with only 10 out of 600 voting against 
strike action and many Hem Heath pickets being arrested, whilst Florence 
worked almost normally throughout the strike. During the overtime ban 
management at Florence "agreed that if maintenance work needed to be 
carried out in normal working hours, then men who could not work on 
their normal jobs would be found alternative work" (Cliff in Samuel et al., 
p87), but at Hem Heath the management took the view that the situation 
was created by the men's refusal to work overtime and, therefore, refused 
to redeploy men. This hard-line attitude provoked bitterness and militancy 
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amongst the Hem Heath miners. 
Crick (p115) draws attention to the collieries of North Nottinghamshire 
which were opened during the 1920's. The owners of these mines 
"developed a special paternalistic relationship with the people they 
employed" (Crick, p115) and later, when miners were moved in from other 
areas, they "seem to have adopted the more conciliatory nature of the 
Notts men" (Crick, p117). 
Before the start of the strike, there were several local disputes going on 
in the Yorkshire Area. The dispute at Manvers Main had been provoked by 
management imposing minor changes in meal times which had been agreed 
with the union but on the understanding that they would be implemented 
once the overtime ban was lifted (Wilsher et al., p38). During the strike 
the hard-line attitude of management in the North Yorkshire area to the 
pit deputies contributed to decision of NACODS to threaten industrial 
action. 
Of course, it is easy to say that it is all the fault of management; it 
could well be that a militant workforce produces a less accommodating 
management, but the part played by management in shaping the attitudes 
of its workforce must not be underestimated. Both the Roman Catholic 
church (section 4.3.3) and the Church of England (section 4.3.2) stressed, 
during the course of the dispute, the need for a sense of partnership in 
industrial relations, underlain by mutual trust and respect. The church, 
particularly that at the local level, was concerned to minister to those 
who continued working throughout the dispute and those who returned early 
(section 5.6.3). 
3.4 The Perspective of the Government and the National Coal Board 
The term 'uneconomic pit' lay at the heart of the coal dispute and, 
certainly Government economic policy played a large part in the decision 
to make cutbacks in coal output and influenced the NCB's conduct during 
the dispute. Fine and Millar (p9) go so far as to claim that "the 
rationality of the Government and NCB case rested entirely on maximising 
the rate of profit in the mining industry." 
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During the Conservative Party's years of opposition (1974-9) "the terms of 
political debate were increasingly cast according to the agenda of the 
party's new right" (Schwarz, p53). This included a greater commitment 
to the free-market economy and monetarism, the privatisation of 
nationalised industries and a reduction in union powers. Mrs Thatcher 
spoke of making a radical break with the old post-war consensus, and 
placing a greater emphasis on the rights of the individual. Many church 
leaders were to criticise this shift in values (see particularly the Bishop of 
Durham's enthronement sermon, section 4.5 and also section 6.3). 
In order to make the coal industry attractive to potential shareholders it 
needed to become profitable and the power of the NUM needed to be 
considerably reduced. The inflicting of a major blow to the NUM was also 
politically desirable as revenge for their part in the downfall of the 
Conservatives in 1974. The book, 'Digging Deeper; Issues in the Miners' 
Strike' (edited by Huw Beynon), argues that in order to achieve their 
revenge the coal dispute was engineered by the Government, and this 
theory has been tagged the 'conspiracy theory'. The preparation for the 
strike is believed to have started shortly after the Conservatives lost the 
1974 election. 
The Conservatives were determined to learn from the mistakes of the past 
and a detailed report on the confrontations with the miners was drawn up 
(Beynon and McMylor, p34). It identified the potential power of well-
organised workers in key industries and the vulnerability of the state due 
to its dependence on electricity (Beynon and McMylor, p34-5) and so 
Nicholas Ridley developed a strategy to deal with this. This report (The 
Ridley Report), leaked to 'The Economist' ( 27.5.197 8), predicted trouble in 
the coal industry and advised a Thatcher Government to: -
"(a) build up coal stocks, particularly at the power stations; 
(b) make contingency plans for the import of coal; 
(c) encourage the recruitment of non-union drivers by haulage 
companies to help move coal where necessary; 
(d) introduce dual coal/oil firing in all power stations as quickly as 
possible." 
The report also argued that the greatest deterrent to any strike would be 
"to cut off the money supply to strikers and make the unions finance 
them", and advised that a large mobile squad of police be equipped and 
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prepared to uphold the law against violent picketing (Adeney and Lloyd, 
p73). It is the close similarity between this plan and the actions of the 
Conservatives, once in office, which led to the conclusion that the 1984-5 
coal dispute was Government provoked. 
The choice of Ian MacGregor as the new chairman of the NCB was a 
Government decision and MacGregor was in agreement with the 
Government's economic strategy in general and its implications for the 
coal industry. He was convinced that the industry needed to be slimmed 
down and to show a better return on capital. He believed that 
Government subsidies had delayed the essential change and he blamed the 
economic crisis of the early 1980's on Britain's failure to move from a 
labour-intensive to a capital-intensive society, with the high-cost of labour 
resulting in loss of markets. (MacGregor, p65-6). This implies that 
MacGregor would continue the introduction of high technology into the 
industry and would press for the closure of 'uneconomic' pits. 
In implementing this policy he was to come into conflict with the miners' 
unions, who since the nationalisation of the mines and, in particular, since 
the signing of the 197 4 Plan for Coal, regarded themselves as equal parties 
to the major decisions affecting the industry. MacGregor did not see the 
unions' negotiating position in this light. His comment, "I can't wait for 
the unions. I work for the Government" (Adeney and Lloyd, p84), made 
in February 1984 implied that he had already dismissed the meeting with 
the unions (scheduled for 6 March 1984) "as a waste of time, at least in 
terms of achieving what it was meant to - agreement on a joint approach" 
(Adeney and Lloyd, p84). In general, the new Chairman was regarded as 
having "a very considerable contempt for unions" (Lloyd, p15) and 
throughout the dispute he argued that management must have the right to 
manage. From his point of view this was the central issue and it meant 
that the NCB had to stand firm over the need to close what it termed 
'uneconomic pits'. 
However, not all of the NCB management were in agreement with 
MacGregor's approach. Many of the senior staff had worked their way up 
through the industry, had been members of the unions and some were 
members of BACMS (the British Association of Colliery Management). 
They accepted that, whilst they had a responsibility to drive a hard 
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bargain, the unions also had a right to be consulted; they were committed 
to obtaining negotiated settlements. To MacGregor's way of thinking it 
was an anathema for people who laid full claim to being representatives of 
'management' to "through their union, criticize that management" 
(MacGregor, p151) and it was symptomatic of a lot that was wrong with 
the coal industry. See section 3.2 for further discussion of the 
management's right to manage and sections 4.3.2 and 4.4 for church 
comment on this issue. 
One of the new Chairman's first moves was to appoint board members 
from outside the coal industry who "would be more in sympathy with the 
changes that had to be made" (MacGregor, p139). He also altered the 
decision-making structure at the top of the industry in a such a way as to 
prevent senior board officials from formally discussing issues between 
themselves (Adeney and Lloyd, p66). More power was seemingly given to 
the Area Directors since they were given greater spending powers but 
when it came to setting their budgets "they were to have more 
interference and more direction than they could remember" (Adeney and 
Lloyd, p68), and as personnel at Hobart House changed rapidly their 
impression was "that more of the decisions that mattered were being 
drawn into MacGregor's hands" (loc. cit.). 
Despite there being considerable tensions in the upper echelons of the Coal 
Board, even before the start of the strike, all were united in one thing: 
"that Scargill must not be allowed to win - ever" (Adeney and Lloyd, 
p67). The problem was how to stop him from winning. Ned Smith, the 
NCB director in industrial relations, advocated that the softly-softly 
approach be continued and for a time MacGregor stuck to that line. 
However, he agreed to the union's request to state "his intentions for the 
industry and individual pits" (Adeney and Lloyd, p68), since he believed 
that facts speak for themselves and, that in the face of them, the unions 
would have to accept the board's cutbacks. Others on the board felt that 
by naming uneconomic pits he was giving credence to Scargill's claim that 
the NCB had a hit-list of pits and it would give the NUM a perfect 
excuse to escalate their industrial action. However, MacGregor proceeded 
to uncover his plans on 6 March 1984 by which time strike action over the 
announcement of the closure of Cortonwood was gaining momentum. 
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Regarding 'the conspiracy theory', both the Government and the NCB 
have denied that there was any truth in it. Ned Smith, in his public 
lecture at the University of Durham (18.11.86), called it a 'mythology'. 
He attributed the large coal stocks to the 1979 oil crisis which, in the 
short-run, increased the demand for coal but then triggered a world 
economic slump, thus causing the demand for coal to fall. He claimed 
that the new chairman's assessment of the coal industry was that it was 
going in the right direction, that confrontation and conflict should be 
avoided and the market should be expanded. Also, the Government had 
agreed to a substantial improvement in the redundancy terms for miners 
with effect from 1st April 1984, and had sanctioned the NCB to offer the 
miners a 5.2% pay-award when it was encouraging the rest of the public 
sector to settle around 3-3.5%. Lastly, the Secretary of State for Energy, 
had issued an imperative during February 1984 stating that there should be 
an avoidance of flashpoints. These actions are hardly commensurate with 
a Government wanting to provoke the miners. 
If Smith and senior ministers who claim "that they knew nothing of the 
Cortonwood announcement until it became headline news" (Wilsher et al., 
p51) are to be believed, then it seems that the conspiracy theory is wrong 
in asserting that the Government deliberately provoked the start of the 
strike. However, there seems to have been little doubt that the 
Conservative Party had learnt from its mistakes in 1974 and the 
suggestions of the Ridley Plan had been acted upon. There was no need to 
appease the miners this time or call an election; the state could afford a 
fight until the finish. Furthermore defeat of the miners would very much 
strengthen the Government policy of eroding the rights of the trade unions 
as a whole. The NUM was one of the most powerful unions in the country 
and their defeat would signal to the trade union movement that it was 
now powerless to resist Government policy towards itself. Whether such 
behaviour by a Government is morally legitimate is questionable. To a 
Government attempting to replace the old consensus with the values of the 
new right it was merely a necessary step, but to those who supported the 
old consensus and were a party to it, and that included the churches, such 
behaviour was morally dubious. The Bishop of Durham, in particular, 
criticised the Government for its determination to beat the miners and 
many church leaders appealed to all parties to the dispute to negotiate 
with one another (section 4.5 and also section 6.3). 
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However, not only was the Government determined to win the strike but it 
had a strategy to deal with the conduct of a strike, and its strategy was 
that it hadn't a strategy! The events of 1974 had taught the Government 
that if it puts "itself forward as the negotiator of the first resort, (it) 
can too easily be seen as the villain of the piece" (Adeney and Lloyd, 
p203) so its line for the first few months was "that it was a matter 
entirely between the union and the board" (Adeney and Lloyd, p207). 
However, from mid-April daily briefings were held between the 
Departments of Employment, Energy and Transport, the Home Office and 
the NCB. This ensured that Peter Walker was kept up-to-date and he 
also maintained regular contact with MacGregor. The Cabinet, too, formed 
a committee comprising senior ministers, including the Prime Minister, 
which aimed to monitor the strike (Adeney and Lloyd, p208). 
The NCB's strategy is less clear. At times MacGregor seemed totally 
unprepared to move on the closure programme, but at others he seemed to 
be conceding much, including a higher pay offer, whilst ensuring that the 
small print gave the board sufficient lee-way to close what they regarded 
as uneconomic pits. He claimed that, "once agreement had been signed 
the board could proceed to close pits in the knowledge that a work-force 
on strike for upwards of two months would not be mobilisable again in the 
near future" (Adeney and Lloyd, p191). This tactic failed because Scargill 
understood it (Adeney and Lloyd, p192). 
By late-summer the Government had broken its silence and both it and the 
NCB were describing the strike as a battle between tyranny and freedom. 
This included the Prime Minister contrasting the Argentinian 'enemy 
without' with the NUM, 'the enemy within', which "was just as dangerous 
to liberty, and the country was witnessing an attack on democracy and the 
rule of law" (Adeney and Lloyd, p210) and MacGregor spoke out about the 
dangers of a society controlled by dedicated militants (Adeney and Lloyd, 
p192). Very few in the churches saw the coal dispute in such stark and 
dramatic terms. Many church leaders pointed out that miners, including 
many of those on picket duty, were law-abiding citizens, and drew 
attention to their feelings of powerlessness (see sections 4.3, 4.5 and 
5.6.1). 
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About this time Smith claims to have noticed a hardening in MacGregor's 
attitude. He felt that MacGregor no longer wanted a settlement but saw 
that there was an alternative way to end the dispute; to entice the miners 
back to work. Here he had the backing of several of the area directors. 
MacGregor believed that every time there was a hint that more 
negotiations might be starting the back to work momentum was lost, and 
he admits that he was prepared to let the pit-deputies strike (MacGregor, 
p280). However, when it seemed that the pit deputies would strike the 
Government started to put pressure on the NCB and Smith, who had by 
this time resigned as he felt he could no longer work under this new-style 
management, was brought back to settle the NACODS dispute. 
Once the threat of NACODS had died down, and the TUG had 
demonstrated that it could provide little support for the NUM, Smith felt 
that the Government's attitude also hardened (Smith, Lecture, 18,11.86). 
Given comments, such as that from Francis Pym, that "the final outcome 
of the strike will be a defeat for one side or the other ••• (and) ••• let us 
hope it is a defeat for Arthur Scargill" (Pym, 'The Times', 19.9.84, quoted 
in Schwarz, pSO), Smith's assessment does seem reasonable. 
Throughout the dispute relations between the NCB Chairman and his 
industrial relations chief were strained. In the early days of the strike 
Smith and his deputy, Kevan Hunt, had spoken against the board taking 
legal action against the NUM, arguing that it would be hard to keep the 
Nottinghamshire men working if the NUM was seen to be under direct 
attack (Adeney and Lloyd, p181). Now, Smith strongly disagreed with 
MacGregor's attempts to by-pass the unions by writing directly to the 
workforce, by advertising in the tabloid press, and by bussing men across 
picket lines into work. Smith believed that it was imperative that the 
board should "do nothing which would interfere with their ability to 
manage the industry afterwards" (Adeney and Lloyd, p187) and some local 
managers agreed. But MacGregor had little time for established customs 
and practices; "he had come to break the mould, and was looking for a 
way to win the strike now" (Adeney and Lloyd, p187). 
MacGregor refers to the closing stages of the dispute as "laying the final 
trap" (MacGregor, p341-363). His aim was, that with the assistance of 
the TUG, a document seen to fair could be produced. If Scargill accepted 
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it, the strike would be over, but MacGregor's personal view was "that in 
the end Scargill would refuse to agree" (MacGregor, p347). This would 
leave the miners totally isolated and Scargill exposed as "a Marxist 
Revolutionary - going under the guise of a normal trade union official" 
(MacGregor, p13). It is all too easy, after the event, to say that this was 
the strategy. Whether it was consciously devised by MacGregor, or 
thought up after the events happened, we do not know. We do know that 
the miners returned without a settlement and the board felt that it had 
now established its right to manage, as subsequent pit closures have 
proved. 
Underlying all the arguments, the tensions and the comings and goings at 
Hobart House, there was the clash of two different ideologies. Ned Smith 
represented the party which believed that the final outcome must be a 
negotiated settlement. This view does not see management's right to 
manage as being absolute. Smith maintains that people should be managed 
by respect and that management must be credible. He goes further to 
assert that "people have a right, preferably a legal right, to be consulted 
in their industry" (Smith, Lecture, 18.11.86). Smith's approach stands in 
the tradition of the right of workers to form trade unions and to take 
collective action in order to press for the remedying of a grievance. This 
approach stands in the tradition of the post-war consensus. Throughout 
chapter 4 are instances of how the church's view of the situation very 
much accorded with that of Smith, and this issue is further taken up in 
section 6.3. 
MacGregor takes a different approach. He sees workers as having rights, 
but stresses the right of the individual to work over against the right of 
the collective to strike. Throughout the strike he justified the enormous 
lengths to which the board and the police went to get individual miners 
across picket lines on the grounds of upholding 'the right to work'. In 
MacGregor's reasoning a new interpretation of 'the right to work' 
emerges. Traditionally, it "is envisaged as consisting of the right to 
employment at a fair wage under favourable conditions and a means of 
securing social and economic justice" (Danby, p378) and the right to strike 
goes hand-in-hand with this right. MacGregor, however, uses 'right to 
work' to refer to the 'right to go to work'. It refers more to freedom of 
movement than to actual work. This understanding of the 'right to work' 
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corresponds with that used in the Conservative Party manifesto of 1979; 
"We shall also make any further changes that are necessary so that a 
citizen's right to work and go about his or her lawful business free from 
obstruction or intimidation is guaranteed" (Danby, p378). The 'right to 
work' so interpreted actually means the right to cross a picket-line and 
the right to have protection whilst crossing a picket line. It thus means 
'the right to strike-break'; a right which totally undermines collective 
action by members of a trade-union and has implications far beyond the 
coalfields. Whilst the church did not spell out this new interpretation of 
the right to work it did question the use of both legal might and physical 
force to control picketing (chapter 4 and section 5.6.2). 
Despite their attempts to maintain a non-interventionist stance the 
Government was heavily involved in the strike. Although it took little 
part in the actual negotiations it had appointed an NCB Chairman who was 
committed to Government policy and it had created the atmosphere which 
allowed the dispute to run so long. The dispute cost the CEGB and BR 
heavily in extra costs for oil and lost freight charges and "private 
employers would, if placed in the position of BR or the CEGB, have 
pressed the NCB to settle. As state industries with their losses covered, 
they have been able to combine in an attempt to break the strike" 
(Beynon and McMylor, p39). 
Further evidence of Government involvement during the strike comes from 
Lord Denning who has claimed that the decision not to use the civil law, 
but the police, to control the picketing was a "'high policy decision' 
(which) had been taken in the Cabinet Office" (Scraton, p256). Lloyd 
(p31) claims that the Government restrained BSC from using the 
Employment Law to control picketing at Ravenscraig and pressure from a 
similar quarter stopped the NCB from proceeding with an injunction 
obtained against the NUM. 
The covert hand of the Government in the dispute has been deduced from 
the heavy involvement of David Hart in the Working Miners' Committee of 
Nottinghamshire. Hart "has in the past established himself as an unofficial 
advisor to the Prime Minister" (Schwarz, p61) and by October 1984 was 
MacGregor's closest advisor and had written to MacGregor stating "It was 
not in the national interest for a settlement to be reached, because any 
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agreement could only be secured by the NCB - and therefore the nation -
surrendering to Scargill" (Adeney and Lloyd, p211). 
It was not until near Christmas that the Government actually got involved 
in the negotiations. Their desire for a settlement to be reached was 
made clear to Bill Keys, the general secretary of Sogat 82 and member 
of the TUG negotiating team, and he agreed that a formula short of total 
capitulation should be found (Adeney and Lloyd, p213). However, in the 
end the document agreed by the TUG and the NCB, and approved by the 
Government, was rejected by the NUM who, then, had little choice but to 
heed the demands of their members for a return to work. 
Given the Government's commitment to monetarism, the privatisation of 
nationalised industries and reducing union power, a defeat of the NUM 
was very much in its interests. Throughout the strike the Government 
backed 'the manger's right to manage' and interpreted the miners' 
resistance as a threat to the state. In agreeing the 1984 budget for the 
coal industry, which meant a non-negotiable 20,000 reduction in jobs, the 
Government implied that it no longer regarded the Plan for Coal as being 
binding on either itself or the Coal Board (Scraton, p253). The pursuit of 
pit-closures in 1984, in contrast to the withdrawal of similar proposals in 
1981, was not due to an increased moral legitimacy in the policy, but 
because job-shedding had become accepted as common-sense and the unions 
had lost their power to resist (Samuel, p330). 
Non-intervention is not neutrality. Whether or not the Government 
engineered the start of the strike, it did take full advantage of all the 
opportunities which the dispute presented in order to achieve its objectives. 
"The Chancellor was correct when he said ••• that it was 'a worthwhile 
investment' for the Conservative Party, and for free market principles, 
there could have been few better" (Adeney and Lloyd, p202). Given its 
terms of reference of promoting new right policies at the expense of the 
post-war consensus, the Government achieved its aims. However, there 
are those, including senior managers in the coal industry and many church 
leaders, who question the morality of the Government's understanding of 
free-market principles, the right to work and the right to manage. 
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3.5 The Policing of the Miners' Dispute 
Under the British legal system it is Parliament which makes the law and it 
is the job of the courts and the police to ensure that it is upheld. 
However, it is rarely the case that only one law pertains to one particular 
situation. During the coal dispute little use was made of the 1980 and 
1982 Employment Acts to control the picketing by civil law, for fear of 
antagonising other unions. It was left to the police and the courts to do 
so, using the more widesweeping laws such as preventing a breach of the 
peace. This resulted in many thousands of miners being charged with 
criminal offences, police resources being heavily stretched and the courts 
overworked, as well as provoking many criticisms of police tactics and 
behaviour. 
In England and Wales there are 43 independent Police Forces and each has 
a Police Authority behind it. The chief constable has 'direction and 
control' of his force, whilst the police authority is responsible for 
maintaining an 'adequate and efficient' force which includes financing it 
(Spencer, p35-6). It was the financing of the police operation in the coal 
dispute which caused considerable tensions between individual police forces 
and their police authorities and also between different forces. 
Although each force is independent and geographically distinct there are 
procedures for mutual aid between forces (Kettle, p28). Following the 
1980 steel strike and the riots in the St. Paul's area of Bristol, which both 
revealed inadequacies in the mutual aid system, the Police Support Unit 
(PSU) system was enhanced, so that in 1983-4 there existed "some 13,500 
police in 416 PSU's" (Kettle, p30) and during the course of the coal 
dispute up to 8,000 PSU officers were deployed in coalfields outside their 
own area. 
The responsibility for the deployment of PSU's lies with the National 
Reporting Centre (NRC) which in turn is responsible to the Association of 
Chief Police Officers ( ACPO) and, especially, the Association's President 
(Kettle, p24). The NRC "is not a permanent centre, but is only 
1 activated' when its controllers judge that police forces in more than one 
area are likely to require reinforcements, on a mutual aid basis, to deal 
with major public order events" (Kettle, p23). During the coal dispute the 
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NRC was put into 'monitoring phase' on 13th March 1983 and a few days 
later went into 'full activation' (Kettle, p25). It is the existence of the 
NRC which has raised fears that the British policing system is no longer a 
local organisation but a national one, "seemingly under the direction of a 
tightly knit group of politically motivated chief constables, controlled by 
Whitehall and the Conservative Government" (Kettle, p23). The Kent and 
CroydGn Industrial Chaplains' Team represented a small church voice raising 
the question of "the unprecedented movement of police from one part of 
the country to another, centrally co-ordinated, (which) brings the prospect 
of a national police-force, nearer" and whether the police were "keeping 
order and upholding the law impartially, or whether they are in danger of 
moving towards being used directly to serve the interests of the 
Government of the day." (See section 4.2 for further comment on the 
Kent and CroydQn Industrial Chaplains' Team). 
The setting up of road blocks by the police also contributed to the sense 
that local policing had been replaced by national policing. Road blocks 
were particularly used to prevent flying pickets entering Nottinghamshire. 
The 1972 Road Traffic Act gives a uniformed officer the power to stop 
vehicles, but not to conduct random searches, or to prevent vehicles and 
their occupants continuing their journey, except where an offence has been 
committed. However, "the Public Order Act 1936 establishes the authority 
of a police officer to intervene 'when a breach of the peace occurs or is 
imminent •• '" (East and Thomas, p63) and this was used to justify the road 
blocks, even though many were a long way from collieries and their 
legality in preventing an imminent breach of the peace questionable. At 
some road blocks police dragged drivers out of their cars and then 
proceeded to smash windscreens and door panels (Samuel et al., p219). 
Another source of inter-force tension was over police behaviour. Where 
several forces work together the operational control remains with the home 
force, for instance, "South Yorkshire police have always maintained that 
their officers were in charge of other forces assisting them" (Anon, 
3.12.84). However, this is contradicted by situations such as occurred on 
22nd August 1984 in Armthorpe, South Yorkshire where there was a heavy 
police presence and much violence when several miners returned to work. 
The NUM secretary tells of a South Yorkshire police inspector agreeing 
that an ambulance be sent for injured pickets, but this decision was 
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overturned by a senior officer from the aiding Manchester force (Anon, 
3.12.84) 
There have also been complaints of police brutality, some of the strongest 
resulting from incidents at Grimethorpe where, on 12th October 1984, 
police with dogs confronted villagers who were riddling coal on the local 
coal stack. "Men, women and children are punched, kicked and 
arrested •••• many of them are left bleeding and bruised" (Samuel et al., 
p120). Four days later there was a similar incident on the tip, and again 
the next day, but this last time the villagers did not run a way. Fighting 
broke out and later in the day the police-station was stoned. That 
evening "600 riot police were running amok in the village, clubbing anyone 
within arm's reach" Ooc. cit.). And the effect on the village? "The 
brutality of the riot police drafted in from Southern counties has left deep 
scars on the minds of the people of this village, and an inheritance of 
hatred and mistrust of the local police. This hatred will take until long 
after this strike is over to heal - not months, but generations" (Samuel et 
al., p121). 
Again, police behaviour on the picket-lines also left much to be desired 
(section 5.6.1). "Prior to the strike, the large majority of pickets felt 
that the police worked with a law that was generally fair,... During it not 
only did they lose confidence in how justice was dispensed by legal 
institutions, but they came to see the law itself as something made up by 
the police as they went along" (Gibbon a Steyne, p96). It was not so 
much the violence as the arbitrary character of police behaviour which 
upset the pickets. "We've been arrested for, stepping on the pavement, 
stepping off the pavement, walking on the grass, sitting on the 
wall •• !t Gibbon a Steyne, p96). Some pickets noticed a recurrent pattern 
that when the police were outnumbered they were friendly and talkative 
but when reinforcements arrived the atmosphere changed. "They marched 
us down the lanes, walking on the back of our legs, kicking us, shoving us" 
(Gibbon a Steyne, p97). The stories of police provoking pickets by waving 
£10 notes at them are too numerous for some not to be true and, 
similarly, the tales of obscene language used to women who came to 
support the pickets. 
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Such actions by the police led to the feeling amongst the mining 
communities that the police were far from impartial upholders of the law, 
rather they too sided with those trying to defeat the miners. There was 
considerable concern amongst the clergy about police behaviour with many 
clergy in mining villages spending time on picket-lines trying to foster 
good relationships and understanding between pickets and the police (see 
sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2), and acting as independent monitors of police 
behaviour (see section 5.6.2). At times this meant that clergy were on 
the receiving end of police violence. Senior church leaders condemned 
violent acts by police as well as those committed by pickets e.g. see 
remarks made by the Bishop of Manchester (section 4.5). 
As the strike moved into its final phases police neutrality was further 
questioned. With the armoured buses hurtling through the pit entrance, 
waved on by the police, pickets were denied the opportunity to put their 
case to the returning men. This added to the feeling that the police were 
party to those who wished the NUM to be defeated. 
Many of those who were arrested went on to experience treatment which 
was legally dubious. "In Nottinghamshire prisoners were frequently 
photographed without permission and without any explanation of their right 
(before the Police and Criminal Evidence Act became law) to refuse this; 
sometimes this was done forcibly" (Field, p210) In the early days of the 
strike miners were herded into the dock at Mansfield Magistrates' Court in 
groups of twelve and often, very vague allegations, without specifying the 
actual behaviour of the defendants, were made by the presenting officer. 
(Christian, p124). This impression of 'supermarket justice' was furthered 
by the use of pro-forma slips detailing bail conditions which were stapled 
to bail sheets before the magistrates gave their decision! (Christian, 
p127). This procedure of trying people in groups with blanket accusations 
only contributed to the sense that a particular group of people was being 
victimised. 
To be fair to the police, for much of the dispute, their behaviour was 
without fault and many individual officers were having to work very long 
hours, often some distance from home. Their private life was considerably 
disrupted, as one officer said, "Blow the money ••• ! have been away from 
home for ten weeks now and during that time my wife has given birth to 
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our first child and I have yet to see my daughter 11 (Barrodale, p5). Some 
clergy were very aware of this and encouraged the pickets to try to 
understand what the strike meant to the police (see section 5.6.2). 
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CHAPTER 4 
National and Regional Church Responses 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines how the church responded to the coal dispute 
through its national and regional decision-making bodies, through its church 
leaders, through the various boards and committees for social responsibility 
and industrial matters, through the corporate work of industrial chaplains 
and through the church press. 
In building up a picture of such responses a systematic study has been 
made of church reactions to the dispute as covered by the 'The Times' 
(arguably the pre-eminent national newspaper) and one newspaper 
representing the Anglican Church ('Church Times'), the Roman Catholic 
Church ('The Tablet') and the free churches ('Methodist Recorder'). The 
Board for Social Responsibility of the Church of England produced various 
briefing papers which have proved to be useful summaries, and several 
people have made available copies of letters and other documents which 
deal with this matter. Discussions have also been held with the Coal 
Chaplain to the North East Coalfield and 
Industrial Mission. 
4.2 Church attempts to establish the truth 
members of the Sheffield 
In most strikes it is often very difficult for onlookers, and even for those 
directly involved, to build up an accurate picture of the situation and to 
put it into some sort of perspective. It has already been noted (section 
2.4) that many of the reports in the secular media were subject to heavy 
bias. Several groups of people, therefore, felt it worthwhile to produce 
briefing papers which gave a succinct background to the dispute and raised 
questions dealing with the wider dimensions of the strike. 
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The Northumbrian Industrial Mission (NIM) was one of the first groups to 
do this with the production of an Information Sheet in April 1984. This 
was updated at various points throughout the dispute. It identified the 
initial issues of the dispute and gave a summary of the NUM 'S attitude 
and the NCB's attitude to them, including areas of agreement. As time 
went on sections on the hardship caused by the dispute and attitudes to it 
were added or amended, but right from the first sheet some personal 
opinions and questions were included. The following month the Kent and 
Croydon Industrial Chaplains' Team published a short paper entitled 'Some 
of the issues behind the miners' strike', raising questions and issues for 
discussion and prayer. This included sections on unemployment, the lack of 
a ballot, violence and the role of the police. It also suggested that 
justice, compassion and the common good should govern the Christian 
response to social and industrial conflict. 
In November 1984, Paul Skirrow of the Leeds Industrial Mission, published a 
briefing paper entitled 'The Miners' Strike - Fact and Fiction'. This gave 
a concise summary of the events in the coal industry leading up to the 
dispute, carefully analysed the factors which cause a pit to be described as 
uneconomic and traced the political context of the dispute. The paper was 
"intended to enable a deepening of debate and concern within the 
churches." Another set of papers which were designed to help Christians 
to wrestle with the many issues raised by the strike were produced by the 
Work and Society Committee of Quaker Social Responsibility and Education 
( QSRE), entitled 'The Coal Dispute 1984-5 '. Representation to the QSRE 
General Purposes Committee had been made in late 1984 about the 
possibility of running a day conference to enable members of the Society 
of Friends to discuss the implications of the coal dispute. This conference 
was held in Sheffield on 5th January 1985 and one of its byproducts was 
this set of papers. They included background notes about energy supplies 
in Britain, a consideration of the social and historical factors relating to 
the mining community, extracts from NCB and NUM documents and the 
Sheffield Policewatch report 'Taking Liberties'. Also enclosed were a 
report of the conference, a list of relief funds and copies of press releases 
and letters concerning church initiatives to end the strike. This package 
was the most wide-ranging set of papers designed to initiate discussion 
and thought amongst church members which was produced by any church 
body. 
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The Industrial and Economic Affairs Committee of the Church of England 
General Synod's Board for Social Responsibility produced various sets of 
papers throughout the dispute. The first, working paper 17, 'The Church 
and the Miners' Strike: a briefing paper' (Brett), published in October 
1984, contained three papers which had been written between June and 
October and gave updates on church involvement in the dispute, with some 
assessment of that involvement, as well as touching on some of the issues 
raised by the dispute and an examination of ways forward. The second 
published group of papers came out in February 1985 (Working paper 18: 
The mining dispute and the churches: Christian Responses and Initiatives 
(Beales)). By this time many church leaders and church bodies had spoken 
out about the dispute and various initiatives had been made to bring about 
a settlement, so these papers were mainly a summary of such events. In 
between the publication of these two sets of working papers another 
briefing paper was made available by the Industrial and Economic Affairs 
Committee. This paper was prepared for the Archbishops of Canterbury 
and York and other senior church leaders following a meeting chaired by 
the Bishop of Lincoln (the Rt. Revd. Simon Phipps, also chairman of the 
Industrial Committee) at which were present several industrial chaplains, 
clergy from mining areas and lay people whose work meant they were in 
some way involved with the dispute. Some of the material about church 
initiatives was published in working paper 18, but this paper also included 
a 'General Briefing paper' covering various issues raised by the dispute and 
some theological reflections, and the Chairman's comments which were 
divided into areas of immediate, local concern and areas of long-term, 
economic and political assessment and their moral and spiritual implications 
(Beales and Phipps). 
The church press did much to balance the picture of the dispute as 
portrayed by much of the secular press (see section 2.4), and to probe 
some of the underlying issues. The 'Methodist Recorder', in particular, 
produced many features which studied the effect of the strike in various 
areas of the country and reported the views of different people. For 
instance, on 25.10.84 the 'Methodist Recorder' carried a report from the 
coalfields which included an interview with a former financial secretary of 
the Yorkshire NUM, an NUM national executive member for the South 
Midlands area and three chaplains to pits, including one who served both 
working and striking pits. The following month wives of miners in Kent 
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were interviewed (Singleton) and in December the director of the Selby 
coalfield put his view on modern technology in the mines and the future of 
the mining industry (Anon, 1984u)). The situations in South Wales 
(Weetman, 1985a) and North East England (Weetman, 1985c) were surveyed 
and the working miners in the Mansfield area were also given their say 
(Weetman, 1985b). Most of the people interviewed had some Methodist 
connection and many spoke about the role of the church and church 
members in the dispute. Most of these features brought home the fact 
that many of the people who were caught up in the dispute were ordinary 
folk, rather than Marxist militants, no-good blacklegs, ruthless managers 
and the like, as some of the more sensationalist television and press 
images portrayed. 
To a lesser extent the 'Church Times' probed beneath the 'two-sided' 
confrontation. Its articles included a reporter's visit to several pit villages 
in Nottinghamshire (Burley) and a discussion of the moral issues behind the 
strike (Brown). Such coverage in 'The Tablet' was somewhat scanty and 
tended to be descriptive rather than analytical. Also editorials in 'The 
Tablet' were rarely able to refer to Scargill without adding some comment 
about his 'marxist views' (eg. 'The Tablet,' 7.4.84 and 30.6.84). 
4.3 What the official church bodies said. 
4.3.1 The Methodist Church 
The Methodist Conference, the supreme decision making body of the 
Methodist Church, meeting as it does in June/July of each year, was in 
1984 urged to debate some of the issues of the coal dispute. The matter 
was brought to the attention of the Conference by the Rev d. Denis 
Gardiner, the Superintendent of the Barnsley Circuit, Sheffield district 
(Anon, 1984c) who proposed a motion, which after considerable amendment 
received a massive majority vote. The amended motion read: -
"Conference deeply regretted that the dispute in the coal industry 
remained unresolved. Noting 
a) the continuing need for secure supplies of energy from coal for 
the foreseeable future; 
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b) the damage caused to the common weal of the nation including 
many mining communities by the present dispute; 
c) the destruction of community life when pits are closed where no 
concrete plans are being put forward by Government or National 
Coal Board to provide new sources of employment; 
d) the appalling level of violence which has arisen; and 
e) the dangers and the cost of increasing dependence on nuclear 
energy; 
[Conference] urged the NUM and NCB to resume meaningful discussions in 
order to seek to resolve the dispute, urged the Government to exercise 
authority in order that the well-being of all our people may be more 
urgently sought, and directed that the text of this resolution be sent to 
the NUM, the NCB, and the Secretary of State for Energy" (Anon, 1984e). 
During the course of the debate Gardiner expressed his horror at the 
scenes of violence shown on the television, especially as he recognised 
some of the faces as men whose marriages he had conducted or families 
of babies he had baptised. Generally, Barnsley is not a particularly violent 
area, and "it was necessary to overcome immediate reactions to scenes of 
violence in order to understand the reason for such anger and frustration 
being expressed in that way" (Anon, 1984c). The major fears of the 
striking miners were for their jobs and their communities. The NCB's 
argument about uneconomic pits was treated with considerable suspicion 
since the "Uneconomic pits of 1964 became the economic pits of 1974 and 
then the uneconomic pits of 1984" (lac. cit.). 
Terence Hyde, the seconder of the motion and an employee of the NCB, 
asked the Conference to deplore the violence and look at the matter in 
the light of reconciliation. "We are not here to bash the NUM, we are 
not here to bash the NCB, we are not here to bash the Government, but 
all have responsibility" (lac. cit.). 
Another speaker, the Revd. Anthony Kinch, referred to the lack of jobs in 
the Wolverhampton region because of the steady demolition of most of the 
industrial base. He had seen the stress caused to individuals by not 
knowing whether they or their families would work again. He felt that 
"unless the Government took the necessary steps, there would be vast 
areas of the country where there was no proper work and no fulfilling 
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vision of life for the people" (lac. cit.). A chaplain in the Durham 
coalfield, the Rev d. Barry Morley, urged that the NCB be made to 
recognise some responsibility for providing work when they moved out. 
However, the Rev d. Peter Stephens, expressed concern about seemingly 
endless subsidies and felt that the miners' cause should not be reduced to 
one of one group fighting for its own corner against the rest of the 
community (lac. cit.). 
4.3.2 The Church of England 
The General Synod of the Church of England, which meets three times 
each year, also touched on the coal dispute during the course of its July 
1984 session, though there was no formal debate on the subject. This was 
very much regretted by Mr Cranfield who pointed out that "many 
thousands of laymen and clergy of all denominations are intimately 
affected by the cause, effect and future consequences of what can only be 
described as a terrible blight on the nation" (C. of E., General Synod, 
1984a, p390-1). He implored that opportunity be made to debate the 
miners' strike, with specific reference to public order and the 
Government's role, in the light of recent violence. The Archdeacon of 
West Ham replied to Cranfield's request by pointing out that the Synod's 
agenda is arranged sometime beforehand and if time is set aside then, the 
matter could well be resolved by the time of the meeting leaving a hole 
in the agenda. The Archdeacon added that "as events have shown, this 
would have been the worst possible time to have a debate here" (op. cit., 
p396). He gave no explanation for this judgement but presumably it was 
because the NCB and NUM were engaged in negotiations at that very time 
( Wilsher et al., p135). The validity of this argument and the 
responsibility the General Synod has of debating such issues of national 
importance will be considered further in section 6.3. 
The only other person to speak out about the coal dispute during this 
session of Synod was Mr Pogmore who had been a deputy area director for 
the NCB from 1967-74 (Anon, 1984d). He praised the work of industrial 
chaplains and clergy in the colliery villages who had done much to win the 
respect of both sides, but hoped the Standing Committee would not do 
anything other than pray for the successful conclusion to the current 
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negotiations (C. of E., General Synod, 1984a, p394). 
However, the July negotiations did not bring about a resolution to the coal 
dispute and by the time the General Synod met again in November many 
miners were still on strike. Again, no formal debate on the dispute was 
scheduled, but the Synod was due to debate 'Perspectives on Economics 1, a 
report commissioned by the Industrial and Economic Affairs Committee of 
the General Synod Board for Social Responsibility, and it was during the 
course of this debate that many references to, and concerns about the 
dispute were made. This debate, and the report itself, represent a major 
statement by the Church of England on the nature of the British economy 
and the place of industrial relations within it. 
The report, 'Perspectives on Economics', was formally received and then a 
motion, affirming certain views expressed within it, was carried. "These 
were that: -
Economic values were not self-justifying but needed to be set in the 
larger context of human values. 
Short-term and narrowly-conceived economic policies concerned with 
immediate sectional interest were "dangerously inadequate." 
The whole community shared a responsibility for meeting the basic 
needs of each of its members while each accepted their responsibility 
for contributing to the common good." 
The report was commended "for study and response by the Church 
Com missioners, the Central Board of Finance, dioceses and beyond" (Anon, 
1984o). 
Acknowledging that Christian theology can produce no one answer about 
how the church and the world should relate to one another, the report 
prefers the Kingdom of God model which sees human nature still in the 
making and therefore human needs include the need of redemption and a 
place in God's kingdom. Thus Jesus' teaching about God's kingdom, 
together with his own example, provide us with an ultimate criterion for 
assessing the variety of natural and biblical norms (C. of E., GS, BSR, 
Industrial and Economic Affairs Committee, p17). Peter Baelz, chairman 
of the report's Working Group and (then) Dean of Durham, finds that H. 
R. Niebuhr's model of transformation (in 'Christ and Culture') does 
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greatest justice to the Gospel (op. cit., p18). This model recognises that 
whilst the pattern and form of the Kingdom of God as can be deduced 
from the gospels can never be embodied in this world because of sin and 
lack of human understanding, it does provide a critique of secular life and 
a challenge to transform it into something more in keeping with the 
Kingdom of God. At times this may mean support of the secular 
authorities but at others it may bring us into tension and even conflict 
with them (op. cit., p17-8). The model also makes clear that the 
Christian Gospel cannot be divorced from the economic and political life of 
a nation, but neither can it be translated into a political ideology or an 
economic programme (op. cit., p21). 
The section which analyses business enterprises points out that the three 
ingredients vital to any enterprise are capital, workers' skills and 
organising ability (op. cit., p41). It notes the positive side of greater 
participation by employees in decision making processes and suspects that 
improved human relations may provide a key to improved business 
performances (op. cit., p48). See section 3.3 of this work for discussion 
of this in the coal industry. 
Chapter 6 of the report calls for trade unions to take a wider perspective 
than the immediate needs of their members. They should be willing to 
consider not just the redistribution of income and resources, but the nature 
of work itself. Since the mid-1960's long term agreements between 
employers and unions have tended to be replaced by short-run agreements 
on pay and conditions. Such agreements militate against worker 
participation in forward-planning for the enterprise, and the Continental 
system of industrial relations, involving a greater sharing of control over 
longer-term development, as well as allowing improvements in labour skills 
and education, is felt to be a better model. Such a system would involve 
a major shift in union responsibility, organisation and function as well as 
challenging the more authoritarian styles of management (op. cit., p54-55). 
Canon Boulton referred to these points during the Synod debate, and 
added flesh to the argument, by pointing out that the Plan for Coal had 
"achieved a real collaboration of government, Coal Board and unions in 
planning the coal industry" and enabling the closure of over 300 pits 
through negotiation and consultation. However, the recent introduction of 
"an alien, harsher, old-fashioned authoritarian" regime had not only upset 
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the NU M but also completely shattered the industrial relations policy of 
the NCB. "Thus, out of a just and participatory system of industrial 
relations, which enabled pits to be closed by negotiation ••• we now have a 
confrontational type of industrial relations, where the right of management 
to manage is regarded as so vital that the police forces of the whole 
country must be organised to make sure that it works" (C. of E., General 
Synod, 1984b, plOll). The Bishop of Lincoln had, earlier in the debate, 
touched on the right of management to manage suggesting that 
management had no such right, rather it had a duty to manage and this 
involved maintaining clear channels of communication with the workforce 
(op. cit., p995). 
'Perspectives on Economics' also criticised state intervention in the 
economy for being too concerned with short-term balancing of resources 
and demand, and wants this to be replaced by a longer-term view-point, 
which takes special account of the essential requirements of renewed 
economic development and a structural response to change, and calls for a 
participatory structuring of society which gives a voice to the 'have nots' 
as well as to the 'haves' (C. of E., GS, BSR, Industrial and Economic 
Affairs Committee, p69). 
This criticism of short-term polices is highlighted in the second of the 
Synod's affirmations of the report. The precise wording of this 
affirmation comes from the final chapter of the report (p72) in which 
Baelz draws together many of the themes of the report and puts them into 
a Christian context. He takes up again the model of the Kingdom of God, 
and whilst acknowledging that the values and dynamic of the kingdom 
cannot be directly translated into economic polices and programmes, feels 
they do point us in the direction of a society which is 'just, participatory 
and sustainable'; 'just' in the sense that it works to reduce inequalities, 
'participatory' in that it encourages individuals to accept responsibility 
both for their own lives and the ordering of society, 'sustainable' in that 
it creates wealth for the present and preserves resources for the future 
(op. cit., p76-7). 
The synod debate, in its third affirmation referring to the common good, 
draws attention to the 'participatory factor.' What it made no attempt to 
do was to take the 'just, participatory, sustainable' model and compare it 
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with the events behind the coal dispute, and from this moral basis make a 
critique of the dispute. No doubt Synod, particularly within the context 
of that particular debate, felt that this was well beyond its brief, but such 
an omission shows up the gap, the existence of which the report admits, 
"that needs to be bridged between Christian insight on the one hand and 
economic problems and practical decisions on the other" (op. cit., p2). 
In the final chapter the response of the churches to the coal dispute will 
be analysed in the light of the model of a society which is aiming towards 
justice, participation and sustainability. This analysis will illustrate one 
way in which the gap between Christian insight and economic problems, 
and practical decisions can begin to be bridged (section 6.2). 
During the February 1985 Synod session there was no reference made to 
the dispute which, by this time, was clearly in its final stages with many 
miners back at work. However, during the July 1985 session the annual 
report for the Board for Social Responsibility was presented and this 
mentioned the three briefing papers the Board had produced relating to the 
dispute in the mining industry (C. of E., GS, BSR, 1984, p12). 
4.3.3 The Roman Catholic Church 
Unlike the Methodist and the Anglican churches, the Roman Catholic 
Church has no national forum which includes both clergy and laity. 
However, twice a year there is a conference of all the bishops in England 
and Wales. The coal dispute did not feature in their conference of May 
1984 but in November 1984 it was top of the agenda, and the 42 bishops 
"discussed the strike in the context of the whole subject of industrial 
relations, although there had been some concern among the bishops before 
the meeting not to submerge the issue of the coal strike in generalities" 
(Anon, 1984p). As a result of their discussion, the bishops published a 
public statement about the dispute, the full text of which was printed in 
'The Tablet', 17.11.84, p1156 (Anon, 1984q). 
The statement registered concern at the violent nature of the dispute and 
the effect the dispute was having on the whole community (point 1). It 
further noted that in the months prior to the dispute there had been an 
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increasing tendency for industrial action to spill over into violence whilst 
the available means of reconciliation and settlement were neglected (point 
2). Generally, the established processes of consultation, which lie at the 
heart of industrial relations, were felt to be under severe strain. The 
bishops underlined the fact that true partnership requires mutual trust, 
with the rights and dignities of others being respected (point 3). They 
also thought that in order to achieve a just settlement, which restored the 
confidence needed for future industrial harmony, there could be no 
substitute for negotiation; in particular resort to the law and penal 
sanctions were felt to be of limited value (point 4). 
The bishops' statement placed the coal dispute within the context of ever-
advancing technology which had led to job-losses in many industries. This, 
in turn, had put an increasing strain on industrial relations; those facing 
redundancy and long-term unemployment had become increasingly 
determined to protect their jobs. The statement emphasised that no one 
industry or geographical region was felt to be able to solve this problem 
on its own (point 5). 
In considering the effect of the coal dispute on the country, the bishops 
noted that the atmosphere of instability and violence which prevailed was 
gravely damaging to the morale of the country and was putting many 
family bonds under threat (point 6). They went on to assert that the 
socio-economic good of a country must have adequate regard for moral 
values;, including the dignity of human labour, good housing, education and 
social services. Furthermore, industrial relations should take account of 
moral principles concerning the human person and the legitimate demands 
of the moral good of society (point 7). They felt that the protracted 
nature of the dispute was causing economic loss which, in turn, affected 
both the national well-being and the ability to give aid to poorer 
countries. In addition, it was damaging police and community relations 
and causing hardship and division amongst the pit communities (point 8). 
The bitterness within the mining villages was exacerbated by the stalemate 
in negotiations towards a settlement (point 9). "As pastors charged with 
responsibility before God in the work of reconciliation", the bishops 
believed that it was their right and duty to urge all involved in "this 
tragic dispute" to seek a swift return to the negotiating table as well as 
to call on all men and women of good will to pray earnestly that a just 
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and lasting settlement would be found and that a spirit of forgiveness 
would heal the divisions and distress that had been caused (point 10). 
This statement proved to be the only one which the Roman Catholic 
Church issued at national level as the dispute ended before the bishops met 
again. Points 3, 4, 7 and 10 show the bishops to be advocating industrial 
relations based on consensus. Sections 3.2 and 3.4 consider how consensual 
industrial relations were being challenged by the Government and the NCB. 
4.3.4 The British Council of Churches 
Almost immediately after the Roman Catholic Bishops met, the British 
Council of Churches (BCC) held its 21st Assembly. In his opening address 
the General Secretary, Dr. Philip Morgan, praised leaders for speaking out 
on political issues and in particular commended the recent talks between 
church leaders and representatives of the NUM (Anon, 1984t). 
Towards the end of the assembly the debate on the state of the nation 
developed into a discussion on the rights and wrongs of the dispute. The 
Bishop of Doncaster (the Rt. Revd. William Persson) was anxious to correct 
the impression the media often gave of the striking miners. "These men 
are not manipulative, sinister Marxists, the enemy within or anything else. 
The average striking miner is a decent, honest and caring man" (loc. cit.). 
David Bleakley pointed out that trade unions are part of the fabric of the 
nation; and if that fabric is damaged, so too is the state of the nation. 
He went on to liken Mr Scargill and Mr MacGregor to two blind Samsons 
at the pillars on which the stability of society depends, and felt that the 
Church must be clearly identified with this dilemma (loc. cit.). Bernard 
Thorogood argued that the strike could only be resolved in the context of 
the fuel policy of the nation (loc. cit.). 
At the end of the debate a motion was passed, on the Chairman's casting 
vote, which "urged the Government, politicians of all parties, those 
engaged in industrial relations and the BCC 's member churches to 
encourage patterns of reconciliation" (lac. cit.). 
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Although members of the BCC met with and wrote to both union and coal 
board leaders on various occasions, this was the only debated official 
statement that was made. 
4.4 The Network of Coal Chaplains 
The coalfields of Britain are well served by chaplains, whether they be 
full-time Industrial Chaplains or local parochial clergy who have a link 
with the nearby pit. The majority of the chaplains are Anglican but they 
usually work interdenominationally. The Chaplains all did valuable work at 
local level but also, through their National Network, were able to act 
collectively. 
Concern about pit closures and the coal chaplains' response to them was 
expressed by the Revd. Stephen Kendal, Secretary to the Network, in a 
letter to members of the Network in November 1983, four months prior to 
the commencement of the strike. The closure of pits had been discussed 
at their previous meeting and he was concerned that they should attempt 
to develop a theological response to the closures as well as regretting 
their closure and "putting forward an ambulance service for community 
response to a closure" (Kendal, 1983). 
During the overtime ban preceding the strike some of the chaplains met 
and instituted a study into facts surrounding pit closures (Kendal, 1985b, 
p29). However, this was soon overtaken by the start of the strike. The 
chaplains met again and sent letters to Scargill (NUM), MacGregor (NCB) 
and Walker (Department of Energy) "saying that it was going to take 
goodwill on everyone's part to end the dispute and suggesting that the 
chaplains were always available to help in any way we could" (Kendal, 
1985b, p30). Further letters were sent to the NUM and NCB leaders 
asking them to make a conciliatory gesture, and meet to end the dispute. 
Replies were received from all parties but the chaplains' suggestions were 
not acted upon. 
In June the Network met again, with an agenda of hearing each other's 
accounts of their local situation, assessing the dispute and its impact, and 
considering whether to take further action. As they were about to begin 
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they were contacted by the Archbishop of York, asking them for a brief on 
what might be done to find a solution. With this revised agenda the group 
went on to suggest that the Archbishop convene an ecumenical group to 
meet with Scargill, MacGregor and possibly Mrs Thatcher. The aim of any 
such church initiative should be threefold: -
1. 11 to put before all parties the churches' concern for the industry 
which belongs to all. 
2. to mobilise strength for the mining communities where suffering is 
growing and will continue to do so. 
3. to say something of our concern for the future 11 (National 
Network, 1984a). 
The chaplains wanted to stress that negotiations needed to be as speedy as 
possible both on humanitarian grounds and in the national interest and that 
the task of church negotiators was to listen and make certain points but 
not to become embroiled in details about economics, the violence being 
committed or plans and negotiations to end the dispute (loc. cit.). In an 
unpublished draft statement the Network 11 called on Churches, among other 
things, to help in a welfare capacity 11 , on the parties to 11 speed up 
negotiations 11 and on miners to 11 refrain from violent actions 11 (Brett, pll). 
The following week negotiations between the NU M and NCB recommenced 
and so the Archbishop did not need to act on the Network's advice. 
Kendal feels that he would not have done so in any case, as his response 
to the Network's briefing was that 11 it did not give him anything new 
which he could take to meetings or to end the dispute 11 (Kendal, 1985b, 
p30). Kendal goes on to comment that the coal chaplains had no 
experience of dealing in a dispute as political as this, nor were they used 
to addressing themselves to the national church. Because of this they 
made some fundamental mistakes, the most important of which 11 was to 
believe that Church leaders, at national level, would take any notice of us 
unless we came up with views of the political scene which accorded with 
their own 11 (loc. cit.). This point will be picked up in section 6.4. 
However, the papers which the June Network meeting produced were used 
by the Bishop of Birmingham in his address to Diocesan Synod and were 
used by the Church of England's Industrial and Economic Affairs 
Committee (loc. cit.). 
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The next meeting of the Coal Chaplains was not until November 1984, by 
which time various sets of negotiations had taken place and broken down. 
Prior to this meeting some of the Chaplains met with MacGregor at the 
NCB's headquarters. There they received a lecture on the economics of 
coal and were given the impression that MacGregor felt powerless in 
solving the dispute. "His powerlessness was founded in his total economic 
view of the industry: unless prices were right nothing else could be done" 
(National Network, 1984b). The only role he saw for the church was after 
the dispute, though he had been clearly hurt by the national statements 
made by the church (lac. cit.). 
This meeting with MacGregor was discussed at the Network meeting. A 
similar meeting with Scargill had been hoped for, but he was unwilling to 
meet until after the dispute was over. The Network decided to issue a 
press statement including the plea for a negotiated settlement to the 
current dispute. The drift back to work was felt to be in no one's long 
term interest as it would further divide the workforce and would do lasting 
damage to industrial relations. "As the Churches' official representatives 
in the industry we appeal to the NCB and the NUM to return immediately 
to the negotiating table and that the Government should do all within its 
power to bring this about" (Kendal, 1985b, Appendix 4). However, in 
England, the press release received very little coverage, although it did so 
in Scotland. The Network meeting also expressed concern that they had 
been neither consulted about nor informed of meetings between church 
leaders of various denominations and the leaders in the dispute, and they 
wrote to the Bishop of Lincoln to this effect (National Network, 1984c). 
The next meeting of the Network was scheduled for early March but in 
the interim several of the coal chaplains met with Douglas Bate, an 
Industrial Chaplain in South Wales, to learn more about ecumenically based 
initiatives taken by the Welsh churches to bring the dispute to a 
negotiated settlement (see further section 4.6 • 
Even after the dispute had come to end, it continued to dominate Network 
meetings. At the May 1985 conference David Holmes, Doncaster Area 
Industrial Relations Officer spoke about the problems and opportunities in 
his area and four Sheffield clergy, all based in pit villages, spoke about 
the effect the dispute had on their communities (National Network, 1985b). 
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Throughout the dispute the Network, 11 at all times worked with the desire 
to end the dispute to the benefit of all within the industry The 
sympathies of the chaplains lay with the miners, the industry and the 
principles of consensus 11 (Kendal, 1985b, p32). The existence of the 
Network enabled the chaplains to keep one another informed of their local 
situation and to offer one another support, and from this they were able 
to pass on their knowledge and understanding to the wider church. 
However, the work of the Network was hampered by practical factors such 
as lack of money to enable the chaplains to meet together more 
frequently. Some of the chaplains also felt that the wider church did not 
take them seriously and this was partly due to the individualistic nature of 
the church's theology (Kendal, 1985a). Perhaps a telling factor of the low 
regard with which industrial chaplaincy is held within the Church of 
England is that, unlike the universities and armed services, there are no 
reserved seats in General Synod for those working within industry. 
The work of industrial chaplains and their relationship with the wider 
church will be considered further in section 6.3. It will be suggested in 
the final conclusions (section 6.5) that industrial chaplains are both under-
resourced and under-valued by the church as a whole. 
4.5 Church leaders speak out 
11 1 have always believed that there is a time to speak out and a time to 
be silent, 11 said the Bishop of Southwell (the Rt. Revd. John Wakeling) in 
the House of Lords on 13 November 1984, in his contribution to the debate 
on Economic and Industrial Affairs (House of Lords, 1984, p257). His 
speech dealt primarily with matters relating to the coal dispute, and in it 
he touched on issues on which many church leaders had spoken out, 
including the hardship and pain within the pit communities, the conduct of 
the strike and its political undercurrents, as well as the wider issues of 
unemployment and economic policies. 
Many church leaders felt this dilemma of when to speak out and when to 
keep silent during the course of the dispute. The Revd. Gordon Barritt, 
the President of the Methodist Conference, in particular, was very wary of 
making public statements which, he felt, could easily aggravate the 
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situation (Weetman, 1984d). The Bishop of Southwell, in his speech in the 
House of Lords, minimised the importance of pronouncements by bishops, 
emphasising more the pastoral role of the clergy of all denominations who 
worked in the strike-torn areas. 
However, many church leaders found that there were many occasions when 
not to have made public reference to the coal dispute would have been 
singularly inappropriate. The Bishop of Southwell, himself could hardly 
have ignored the strike when preaching at the annual service for miners 
in Southwell Cathedral on 6th May 1984. Nor, when being enthroned as 
Bishop of Durham (21st September 1984) could the Rt. Revd. David Jenkins 
have omitted reference to the dispute in a diocese which has had a long 
history of coal mining. Funerals, such as that of David Wilkie, the taxi 
driver killed as he took a miner to work in South Wales, attracted much 
media attention. Again the preacher, the Bishop of Llandaff (the Rt. 
Revd. John Poole-Hughes), was virtually obliged to speak of the wider 
circumstances surrounding this tragedy, especially the need for the spirit of 
reconciliation and forgiveness (Poole-Hughes, p2). 
Other senior clergy felt it was their pastoral duty to visit the areas of 
tension and hardship, and comments made during the course of their visits 
became public knowledge. Some made the most of regularly scheduled 
occasions to refer to the dispute, for instance the Bishop of Birmingham 
(the Rt. Revd. Hugh Montefiore) did so in his presidential addresses to the 
Birmingham Diocesan Synod in both June and October of 1984. One or 
two used the pages of the national and local newspapers to press their 
understanding of the salient features of the dispute and to speak out on 
behalf of the people for whom they had pastoral and spiritual 
responsibility. 
Whatever method was used, there was a considerable amount of uniformity 
(even monotony) in what those in leadership positions in the churches said. 
The predominant theme was that there should be reconciliation between 
the various parties and that a settlement be negotiated as quickly as 
possible. A typical comment of this nature comes from the Bishops of 
Southwell, Derby (the Rt. Revd. Cyril Bowles) and Sheffield (the Rt. Revd. 
David Lunn) in a letter to 'The Times' (24.5.84). "While we do not have 
the knowledge to judge the technical details of policies, nevertheless we 
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urge on management and unions, her Majesty's Government and other key 
political leaders the need to enter now into a process of conciliation aimed 
at finding a just and speedy solution for the sake of all who are affected 
by this dispute". 
The Archbishop of Canterbury (the Most Revd. Robert Runcie) pointed out 
the need for reconciliation on various occasions. The text he was given to 
preach on in Derby Cathedral on 15th September 1984 was "Now in Christ 
Jesus you who once were far off have been brought near in the blood of 
Christ. For He is our peace, who has made us one, and has broken down 
the wall of hostility" (Ephesians, 2.13f). The Archbishop went on to say 
"I appeal to every Christian involved in the mining industry, whether 
directly or indirectly, whether in management, or union or among the 
rank-and-file, to work together to consider how a new spirit of peace-
making, how a willingness to go the extra mile can begin to work its way 
into our angry and divided communities, and draw the poison of bitter 
words" (Runcie, p9). But the Archbishop was well aware that 
reconciliation was no easy task: "Reconciliation is not papering over 
cracks, it is a costly business, and it is not believing that there shouldn't 
be conflict. I think Christians should not be people who are too crisis 
ridden; they should go on believing in the actual possibilities of 
reconciliation even when things are at their worse" (Longley a Runcie). 
Within this major theme of the need for reconciliation three sub-themes 
can be identified which were regular causes for comment: 
- the effect of the dispute on the pit communities, 
- the conduct of the dispute, 
- the implications of the dispute for the nation. 
From early on in the dispute many church leaders voiced their concern 
about the effect that pit closures would have on the mining communities. 
In their letter to 'The Times' (24.5.84) the bishops of Southwell, Derby 
and Sheffield drew attention to the divisions within families and 
communities which were being created by the dispute, as well as the 
hardship being endured. 
In an address to his Diocesan Synod in June 1984, the Bishop of 
Manchester (the Rt. Rev d. Stanley Booth Clibborn) pointed out the distress 
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being caused to all caught up in the dispute, as well as criticising the 
pickets for their use of violence and intimidation and expressing concern 
that the police seemed to be using more than minimum force. He also 
stated that too much intransigence had been shown by both sides and felt 
that too little had been done to bring them together (Anon, 1984b). 
The Bishop of Birmingham, in the same month, asked his Diocesan Synod 
how they would feel if local major employers such as Lucas, GKN and 
British Leyland were all threatened with permanent closure. He gave the 
answer, "It would be the end of our world - and that is how many miners 
feel about their own threatened closures" ( Montefiore, p2-3). He pointed 
out that despite the violent scenes, many miners were decent, hard-
working people. He felt the strike should be ended quickly on the grounds 
of stewardship for mines were becoming dangerous due to lack of 
maintenance and this could force early closure upon them (op. cit., p3). 
All this built up the case for reconciliation, but, before reconciliation was 
a possibility, both sides needed to answer some questions. The NCB 
needed to make clear at what point it regarded it justifiable to close a 
pit: for instance, when coal is 1 t times more expensive than the average, 
or 2 or 3 times? Also, it needed to clarify what help it proposed to give 
to the communities affected. The NUM, too, needed to modify the 
impression that it was demanding what amounted to an unlimited subsidy 
to keep open all pits which were not exhausted or dangerous (op. cit., pS). 
Both the Bishop of Birmingham (Montefiore, p6) and the Bishop of Durham 
(Jenkins, pS) expressed concern about talk of victory by either side, and 
also saw the need for the NUM and the NCB to climb down from their 
absolute demands. The bishops referred to the part the wider society had 
to play and pointed out the political dimensions of the strike. David 
Jenkins was particularly critical of the Government, not just because they 
appeared to be "determined to beat the miners" but because "they also 
seem to be indifferent to poverty and powerlessness. Their financial 
measures consistently improve the lot of the already better off while 
worsening that of the badly off" (Jenkins, pS). The Archbishop of 
Canterbury echoed these sentiments a few days later; "We live in a society 
in which the majority are better off, but nevertheless there is growing 
poverty and despair and a sense of powerlessness" (Longley 6 Runcie). He 
also criticised the shift from consensus to confrontation as a way of 
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ordering society, and spoke of the sense of powerlessness that those faced 
with poverty and long-term unemployment felt. The Bishop of Birmingham 
made a similar analysis of the situation in his October Diocesan Synod 
address saying that an underlying reason for the dispute was fear; "a fear 
of becoming powerless in a land where those in power don't seem to care" 
and he felt that the fear for the future would not be allayed "if this 
Government insists on continuing the politics of confrontation" (Anon, 
1984i). 
The coal dispute had raised urgent questions about the ordering of society 
and it needed to be understood and resolved in the light of these. The 
Bishop of Birmingham had no doubt that it was the duty of the Church to 
draw attention to these deeper issues, and so he called for a national 
debate about the real nature of work, as against gainful employment (lac. 
cit. ) . Another major issue that was tied in with the immediate dispute 
was the need for a national energy policy which covered, not only coal but 
also gas, oil and nuclear power, and the Council of Churches in Wales 
called for this on several occasions. 
For the most part the church leaders took up a major strand in the 
arguments of the NUM: that they were victims of monetarist economic 
policies, that Government was not doing as much as it could to alleviate 
unemployment, that social costs should be given more weight in the 
decision to close pits. As the Archbishop of York (the Most Revd. John 
Habgood) wrote, in a letter to Durham miners, "I believe that we owe it 
to future generations not to close pits before they are properly worked 
out, just as we owe it to the present generation not to destroy jobs until 
there is an overwhelming case for doing so. I am fully aware of the 
serious consequences which might follow the premature closing of pits" 
(Anon, 1984a). 
Although there was considerable unanimity in what church leaders said 
during the course of the strike, there were some lone voices making rather 
different comments. Whilst most senior clergy were careful, in their 
condemnation of the violence, not to apportion blame solely to one group 
of people, the Bishop of Peterborough (the Rt. Revd. William Westwood) 
was not so cautious. He "came in on the side of the Government, with 
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praise for the way if faced mob violence like that seen 'in Nazi Germany 
during the 1930's'" (Anon, 1984j). There were, too, questions asked of 
church leaders for speaking out on behalf of the pit communities. Why 
were the bishops silent when the mill towns of Lancashire were similarly 
affected in the 1960's and the steel-towns in the 1970's? Will those 
opposing heavy redundancies in the future have similar episcopal support, 
wondered a writer to the 'Church Times' (Weatherhead). Another author 
wrote to 'The Times' accusing the church leaders of "publicly 
encourage(ing) a crusade led by a bunch of undemocratic rebels who 
condone civil disobedience" and advising them to keep well clear of 
politics (Smithers). Whether church leaders should speak up in 
circumstances such as prevailed during the course of the pit dispute will 
be considered in section 6.3. 
4.6 Church attempts to bring about a negotiated settlement 
As we have seen above, throughout the course of the dispute there was a 
consistent call from church leaders and industrial chaplains of almost all 
denominations to the parties embroiled to sit round the table and negotiate 
a settlement. In the early months these calls were made either verbally, 
at public gatherings, or in letters to the leaders of the NUM and the NCB 
and the Secretary of State for Energy. As the months passed the 
frequency of these calls increased and were supplemented with meetings 
between church leaders and representatives of various parties to the 
dispute. 
One of the earliest of these meetings came in August 1984 when the 
Bishop of Birmingham met with the Energy Secretary and also wrote to 
Neil Kinnock and Len Murray, offering the Church's help 'in any way' 
towards resolving the dispute (Brett, p12). During the summer months 
several senior ministers were keen to have some direct contact with local 
people caught up with the dispute, partly to keep themselves informed but 
also to show a willingness to make more direct intervention if this were 
felt to be helpful. To this end, the Archbishop of York had discussions 
with the leader of the Yorkshire miners, and the Bishop of Sheffield visited 
the pickets at Cortonwood Colliery as well as meeting the Secretary of the 
N U M along with other church leaders . 
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On 31 August 1984 the President and Secretary of the Baptist Union (the 
Revd. Frank Cooke and the Revd. Bernard Green) wrote an open letter to 
the NUM and the NCB urging the parties "to get together and stay there 
until you have come to some mu tually acceptable agreement on all issues 
under a trusted chair man" (Anon, 1984g). The Baptist Union President 
later added that he had not asked leaders from other denominations to join 
in their approach because that could result in something like an 
Archbishop's Com mission, which did little other than haggle over wording 
(loc. cit.). 
The Bishop of Durh a m 's enthronement sermon, 21 September 1984, which 
spoke of the need for "a negotiated settlement which is a compromise" 
(Jenkins, p5) resulted in a correspondence between t he Secretary of State 
for Energy and the Bishop in which the Bishop suggested a 'cooling-off' 
period and resump tio n of all possible negotiations. Some felt that the 
sermon revitalised the stale ma te and hastened the beginning of new talks 
between the NCB and NUM (Kendal, 1985b, p33). 
The followin g month sa w MacGregor meeting with the Network of Coal 
Chaplains and also with the President of the Methodist Conference, the 
Revd. Gordon Barritt (Weetman, 1984b). Prior to this, the Methodist 
Division for Social Responsibility had set up a group to advise the 
President of Conference about t he strike, and the President had issued a 
statement which spoke of the need for Church leaders to avoid further 
controversy and be involved in working towards reconciliation (Wee tman, 
1984a). 
The Methodist President also met wi th miners and t heir families in South 
Yorkshire and pledged to pass on their view about the dispute to 
MacGregor ( Weetman, 1984b). Al t hough MacGregor made clear that he 
was prepared to negotiate only with Scargill, he welcomed a further 
meeting with Barritt and members of his ' Me thodist thi nk tank' and some 
miners ( Weet man, 1984c). Scargill refused to meet with Barritt on the 
grounds of a full diary, but the Methodist President did manage to have 
discussions with Pe ter Walker (loc. cit.) and later bot h NUM President and 
Vice-President were able to find time to meet the Me thodist leader. 
Barritt's ai m in meeting these people was to listen to as many sides as 
possible and to act as a possible bridge-builder. However, he felt that 
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church leaders should be very cautious in making public statements 
(Weetman, 1984d). 
Meanwhile, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Liverpool (the Most Revd . 
Derek Warlock), the Archbishop of York (the Most Revd. John Habgood), 
the Bishop of Lincoln (the R t. Revd. Simon Phipps) and the General 
Secretary of the United Reformed Church (the Revd. Bernard 
Thoroughgood) met with Arthur Scargill and Peter Heathfield on 21 
November 1984. As the meeting was being set up, the Secretary of the 
NUM commented, "Initially, the important thing is to establish contact" 
(Anon, 1984r). The meeting was arranged at the request of the NUM, 
after negotiations with the Coal Board had broken down again, and was an 
off the record conversation about the dispute in general terms. The main 
concern of the church leaders was to listen to the NU M leaders in order 
to understand their case, as well as to see if there might be grounds for 
the resumption of negotiations (Anon, 1984s). The previous day the Bishop 
of Manchester met the general secretary of the Lancashire NU M (Sid 
Vincent) for a briefing about the possibility of further negotiations (lac. 
cit. ). Despite all these talks the NUM and NCB were not persuaded to 
resume negotiations. 
Early in December some church leaders in Scotland visited the coal fields 
and met with representatives of the union and the coal board. Afterwards 
they expressed "their sadness at the impasse in the dispute, and the 
unwillingness of either side to move towards the other" (Beales, p6). They 
went on to suggest that there be a cooling-off period of at least three 
months in which work was resumed and the Government, the NCB and the 
NUM plan together the long term future shape of the industry, with no 
one tied to former plans or entrenched positions. If any one of these 
three bodies found the progress to be unsatisfactory then an all-party 
committee of MP's should work on a way out of the impasse (Beales, p6). 
Meanwhile, Welsh church leaders were coming to similar conclusions. 
Preaching at the funeral of the taxi driver, killed whilst taking a miner 
into work, the Bishop of Llandaff mooted the possibility of the agreement 
of some sort of moratorium which allowed for "an immediate return to 
work without prejudice to tactical gains so far achieved, such as they are. 
Then an impartial board might be set up to look at the wider issues 
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involved in an energy policy for the whole country and how to use our 
national asset of coal to the best advantage, bearing in mind the human 
elements and the welfare of those people who are dependent on the 
industry" (Poole-Hughes, page 1-2). This was followed by a letter, on 20 
December, from ten We lsh church leaders to the Prime Minister, the 
Energy Secretary, the other political parties and the NCB and NUM . The 
Prime Minister was urged to set up an Independent Review Body which 
would examine the future of the coal industry in the context of a long-
term energy policy, taking into account the needs of the coal industry and 
its customers, and also analyse the issues of development, unemployment 
and the nature of community. Before putting pen to paper, the Annual 
Meeting of the Council of Churches for Wales (13 October 1984) had 
passed a resolution concerning the mining industry in Wa les which called 
for a debate about energy policy and also for 'total costing' which 
included social as well as economic costs. In taking this further the Welsh 
churches had held confidential meetings with the NCB and NUM in South 
Wales and had produced a statement which claimed six areas on which the 
union and the board were agreed. These areas included community and 
managerial factors as well as the conviction by both parties of the 
necessity of a negotiated settlement, and belief that it was possible 
(Beales, p6-7). 
The letter to the Prime Minister was followed by a press statement on 16 
January 1985 which again called for the establishment of an Independent 
Review Body and added that the closure programme should be suspended 
until the body had presented its report. However, at a mee ting between 
the Welsh ministers and the Energy Secretary on 23 January, Peter Walker 
rejected their proposal outright, though he welcomed their visit and 
accepted their pastoral role and concern (Beales, p7). Not deterred, the 
Welsh delegation met with national NUM and NCB representatives, 
separately, at the end of January. The NUM national executive endorsed 
the Welsh churches' proposals, including the Independent Review Body, and 
this led to further discussions with the NUM and NCB, though only in the 
South Wales area, rather than at national level (Beales, p8). Commenting 
afterwards on these attempts at mediation by the Welsh churches, Stephen 
Kendal applauded the a mount of consultation they did (Kendal, 1985b, p31) 
and added that their initiative "gave both sides the chance to approach the 
problem from a different angle without jeopardising their stated cases. 
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Unfortunately the initiative seemed to founder at Government level, after 
receiving favourable responses from many others in a position to know if 
the proposals had any life in them" (op. cit., p32). The Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Cardiff (the Most Revd. John Ward), one of the clergy 
involved, at the time said that "the church was seeking reconciliation and 
not just meddling in politics. He saw himself as being able to give a 
voice to Wales, which, he felt, had been neglected by the national 
Government" (Anon, 1985c). 
The British Council of Churches (BCC) similarly thought that an 
Independent Review Body should be established and, following their 
executive meeting at which they welcomed the proposals by the Scottish 
and Welsh churches, the Moderator of the Executive Committee wrote to 
Peter Walker calling for "the setting-up of regional working parties to 
detail the economics of the industry pit by pit, including data on direct 
mining costs, research costs, closure costs, overhead national costs, 
investment needed and all other cost factors...... At the same time, the 
Department of Energy to set up an Independent All-Party Review Body to 
examine the future of the industry in the context of a national energy 
policy taking in gas, oil and nuclear power" (Kendal, 1985b, Apendix 6C). 
This letter led to a meeting between delegates from BCC and Peter Walker 
at which the delegates received assurances that the Government was 
committed to a negotiated settlement, however the suggestion that an 
Independent Review Body be established was again rejected (Anon, 1985b 
and Anon, 1985d). 
The Church and Nation Committee of the Church of Scotland, the Justice 
and Peace Com mission of the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland and the 
Scottish Churches' Council, together, were also urging the Energy Secretary 
to use his "good offices, at this critical stage of the dispute, to show that 
magnaminity which will pave the way to a negotiated settlement between 
the Board and the Union". This plea was contained in a letter to Peter 
Walker on 24 January 1985 (Beales, p9). 
This was followed by an ecumenical appeal issued by church leaders in 
England, Scotland and Wales, on 1 February. It read: -
"We regret the failure to reach a negotiated settlement of the 
damaging coal dispute. 
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The issue now is not for support for one side or the other but the 
urgent need for negotiations to be resumed immediately (sic). It is 
surely not the nature of the process of consultation to require 
decisions by any one party before the process begins. 
While the agenda for such negotiations must clearly include the 
central issue of economic policy in the mining industry, we believe 
that neither party should seek to impose its own interpretations in 
advance of negotiation" (Beales, p9-10). 
However, no negotiations took place, and by early March the NUM had 
decided to abandon the strike and their members returned to work without 
an agreement. All the church leaders could now do was to "issue a plea 
for reconciliation and magnaminity on all sides" (Anon, 1985e), a plea 
made by the BCC, individual bishops and church leaders and local clergy. 
4.7 Financial help for those suffering in the dispute. 
As will be shown in Chapter 5, many local churches and small groups of 
people set about providing help for those in hardship because of the coal 
dispute. Their help included the provision of food parcels and vouchers, 
the establishment of food kitchens and the giving of presents at Christmas. 
Most of the church aid for those not working was organised at the local 
level but there were some national schemes and national organisations 
which took some initiatives in this area. Both the Church of England 
Children's Society and the Methodist Relief Fund sparked off a storm of 
controversy when they started to make funds available to the families of 
miners suffering great hardship. 
It was early in June 1984 when the Revd. Brian Duckworth wrote to the 
'Methodist Recorder' on behalf of the Methodist Relief Fund, which is 
administered by the Division of Social Responsibility ( DSR) of the 
Methodist Church. He stated that the fund had received requests for 
grants to assist miners and their families suffering hardship. He went on 
to invite donations, designated for use in this way, from individuals and 
from Methodist churches (Duckworth, 1984a) and made clear that "It is 
not proposed at present to make any grants from the general, undesignated 
resources of the fund." 
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In August it became known that the Children's Society had given grants of 
£500 to each of four dioceses in the Church in Wales and around £4,500 to 
extend the work of a family centre in Maltby, South Yorkshire (Halsall). 
The money had come from a sum of £10,000 which the society had "ear-
marked for distribution for the benefit of 'children and families in need"' 
(Anon, 1984h). The need had been identified by clergy working within 
mining communities, who had approached their bishops for help and the 
bishops in turn had approached the society (Stone). 
The actions of both these organisations provoked a storm of protest. A 
typical comment was that of Mary Seymour, "The NUM have called their 
miners to strike. They pay strikers to picket which ends in violence. It 
is that organisation which should be helping their members' children, not 
voluntary organisations using money raised by the hard work of ordinary 
people". John Probert objected to the Methodist appeal for funds on the 
grounds that, "The miners have brought this suffering upon themselves, 
unlike those poor souls in the Third World who are trapped by poverty." 
The giving of money to miners' families was interpreted as a political act 
which charities had no right to make. 
There were others, however, who felt that the Methodist Relief Fund had 
not gone far enough. Alan Powers asks, "Isn't it time that we put our 
money directly from Methodist Relief Fund into the miners' food stores so 
that we show our solidarity with them?". For Powers and others the 
action of the DSR was not political enough; after all, the Methodist 
Conference had committed itself to a Mission alongside the Poor, so why 
was generous provision not being made for those being oppressed or about 
to be oppressed? (Slack). 
Brian Duckworth replied to his critics by explaining the background to the 
DSR 's decision to invite donations specifically earmarked for miners' 
families. He argued that the basic criterion in allocating money from the 
Methodist Relief Fund can only be need. The DSR, however, had 
recognised that the dispute has aroused deeply divided opinion and had felt 
that to make a grant from the general fund would alienate many 
supporters, but they also felt that they could not ignore requests for help 
with pressing local needs. They thus opted to offer the fund as an 
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administrative channel for those who wished to help relieve the need 
(Duckworth, 1984b). 
The Children's Society, whose chairman Peter Bottom ley is a Conservative 
M.P., quickly issued a statement distancing the Society's action from 
active support of striking miners. "We are aware through our existing 
work with children and families that at the present time the children of 
some miners are suffering actual hardship... The Society takes no view 
either way on the rights and wrongs of the strike but we are concerned 
for the children suffering as a result. Money is entrusted to us to help 
children in any kind of need and so, alongside helping many thousands of 
other children, we are trying to make some small contribution to help 
miners' children at this time.... We do not see miners' children as a 
special group. It is simply that at present they need help as do the 
children of the long-term unemployed or of single parents or broken homes 
and the children who are severely handicapped, emotionally damaged or 
drifting into crime" (Children's Society). It was also made clear that none 
of the money had gone to miners' lodges to be distributed only to families 
of striking miners, but to clergy who know of particular cases of hardship, 
not all of whom are miners (Anon, 1984f). 
Other hardship funds organised at national level, with varying degrees of 
church support, aroused much less criticism. They included the fund set 
up by the Christian Organisations for Social, Political and Economic Change 
(COSPEC), launched in October 1984 after talks to resolve the dispute had 
once more broken down (Anon, 19841) and after hearing about the plight of 
mining families, particularly in Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire and Kent (Anon, 
1984k). Church leaders who agreed to sponsor the fund included the 
Methodist Chairman of the Liverpool District (the Revd. Norwyn Denny), 
the Methodist Chairman of the Birmingham District (the Revd. Chris 
Hughes Smith), the Bishop of Durham and the Moderator of the URC of 
the West Midlands (the Revd. Fred Kaan) (lac. cit.) but the Bishop of 
Sheffield refused to, not because such schemes were not welcome, but that 
there was a limit to the number of schemes with which one could be 
personally associated (Anon, 19841). COSPEC raised money by asking 
Christians to make a personal commitment of £1 per week (waged) or SOp 
(unwaged) (Anon, 1984k) and by mid-December they reported that they 
had raised over £3,000 (Anon, 1984v). 
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A second scheme was the TUC Miners' Hardship Fund, established early in 
November 1984, and which included amongst its trustees the Anglican 
Bishop of Liverpool (the Rt. Revd. David Sheppard), the Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Liverpool (the Most Revd . Derek Warlock) and the Moderator 
of the Free Church Federal Council (the Revd. Howard Williams). The 
two Bishops issued a joint statement stressing that this fund was separate 
from the mineworkers' fighting fund and their agreement to be trustees 
did not mean that they were taking sides, rather they "wished to act as 
reconcilers to ease the bitterness. No lasting solution could be achieved 
by one party being ground down or by mere surrender by one side" (Anon, 
1984n). The Bishop of Liverpool added "If people talk of a creeping return 
to work because of despair, that is a prescription for bitterness for a long 
time into the future . The Church •• • has a very real contact with mining 
communities, and the churches really do understand something of how 
import ant reconciliation is going to be. 
human distress" (Anon, 1984m). 
4.8 References 
Anon. (1984a) 
We should attend to need and 
The Miners 1 Dispute: Archbishop supports efforts to save pits. 
The Times 12 April. 
Anon. (1984b) 
Miners 1 Strike: bishop 1 s concern. 
Church Times 8 June. 
Anon. (1984c) 
Damage to Common Weal of Nation 
Methodist Recorder 12 July. 
Anon. (1984d) 
Clergy Response to Miners 1 Strike. 
Church Times 13 July. 
Anon. (1984e) 
Coal Dispute. 
Methodist Recorder 2 August. 
Anon . (19840 
Society not 1 taking sides'· 
Church Times 17 August. 
Anon . (1984g) 
Baptist Leaders plea to both sides in Coal Dispute. 
Church Times 31 August. 
84 
Anon. (1984h) 
Society defends its Grants for Miners' Children. 
Church Times 21 September. 
Anon. (1984i) 
Coal Strike: Church voice grows louder. 
Church Times 12 October. 
Anon. (1984j) 
Vigorous Reactions continue. 
Church Times 12 October. 
Anon. (1984k) 
Fund for Families of Striking Miners. 
Methodist Recorder 18 October. 
Anon. (19841) 
Aid Scheme for Miners' Families. 
Church Times 19 October. 
Anon. (1984m) 
Churchmen Trustees of Miners' Fund. 
Church Times 9 Nove mber. 
Anon. (1984n) 
Archbishop backs Miners' Hardship Fund. 
The Tablet 10 Nove mber. 
Anon. (1984o) 
Synod Members attack Government policies in key debate . 
Church Times 16 November. 
Anon. (1984p) 
Home News: Bishops focus on Social Issues. 
The Tablet 17 November. 
Anon. (1984q) 
Bishops speak on Miners' Strike. 
The Tablet 17 November. 
Anon. (1984r) 
Bishops will meet NU M despite Gum mer sermon. 
The Times 19 November. 
Anon. (1984s) 
Churchmen meet NUM Leaders. 
Church Times 23 November. 
Anon. (1984t) 
Speaking Out on Miners' Strike. 
Church Times 7 December. 
Anon. (1984u) 
Selby Boss: way ahead for pits. 
Meth odist Recorder 13 December. 
85 
Anon. (1984v) 
Church Aid for Miners' Families. 
Church Times 21 December. 
Anon. (1985a) 
Another Pit Strike Initiative. 
Church Times 18 January. 
Anon. (1985b) 
Churches in more Coal Talks. 
Church Times 25 January. 
Anon. (1985c) 
Bishops meet politicians on Coal Strike. 
The Tablet 26 January. 
Anon. (1985d) 
Churches want more Pit Talks. 
Church Times 1 February. 
Anon. (1985e) 
Conciliation urged in Mining Areas. 
Church Times 8 Ma rch. 
Beales, Chris. (1985) 
The Mining Dispute and the Churches: Christian Responses and 
Ini tia ti ves. 
[Industrial and Economic Affairs Committee of the General Synod 
Board for Social Responsibility Working Paper 18]. 
London, Church House. 
Beales, Chris and Phipps, Simon. (1985) 
'The Mining Dispute and the Churches' 
[available from Industrial and Economic Affairs Committee of the 
General Synod Board for Social Responsibility]. 
London, [unpublished]. 
Brett, Paul. (1984) 
The Church and the Mine rs' Strike: a briefing paper. 
[Industrial and Economic Affairs Committee of the General Synod 
Board for Social Responsibility Working Paper 17]. 
London, Church House. 
Brown, Douglas. (1984) 
Moral Issues behind Industrial Strife. 
Church Times 7 September. 
Burley, Norman. (1984) 
Clergy tread delicately among the Notts miners . 
Church Times 25 May . 
Children's Society. (1984) 
The Society's Position on help for miners' children. 
[Statement issued from the Society, 10 Augus t]. 
London, Children's Society. 
86 
Church of England. General Synod. (1984a) 
Report of Proceedings. July Group of Sessions. 
London, CIO. 
Church of England. General Synod. (1984 b) 
Report of Proceedings. November Group of Sessions. 
London, CIO. 
Church of England. General Synod. Board for Social Responsibility. (1984) 
Annual Report. (GS 671D) 
London, CIO. 
Church of England. General Synod. Board for Social Responsibility. 
Industrial and Economic Affairs Committee. (1984) 
Perspectives on Economics. 
London, CIO. 
Duckworth, Brian. (1984a) 
Miners and Families suffering Hardship. 
Methodist Recorder 7 June. 
Duckworth, Brian. (1984b) 
Providing a Channel. 
Methodist Recorder 23 August. 
Halsall, Martin. (1984) 
Tory MP defends charity aid. 
The Guardian 11 August. 
House of Lords. (1984) 
Debate on the Address: Economic and Industrial Affairs, 13 
November. 
[Official Report. Fifth Series. (CDLVII) p257-262]. 
London, HM SO. 
Jenkins, David (The Bishop of Durham). (1984) 
A sermon on the Cost of Hope. 
[Sermon preached on the occasion of his enthronement as Bishop of 
Durham, 21 September]. 
Durham, Diocese of Durham. 
Kendal, Stephen. (1983) 
'National Network of Coal Industry Chaplains' 
[Letter to colleagues. November]. 
[no location, unpublished]. 
Kendal, Stephen. (198 Sa) 
The Churches in the Coal Dispute. 
Industrial Mission Association Newsletter June, p64-65. 
Kendal, Stephen (1985b) 
'The Mining Strike of 1984/5' 
[A personal view from Stephen Kendal, Industrial Chaplain to the 
North East Coalfield, July]. 
[no location, unpublished]. 
87 
Kent and Croydon Industrial Chaplains' Team. (1984) 
Some of the issues behind the miners' strike . 
[no location], Kent and Croydon Industria l Chaplains' Team. 
Longley, Clifford 6 Runcie, Robert (Archbishop of Canterbury). (1984) 
Runcie on the shift fro m Consensus to Confrontation. 
The Times 8 Septe mber. 
Montefiore, Hugh (The Bishop of Birmingham). (1984) 
Press Release: Extract from Dr. Hugh Montefiore's Presidential 
Address as Bishop of Birmingham to his Diocesan Synod on 27 June. 
Birmingham, Diocese of Birmingham. 
National Net work of Coal Industry Chaplains. (1984a) 
' Minutes of Meeting of 15/16 June' 
[no location, unpublished]. 
National Network of Coal Industry Chaplains. (1984b) 
'Points raised with Mr Ian MacGregor , October' 
[Transcript by Stephen Kendal]. 
[no location, unpublished]. 
National Network of Coal Industry Chaplains. (1984c) 
' Minutes of Meeting of 23/24 November ' 
[no location, unpublished]. 
National Network of Coal Industry Chaplains. (1985a) 
' Notes on meeting held with Douglas Bate, January' 
[Transcript by Stephen Kendal]. 
[no location, unpublished]. 
[National Network of Coal Industry Chaplains]. (1985b) 
'Chaplains's Conference. Minutes of meeting 7 May' 
[no location, unpublished]. 
Northumbrian Industrial Mission. (1984) 
Information Sheet 1 - 4. 
[no location], Northumbrian Industrial Mission. 
Poole-Hughes, John (The Bishop of Llandaff). (1984) 
Address by the Bishop of Llandaff for the Funeral of Mr David 
Wilkie. 
Llandaff, Diocese of Llandaff. 
Powers, Alan. (1984) 
'Solidarity' with Striking Miners. 
Methodist Recorder 21 June. 
Probert, John. (1984) 
Brought this Suffering upon Themselves. 
Methodist Recorder 21 June. 
Quakers. Social Responsibilty and Education. Work and Society Committee. 
(1985) 
The Coal Dispute 1984-5. 
London, Quakers. 
88 
Runcie, Robert (Archbishop of Canterbury). (1984) 
A Sermon preached by the Archbishop of Canterbury at a Sung 
Eucharist at the Cathedral Church of All Saints, Derby on Saturday 
15th September. 
London, Lambe th Palace. 
Seymour, Mary. (1984) 
[Letter]. 
The Daily Telegraph 6 Septe mber. 
Singleton, John . (1984) ••• Anon. (1984 y) 
Coal Women have their say. 
Methodist Recorder 22 November. 
Skirrow, Paul. (1984) 
The Miners' Strike; Fact and Fic tion. 
Leeds: Leeds Industrial Mission. 
Slack, Kenneth. (1984) 
Aiding the Needy. 
Church Times 14 September. 
Smithers, Nor man. (1984) 
[Letter]. 
The Times 25 September. 
Southwell, Derby and Sheffield (Bishops of) (1984) 
Plea for reconciliation in Mining. 
[Letter]. 
The Times 24 May. 
Stone, Winifred. (1984) 
Children's suffering. 
[Letter]. 
The Daily Telegraph 30 August. 
The Tablet. (1984 a) 
Yesterday's Battle in the Coal Field. 
[Editorial]. 
The Tablet 7 April. 
The Tablet. (1984b) 
This Strike damages Britain. 
[Editorial]. 
The Tablet 30 June. 
Weatherhead, John. (1984) 
Christians in the Political Arena. 
Church Times 12 October. 
Weetman, Barry. (1984a) •••• Anon. (1984q) 
Role of the Churches in 'Nightmare After math '. 
Methodist Recorder 25 October. 
Weet man, Barry. (1984b) ••• Anon. (1984r) 
President mee t ing Coal Board Boss. 
Methodist Recorder 8 November. 
89 
Weetman, Barry. (1984c) ••• Anon. (1984u1) 
'Think Tank' may meet Coal Boss. 
Methodist Recorder 15 November. 
Weetman, Barry. (1984d) ••••• Anon. (1984aa) 
President maintains Coal Peace Role. 
Methodist Recorder 29 November. 
Weetman, Barry. (1985a) ••• Anon. (1985a) 
Nightmare haunting the Valleys. 
Methodist Recorder 3 January. 
Weetman, Barry. (1985b) ••• Anon. (1985b) 
Why We're at Work. 
Methodist Recorder 17 January. 
Weetman, Barry. (1985c) •••• Anon. (1984e) 
Community Concerns in the North-East. 
Methodist Recorder 24 January 
Wilsher, Peter a Macintyre, Donald a Jones, Michael. (1985) 
Strike: Thatcher, Scargill and the miners. 
London, Andre Deutsch. 
90 
CHAPTER 5 
Local Church Responses to the Coal Dispute 
5.1 Introduction 
The involvement of t he church wi th those directly affected by the coal 
dispute was at its greatest at the local level . Indeed, it was hearing one 
vicar speak of his experiences during the dispute wh ich aroused my interest 
in this study. 
This chapter draws on material which I have collected by visiting clergy in 
various mining communities in South Yorkshire and County Durham . 
restricted my interviews to Anglican clergy because the Anglican church 
sees it self as ha ving a ministry to all, rather than to just its church 
members . However, I will refer to other churches. This restriction has 
worked well sinc e many mining communities are fai rly distinct entities in 
which both the pa rish church and the pit winding gear are clearly visible . 
The popu lations are such t hat there is usually one (rarely more) Anglican 
minister living in and serving each community. This is not t he case, say 
for the Methodist Church, where ministers often have responsibility for 
several chapels, or the Roman Catholic Church, whose parishes often cover 
several com munities. This means t hat only some of t he clergy of these 
churches will be living in mining communities, whilst others may well be 
living some distance from t he communities directly affected by the dispute 
and thus not have the sa me ready access to the people so involved. 
In the course of my research I have worked closely wi t h the Working Party 
set up by the Social Responsibility Committee of the Diocese of Sheffield 
which produced the report 'The Church in the Mining Communities ' and 
presented it to the Sheffield Diocesan Synod in March 1988. The report 
was "an investigation of the Church's role during the strike in order to 
learn how 'to be the church better in t hese communities"' (C. of E., 
Diocese of Sheffield, pl). I joined t he Working Party for some of their 
interviews and, also, listened to recordings or used transcripts of some of 
those I missed. They, in turn, have used notes of my interviews to aid 
91 
their research. Our focus of interest differed slightly but there was 
sufficient overlap to make a sharing of material worth while. 
In my interviews I usually limited my discussions to the clergy as my 
primary concern lay with discerning how the church's officials saw 
themselves responding to the dispute, though on two occasions, having me t 
with the clergy, I returned to meet a wider representation of the local 
church. In a further parish I was able to talk to an NUM representative. 
The Working Party met with members of the Parochial Church Council 
(PCC), usually with the vicar present, and then separately met with local 
leaders of the NUM . 
Before visiting any parishes the Sheffield Working Party prepared a set of 
questions (see Appendix A), but rather than work formally through them 
we tried to instigate a free discussion, though guiding it so that most of 
our questions were covered. We started each discussion by encouraging 
those present to describe their parish, and the relationship between the 
church and the mining community before the dispute started. We tried to 
discover what proportion of the congregation had been directly involved in 
mining during the recent past. We then moved on to the dispute itself 
and heard how the relationship between the church and the local 
community changed during that year: had the church, perhaps, become a 
focal point in the community because the hall was being used as a canteen 
or had the ministry of the clergy widened to include those on the picket 
line? We listened whilst the people told us what they actually did during 
the dispute, then attempted to probe why they did certain things, e.g. 
enable a Women's Support Group to use the hall rent-free and not others, 
or hold a collection for the local hardship fund. We discussed whether 
their action, or inaction, had caused any disagreements within t he 
congregation and how these were handled. Worship during the dispute was 
analysed to discover whether this had, or had not, been shaped by events 
outside the church. Finally, we encouraged the church members and the 
clergy to assess whether the dispute had a lasting impact on them 
personally, and on the relationship between the church and the community. 
The assessment included comment on where their performance fell short 
and what help or stimulus would have been required to have improved 
this. 
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A similar technique was used for our discussions with the NUM 
representatives. Again we initiated the discussion by hearing their views 
on the place of the church within the community before the dispute 
started. We then went on to discuss what the local church did to he lp 
miners and their families during the dispute and whether this changed t he 
relationship between the miners and the church. Lastly, we invited 
comment on how the church could improve its ministry wi thin mining 
communities. 
Similarly, I had a prepared list of questions (Appendix B) to guide my 
discussions with clergy, based very much on the Working Party list, though 
I also asked for comment on the part the national church played during 
the dispute; were the statements by various bishops helpful, or had they 
said and done too little, or too much? 
South Yorkshire and County Durham were chosen as the main areas in 
which to conduct my research as they share many characteristics. Both 
regions have had a long history of coal mining, and both have experienced 
a decline in the number of small pits leading to a concentration of 
mining at a smaller number of locations. Although the miners of South 
Yorkshire are traditionally more militant than those of Durham, and indeed 
in a local ballot of the Durham Winding Enginemen a 55% majority to 
support the strike-call was not obtained (Ottey, p78), in both regions the 
vast majority of NUM members withdrew their labour until the final weeks 
of the dispute. Unlike some of the Midland regions, in particular 
Nottinghamshire, there was not the same division between working and 
striking miners. Ease of access to these two regions and some prior 
knowledge of their geography also assisted research in these areas. 
Before I commenced my investigations at the parish level, the Working 
Party team had already chosen "a sample of six mining parishes, defined as 
communities in which the coal industry was dominant and where a 
substantial proportion of the families had connections with the industry. 
The sample was balanced to take account of the concentration of mining 
families, church traditions and location in the coal field" ((C. of E., 
Diocese of Sheffield, p2). Their visits were made to: -
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Church Councils 
As kern 
Brampton Bierlo w (t) 
Conisbrough (p) 
Thurnscoe St. Hilda 
Wales (p) 
Woodlands (p) 
p : I was present at the interview 
Miners groups 
As kern 
Carton wood ( t, w) 
Denaby (p) 
Hickleton 
Kiveton Park (p,w) 
Brodsworth (p) 
t : I have heard a recording of the interview 
w : Members of the Women's Support Group were present. 
The group also interviewed the Reverend John Packer, Vicar of Wath and 
the Reverend Rodney Marshall, Vicar of Goldthorpe. 
transcripts of both these discussions. 
have read 
I selected my parishes wi t h the he lp of the Senior Chaplain of the 
Sheffield Industrial Mission (SIM) and the Coal Chaplain to the North East 
Coalfield. In total, I visited seven parishes. also interviewed the person 
who was Team Vicar/Industrial Chaplain in Maltby, South Yorkshire, during 
the dispute. 
The parishes visited were:-
Brampton Bier low, South Yorkshire 
Bolton-on-Dearne, South Yorkshire (c) 
Rossington, South Yorkshire 
New Rossington, South Yorkshire (c) 
Easington Colliery, Durham (e) 
New Seaham , Durham (n) 
Seaham Harbour, Durham 
c I met with church members as well as the clergy 
n I met an NUM leader as we ll as t he clergy. 
e I intervie wed an electrical engineer who worked at the pit but lived 
and worshipped a few miles away, in addition to meeting the clergy. 
In making the selection we attempted to include some parishes where the 
involvement of the church during the dispute was known to have been 
considerable (Brampton, Bolton-on-Dearne, New Rossington, Easington 
Colliery and New Seaham). We also chose a pair of parishes in each 
region which, although adjacent geographically, produced markedly different 
responses (New Seaham/Seaham Harbour and New Rossington/Rossington) in 
order to atte mpt to study why responses differed. 
A further factor taken into account was the socio-economic mix of the 
pa rishes. The parishes can be sub-divided, albeit rather roughly, into two 
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groups. Bolton-on-Dearne, New Seaham and to a slightly lesser extent, 
New Rossington and Easington Colliery are all parishes in which mining has 
very much dominated local industry and where almost every person in the 
recent past has had a close contact with the pit. In these parishes there 
was little black-legging and the communities were united in the stand they 
were taking against pit-closures. However, it would be unfair to see them 
all as militant strikers. They were pro-miner rather than pro-strike. 
Many were deeply uneasy about taking strike action but felt that there 
was no alternative. 
The other parishes had a wider socio-economic base of which the local pit 
was only a part. A considerable proportion of the population either 
com muted out of the parish or worked in other local industries. Some 
contained modern housing estates which housed few miners except those of 
managerial status. Those who were (or had been) underground or surface 
workers tended to live on estates of poor quality housing usually near to 
the pit, and within the community there was an awareness of an 'us and 
them' division. 
In Rossington the two parishes follow the 'us/them 1 division fairly closely 
with New Rossington being the model village built to house the miners and 
now has the feel of an amorphous, fairly run-down, housing estate. The 
old village of Rossington is a mixture of very old houses with individual 
character intermingled with the modern owner-occupier estates which 
house commuters and a few higher grade miners. 
In Wa les and Brampton the 'us/them' division occurred within the parish . 
In both cases the church was situated at the better end of the 
communities and so was perceived to serve 'the middle class' - 'those who 
wear hats'. Presence of an 'us/them' division within the parish has proved 
to be a ma jor factor in shaping both the response of the church to the 
local mining community, and the perception of the church by miners and 
their families. 
Obviously, no two parishes can ever be the same, but some had special 
features on which it is worth commenting. Both New Rossington and 
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Maltby included model villages which were built early this century to house 
the miners who were to work the newly sunk pit. Both, also, had churches 
which were endowed by the South Yorkshire Coalfield's Extension 
Committee specifically to serve the new mining community. Cortonwood 
Colliery, whose threatened closure prompted the dispute, lay within the 
boundaries of Brampton Bierlow, and much attention was focussed on the 
colliery. Also, the clergy of the parish were members of the local Labour 
party and this was an added dimension in their relationship with the local 
community. 
In addition to these interviews I have also received several written 
accounts of experiences during the dispute by clergy, obtained through 
personal contacts and response to a letter in the 'Church Times'. These 
have helped to give a fuller account of what the church was doing during 
the dispute. An essay which has proved particularly illuminating is by 
Brian Barrodale, the Rector of Cotgrave in Nottinghamshire. Although he 
was ministering within a community which was considerably more divided 
in its attitude and behaviour during the strike, reactions to what he did 
during the dispute have much in common with those in South Yorkshire and 
Durham and so have been used to illustrate points and in drawing 
conclusions. 
The rest of this chapter uses the findings of these investigations to 
describe how the church in the mining communities was affected by the 
coal dispute, and how it responded to it. Some preliminary conclusions 
will be drawn in the final section of this chapter. Chapter 6 will then 
analyse these findings, together with the response of the national ·and 
regional churches, and will attempt to classify the different types of 
response and comment on them. 
5.2 Worship 
Despite the havoc the coal dispute wreaked amongst so many aspects of 
daily living in the mining villages, regular Sunday and weekday worship 
continued much as normal. It was a great source of strength and 
comfort for those who participated in it, and many have told how their 
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public worship and their private prayers kept them going amongst so much 
turmoil. 
Although churches varied in how much they felt able to discuss the dispute 
or to have sermons which touched upon it, in the vast majority of services 
in mining parishes, reference was made to the dispute during the 
intercessions. General petitions which recurred regularly included requests 
for a just settlement, cessation of violence, relief of hardship, and strength 
for all who were suffering as a consequence of the dispute. As well as 
general petitions, specific needs and people were mentioned. NCB and 
NUM officials, both at national and local level, were regularly named, 
though "a few chose not to mention local managers and NUM officials by 
name, feeling that selection might be misleading" (C. of E., Diocese of 
Sheffield, p15). Clergy and congregation (often the intercessions are led 
by members of the congregation) were careful to phrase their prayers to 
avoid alignment with either side, and some varied the order in which they 
prayed for the leaders of the various parties to the dispute, but most 
people recognised, that however much they disliked Mr Scargill or Mr 
MacGregor, they still had a duty as Christians to make public, corporate 
prayer for them. 
In a situation where many felt victims of a chain of events over which 
t hey had no control , praying, and particularly praying together in an act of 
worship, restored confidence and gave some hope . Here was something 
they could actually do. Many of the people interviewed felt that the one 
thing they could do throughout the dispute was pray and their prayers 
played a vital part in enabling them to keep going at times when the 
situation within the mining community seemed utterly hopeless . This need 
for public, corporate prayer was reflected in an increase in attendance at 
early morning weekday services in some churches. 
Concern about the dispute also affected other areas of church-life. In 
one church which was preparing for a mission, the PCC met early in the 
morning to pray together, primarily for the mission, but as this meant that 
they were walking to church at a time when the streets were thick with 
pickets and police, they witnessed several violent incidents which most 
people missed. Because of this their prayers broadened out to include not 
just the mission but the situation in the local community. 
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The public, corporate prayers of the worshipping community not only 
helped the individuals praying, but others outside the church walls were 
strengthened by them. One lady reported that during the dispute her 
husband would demand to know why she had not gone to church if she 
missed a Sunday. Her normal church attendance was somewhat irregular, 
and her husband never darkened the door of a church except for baptisms, 
weddings and funerals, but whilst he was on strike it was as though her 
attendance gave them both strength. 
Prayer, however, is not just public and corporate, it is also private and 
individual. The personal prayer of the individual gave the opportunity to 
broach subjects and concerns which could not be spoken about elsewhere. 
One lady spoke of her nephew who had been sacked after an incident 
outside a colliery. During the strike she could not talk to anyone about 
the sacking as she was so ashamed of it, but she continued to pray 11 all 
the time 11 for her nephew. Many others have commented on how much 
strength they received from their private prayers during the dispute. 
Throughout the whole spectru m of churchmanship people were praying, 
whether it be in open prayer meetings, early morning masses, or in the 
privacy of their own hearts. Their prayers were the one place where the 
names of the 'opposition' could be mentioned, where the 'us - them' 
divide could begin to be bridged. 11 lt was very clear that the commitment 
to daily prayer by a nucleus of lay people was a significant element in the 
parishes' responses to the dispute, and supported their peace-making within 
the community 11 (C. of E., Diocese of Sheffield, p16). 
The Archbishop of Canterbury has commented on the importance of prayer 
in such situations: 11 Christians can pray and ought to pray sensitively, and I 
have been encouraged by the amount of prayer that has created a 
readiness to understand the issues at stake, and certainly in mining 
communities to give some people a sense though it may take generations 
to rebuild the life of their community, there are roots which if cherished 
can achieve that. The praying church in every sort of community should 
be praying for those locked in this apparently insoluble dispute. A person 
prayed for may be a person understood, and a person understood may be a 
person enlarged 11 (Longley o Runcie). 
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Even in places where virtually no explicit reference was made to the 
strike the regularity of normal Sunday worship was valued. At times, it 
may have appeared to have been little more than escapism, and one 
congregation went as far as to say that they "tended to pretend that the 
strike was not happening", but even this escapism had its positive points. 
Many churches functioned as "islands of peace" (C. of E., Diocese of 
Sheffield, p19) within the chaos of the community. They enabled people 
to escape from the trauma of the dispute and then return, somewhat 
refreshed, in order to struggle on for another week. When questioned 
about their worship during the strike the vast majority of people said how 
grateful they were for the normality of regular worship when all around 
was abnormal. The church gave them comfort, security and peace. Since 
no one knew when the strike would end, the church was the only stability 
they had. Sermons directly bearing on the strike would not have been 
greatly appreciated as they would have stirred up more controversy and 
that was something they came to church to avoid. A lady who worked in 
a shop testified to the tension in the community, "You daren' t open your 
mouth for fear of offending someone", for the issue was not just about 
the miners' cause, but as much about picketing, the role of the police or 
whether there should have been a ballot. Another gave up going to bingo, 
not through financial hardship, but because there was too much bickering 
about the strike. If the church had become another arena for the 
ceaseless debate it would have lost a valuable function. 
So the peace of mind which worship enabled was a great help to many, 
though, at times, this peace had a negative side to it. The maintenance 
of silence about the dispute prevented the congregation from attempting to 
make sense of the situation about them, nor were they better equipped to 
foster gestures of healing. Fortunately, this was not always the case 
and for some "the peace was a more positive experience, which then 
spilled over into their lives in the community" (C. of E., Diocese of 
Sheffield, p19). Connections between Christian belief and public behaviour 
were being made, and numerous people spoke of their abstinence from 
violence because they felt, as Christians, that it was wrong. Others bore 
condemnation within the community because, as Christians, they refused to 
ostracise those who returned to work early. The peace achieved in 
worship also drew people into the church, and one congregation felt that 
the sense of unity and fellowship which continued throughout was a major 
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factor in the increase of their congregation from 100 to 140 during the 
year of the dispute (op. cit., p19). 
An example of worship enabling some peace-making within the community 
comes from the parish of Maltby. Here, an act of worship, held before 
the dispute started, was felt to have reaped considerable benefits both 
during the dispute and afterwards. The service was held in 1983 to 
commemorate the anniversary of the 1923 pit disaster in which 27 people 
had been killed. The church building has a screen dividing the worship 
area from the hall and in the latter the Local History Society had placed 
an exhibition. The preparations for the service and the exhibition enabled 
the church to build new relationships with people in the community. Many 
miners attended the service and spoke of how moving it was. Others, who 
came just to view the exhibition, wandered into the church area (which 
includes a memorial window to those killed in the disaster and the old 
NUM banner) and found just being in the church personally helpful. 
The Secretary of the Local History Society spoke of the benefits from this 
commemorative service and exhibition at the Sheffield Diocesan Synod in 
March 1988. Amongst them she included: 
better than average community relations during the dispute, for 
instance the church was used to supply meals, 
a strong desire for reconstruction after the strike, in particular, the 
church initiated a village festival, 
jobs being created for the local community project because the parish 
industry group now had a higher profile, 
closer co-operation between the church and the local history society, 
the impact on individuals; working on the exhibition led to the 
secretary herself being drawn into the worshipping congregation. 
Here we see a church enabling positive acts of reconciliation within the 
community at large. The breaking down of barriers between different 
sections of the community enabled greater co-operation between people 
and the fostering of a communal spirit. 
Other churches found that reconciliation could be achieved within the 
church family; people affected in very different ways by the dispute were 
able to overcome their differences and work and worship together in 
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harmony. In one church, one reader was on strike but the other not, as 
the latter was a member of the coal board management. Yet, despite 
this, the two men maintained a close relationship right through the strike 
and were even interviewed on television, in their readers' robes, showing 
that feelings other than hatred existed between those on opposite sides of 
the dispute. Their Vicar com men ted, after the dispute, how these two 
men, with their liturgical high profile, acted as a kind of symbol for the 
rest of the congregation. 
In another church, striking miners knelt to receive communion next to men 
who had left the pit and started their own businesses, ventures which were 
being brought perilously close to bankruptcy by the dispute. One, whose 
fish and chip shop was only just surviving, was asked after the service 
whether he realised that he was kneeling next to those who were 
threatening his livelihood. 
"'Was I? It makes no difference to me, not here.' 
'There's no resentment among you.' 
'Resentment? This time last year I'd 'ave killed 'em, ruining my 
business like that. That shows yer 'ow much I've changed. These 
are my brothers. How can I 'ate them?"' (Guinness, p217). 
Whatever else was falling apart within the community, the church 
continued with her worship. At its worst, it ~ routine and escapist, but 
for much of the time it was far more than this. Regular, normal worship 
enabled many to survive the chaos and hardship of the dispute. When 
some felt so overwhelmed that in desperation they resorted to violent acts 
and words, worship helped others maintain a standard of behaviour they 
knew to be right. At its best, the worship fostered reconciliation both 
within the walls of the church and without. As one Vicar wrote in his 
magazine shortly after the dispute ended, "Our great task is our worship. 
There at every service we lifted our mining community to God in our 
prayers. In worship we proclaim the message of hope and reconciliation 
which flow from the Gospel of Jesus" (Hodgson, 'REX', April 1985). 
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5.3 Preaching in local churches 
Whilst controversial issues can be regularly mentioned in prayers without 
raising hackles, the same does not apply to sermons. There is a fairly 
widespread belief among lay people that politics and religion should not be 
mixed and this particularly applies to words from the pulpit. This 
unwritten rule applies whether or not the views being expressed are in 
agreement with those of the recipients. Since this particular strike had 
strong political dimensions, many clergy felt that it was a taboo topic for 
sermons. 
The ease with which congregations take offence at sermons which hint at 
political dimensions is illustrated by an incident which occurred early on in 
the dispute in a mining parish in South Yorkshire. There, a member of the 
Sheffield Industrial Mission was a guest preacher and during the course of 
the sermon he "said some things against the Coal Board, which went down 
like a lead balloon!" (C. of E., Diocese of Sheffield, p16). The people in 
the pews were not wanting to hear about the dispute on Sunday mornings, 
even when the views of the preacher were sympathetic to their own. 
Many clergy felt there was little they could say which could not be 
misconstrued as overtly supporting one side or the other, and, therefore, 
alienating some of the congregation and destroying any sense of unity 
within the fellowship. In support of this view, it has to be said that it is 
far from easy to develop a coherent argument about an emotive subject in 
a ten minute sermon. One parish spoke of the bitter consequences of an 
Armistice Day sermon, some years earlier, which had stirred up an 
immense amount of controversy in the community. The present incumbent 
felt the one thing he must not do was to make the church a focus for any 
form of controversy. So some clergy made a point of not referring to the 
dispute in their preaching. One put it this way, "I cannot tell the 
congregation how they can be a Christian in the midst of the miners' 
strike" (op. cit., p16-17). He felt that any public utterance from himself 
would be "persuading people to accept one side or the other" (op. cit., 
p16). A further hesitation for the clergy was that they might appear to 
be handing out advice about a situation in which they were not directly 
involved, provoking the reaction, 'Who's he to tell us what to do; he's not 
on strike?'· 
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Despite the difficulties involved in raising such an emotive topic, some 
clergy were able to touch upon it in sermons. Special services often 
provided such opportunities. In one particular church, in the heart of the 
South Yorkshire coal field, there is an annual industrial service. The Vicar 
there usually attempted a balancing act in the sermon and during the 
dispute he spoke about how the local community perceived that it was 
being denied its means of being creative. He went on to look at the 
future and mentioned the right of all people to a creative way of life. 
He then wove in the Marxist accusation that religion is the opium of the 
people, but countered it by attempting to make Christianity relevant. 
Some were able to mention the effects of the strike in Christmas 
messages. The plight of families with their menfolk on strike at 
Christmas had aroused the most unsympathetic of people; even those who 
were firmly against the strike dug into their pockets so as to enable the 
children to have a reasonable Christmas and the practical response of the 
church peaked at this time, so some clergy took this opportunity to say 
something about the turmoil in the community. The parable of the Good 
Samaritan was adapted with scabs and pickets, rather than the Samaritan 
and the religious hierarchy being juxtaposed, though even here the need to 
maintain balance was recognised, so the sermon was preached both ways! 
The ability of those in the pews to misconstrue sermons is illustrated by a 
Christmas message in a mining parish in County Durham. Here the Vicar 
had spent a considerable time on the picket line and had travelled with 
some of the NUM activists on trips to gain support in other areas of the 
country. Shortly before Christmas the husband of the Sunday School 
Superintendent had returned to work at a nearby colliery and because of 
this the windows of their house had been smashed. The Vicar referred to 
this in his Christmas Eve sermon, speaking of the hardship being endured 
by many on strike, but reminding that God was in the situation and so we 
should still refer to one another in love and not break windows! These 
comments caused some people to walk out of the service saying that they 
would only return to the church when the 'Communist Vicar' had left! 
Out of the eight parishes visited by the Sheffield Diocesan Working Party 
only two reported any regular teaching via the sermons on the issues 
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of the strike. In one of these a layman reported that the strike was 
mentioned nearly every Sunday (C. of E., Diocese of Sheffield, p16). A 
clergyman in Durham said that the dispute was touched upon in his 
sermons both implicitly and explicitly, but he went on to add that the 
content of sermons should be dictated primarily by Scripture and only 
within this framework can one refer to national or local situations. He 
also added that in what he said he erred on the side of caution so as not 
to be misunderstood or alienate any section of the community. A great 
fear of upsetting a part of the congregation or a part of the local 
community was a major reason given by the churches for being cautious in 
the many ways in which they responsed or failed to respond to the coal 
dispute. They felt that they had a duty to maintain some sort of neutral 
stance and not be seen to side with one group against another. This 
issue will recur in this chapter, particularly in regard to church provision 
of relief to those suffering hardship during the strike (section 5.5) and the 
presence of clergy on picket lines (section 5.6.1), and will be considered 
further in the final chapter, especially sections 6.2.3 and 6.4. 
5.4 Comments about the dispute in Church Magazines 
Another vehicle often used for expounding the Christian message is the 
Church Magazine. A glance at the magazines of the coalfield parishes 
showed that some made no reference to the dispute, whilst others included 
appeals for clothing and food for miners, and others contained articles 
about the issues raised by the dispute and the part the church should be 
playing. 
In some ways the written word, as oppose to the spoken word, is a much 
better medium for raising controversial issues. It is less easily distorted 
as people can more easily refer to what the vicar actually wrote, rather 
than to what they thought they heard him say. Also, it reaches a far 
greater number of people, as many subscribe to the magazine who never 
darken the door of the church. 
Yet, despite its advantages, some clergy were extremely reluctant to use 
their magazine to express thoughts, or raise questions, about the dispute 
which was affecting all their readership. Indeed, one Vicar, who willingly 
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appeared on television and spoke out on behalf of the local community, 
said he deliberately did not com mit anything to paper. This hesitation, I 
suspect, arose from a feeling that the written word was too concrete, and 
if he expressed any view he would be restricted in his attempts to 
minister to all sections of the community. 
This contrasts with another Vicar who was most adamant in not speaking 
out in church about the dispute but who, after a violent incident in the 
parish, wrote, in his magazine, an article condemning the violence. His 
point was that it was the violence he condemned, and only the miners in 
so far as they were the perpetrators of the violence, and he felt that this 
point would be grasped better if it was expressed in writing. 
The written word was, occasionally, used to elucidate the spoken word. 
One Vicar used his church publication to summarise his Christmas Eve 
sermon (which had caused people to leave part way through) and to answer 
accusations that he was a communist (Holland, 1985a). Prior to this, the 
dispute had featured in the magazine; the Vicar then describing the view 
from his landing window of the pickets quietly gathered at the pit 
entrance. This view contrasted sharply with the violent scenes seen on the 
television. He went on to discuss the rights and wrongs of the dispute, 
but came down on neither side, though criticised those who put profits 
before people; "People do matter, the forces and conditions in which they 
live matter. Clearly Jesus taught us these great eternal truths" (Holland 
1984). 
The January magazine included a review of Christmas events and recalled 
with pleasure the way in which everyone had helped each other (Holland, 
1985a). It also told of the Vicar's trip, with some NUM members, to the 
students of North London Polytechnic who had done much fund-raising for 
the local victims of the coal dispute (Holland, 1985b). In February the 
Vicar, in response to unpleasantness towards himself and the church from a 
working miner, felt it necessary to explain that his prime concern was for 
the local community and jobs for the people who live in it. This meant 
that he was in favour of the strike. The reason he visited the picket line 
(which is "all rather wearying and time-consuming") is to "do what little I 
can to keep it peaceful and friendly and to try to relieve the tensions 
between the pickets and the police." He concluded the article with an 
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offer to working miners to meet with them and hear their point of view, 
"especially if by so doing I can help to reconcile and heal some of the 
wounds in this community" (Holland 1985c). 
During the year of the dispute another Vicar touched on the dispute six 
times in his magazine. "In April 1984 he appealed for Christians to get 
involved in the arguments but to understand each other's viewpoint. In 
August he asked people to be determined and cheerful in the face of 
hardship, and to have courage to speak out about right and wrong. In 
November he explained why Christians including clergy and bishops should 
be involved in politics. This theme reappeared in the magazine for May 
1985, especially in reference to the Bishop of Durham's controversial 
enthronement sermon. In December there was an appeal for forgiveness to 
overcome bitterness 'without turning away from the search for justice', 
and in April 1985 a report on the charitable donations to miners' families" 
(C. of E., Diocese of Sheffield, p17). Throughout all these articles there 
was a consistent attempt to connect Christian faith to the issues of the 
day. 
In one of the Durham mining communities the monthly magazine, 'REX', 
which has a circulation of nearly 800, has for many years carried general 
community news and comment from the Vicar, as well as church 
information. In January 1982, shortly after Arthur Scargill was elected 
President of the NUM, 'REX' carried a piece about Mr Scargill's Christian 
faith. A year later a review of a report on the cost of Nuclear Energy 
appeared, pointing out some of the hazards of nuclear power as well as its 
implications for a mining community. Reference was also made to Bishop 
John Habgood's book 'A Working Faith' which touches on the nuclear issue. 
In August 1982 'REX' welcomed the new chaplain to the local colliery and 
added "The colliery and its workers are regularly remembered at the Altar 
in our prayers at the Eucharist" and on the same page the Vicar thanked 
the local NUM Lodge for allowing him to join them for the Durham 
Miners' Gala; "it was a great privilege to be associated in this way" 
(Hodgson, 1982). 
Within the first few weeks of the coal dispute the Easter edition of 'REX' 
(April 1984) spoke of the need for signs of hope within the community. 
"We need signs of hope at the present. Many people are worried about 
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making ends meet with their menfolk on strike. (Please contact the Vicar 
if you have problems where you think he might be of use!) The strike is 
due to fears for the future - of the effect of pit closures on jobs for the 
miner and his sons and on the community where he lives" (Hodgson , 
1984a). The article went on to speak of the Risen Christ spelling hope for 
each person and for the world. 
A few months later the Vicar explained that he had writ ten to 'The 
Guardian' "to defend the good name of our menfolk by pointing out that 
picket line violence (which is wrong) is out of character with the Durham 
miner and that we should ask why it is happening" (Hodgson, 1984b). The 
letter had resulted in many letters from all over England and donations 
totalling £400 to help needy families, as well as the Vicar being asked to 
appear on television. In October there was a report of money sent to the 
parish from 'Church Times' readers, again in response to a letter published 
therein from the Vicar, as well as clothes brought to the parish by the 
Chapter Clerk to the Cathedral. 'REX' com men ted "Views on the strike 
may differ, but when people suffer there is only one Christian 
viewpoint ••• HELP THEM" (loc. cit.). 
The previous month carried a plea for the preservation of our communal 
life. This followed the intimidation of some not supporting the strike. 
Included in the article was the request from the local NUM secretary for 
his members to stamp out such victimisation. All this was put in the 
context of the more positive side to the strike: we are learning to live 
more simply, largely because everyone is helping each other - no matter 
what their personal view of the strike. 
As Christmas approached 'REX' appealed for toys for children and 
commented on the pressures families faced particularly from television 
advertising. Taking on debts was not the answer! Perhaps, 'REX' hoped, 
the hardship experienced would enable the community to get back to the 
real meaning of Christmas (Hodgson, 1984c). 'REX' also had harsh words 
for those who administer heating allowances for refusing help to a family 
with four children, two of whom are asthmatic, because the father was on 
strike. "What kind of society is it that treats these dependants less 
generously than it does those of convicted criminals in prison? Our Lord 
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has stern words to say about those who cause children to suffer" (Hodgson, 
1984d). 
The New Year saw an appeal for reconciliation within the community, but 
noted that the cross reminds us that reconciliation is costly. "It is not a 
case of 'shaking hands and going for a drink together'. It means facing up 
to the causes of disunity; possibly facing the genuine hurt and injustice of 
which division is the result. Reconciliation is always costly and difficult. 
When the strike is over these will be our tasks, and we should be starting 
now" (Hodgson, 1985a). This was followed the next month with a piece 
about the relationship between Christianity and politics and recognised that 
Christians are rarely united on how best to tackle social and moral 
problems. "Justice must regard a pit closure programme which creates 
mass unemployment and destroys communities as morally wrong. But to 
solve this there are many possible ways. The Strike is one, but Christians 
from their common principles will rightly have differing attitudes to it. 
We need to recognise this frankly and respect those who differ from us" 
(Hodson, 1985b). However, 'REX' does not leave the matter there; it goes 
on to suggest an initiative the church could take. "The Church could 
provide the kind of forum where people with such differences can meet, 
discuss and debate - thereby learning from each other. Sadly we are 
afraid of splitting the Church by 'mixing religion with politics.' However, 
if we recognised these principles we should forget our fears. Then the 
church could make a real contribution to that world which God loved so 
much that he sent his own Son to die for it. And how much we need this 
kind of Christian witness!" (lac. cit.). 
As the dispute came to an end 'REX' reviewed the way the church had 
been involved during the coal dispute. The church had attempted to 
minister to the whole community. This had occurred in worship, with the 
mining community being lifted to God in prayer at every service, and in 
practical ways with many church members giving food to those in need, 
helping in the meals service or being involved with the local Advice and 
Community Centre. A show and a pantomime had been produced with 
profits going to the local Churches' Miners' Hardship Fund. The vicarage 
had been used as a store for food and toys and the Vicar had talked with 
the media, negotiated with the electricity board and given financial help to 
those in desperate need. The review concluded that for the Vicar it had 
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been a privilege to serve the community during the dispute, and a letter 
from a miner's wife, in the same edition, paid tribute to the contribution 
of the local church and clergy throughout the year of the strike (Hodgson, 
1985c). 
'REX' illustrates how well a church magazine can be used to maintain 
links between the church and the community. Its production bears all the 
hallmarks of an over-used church duplicator, but with a cover price of five 
pence and a content which consistently covers all sorts of community 
issues and news of local interest, it is a publication a parish resident can 
not afford not to buy! 
The two themes which are common to all these publications are: -
First, the need for reconciliation within the community, which 
includes respecting the right of others to respond to the sa me 
situation in different ways, and 
Secondly, the need to make connections between faith and actions 
which may have a political dimension. 
These are both themes which have a specifically Christian dimension and 
they were taken up by many national church leaders (see especially 
sections 4.3 and 4.5). Section 6.3 will argue that the church was well 
within its legitimate sphere of responsibility in giving these themes a high 
profile. 
What impact the writings in the church magazines had on their recipients 
is very difficult to assess. The clergy who wrote regularly about the 
strike earned themselves a reputation for caring for the community, though 
so too did the Vicar who deliberately did not write, but who expressed his 
care in many other ways. 
One way to have seen how far congregations had begun to connect their 
faith with the situation around them and how far they were reconciled to 
views other than their own, would have been to take up the suggestion in 
'REX' that the church provide a forum for discussion and debate. Alas, 
this rarely, if ever happened. Informal discussion did take place after 
services or even in house groups but these were probably little different 
from those in the Post Office queues or family gatherings. On the whole 
there was no special effort to initiate discussion groups, or get the dispute 
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on to the agenda of existing groups including the PCCs (c. of E., Diocese 
of Sheffield, p17). This was partly because the clergy had discovered from 
previous experiences that "enabling a good discussion or debate in large, 
more formal groups (like a PCC) is difficult and unpopular in these 
communities" (lac. cit.). 
5.5 Church responses to local hardship 
The responses of the churches to the hardship experienced by their 
parishioners varied greatly and these variations were due to a host of 
factors. In some villages the NUM, supported by the wives of miners, set 
up canteens in their own premises within the first few weeks, even the 
first few days, of the strike. They also ran a well-organised food parcel 
distribution service. In such cases the churches tended to support the 
NUM initiated ventures and there was little need for them to set up a 
parallel service. In other places the local NUM was slower to respond. 
For the first few weeks of the dispute most families had enough of their 
own resources to be able to manage, and with the hope that all would be 
settled by the next week, there seemed little point in organising communal 
relief. However, as the dispute dragged on more and more local canteens 
and food distribution schemes began to spring up, and many churches 
played a major part in these. 
Some churches collected food and clothing and, very occasionally, money 
then sent it all directly to the NUM to distribute as they felt fit. Others 
ran a totally church based scheme but usually with some liaison between 
the church and the union. Often the church was asked by the union to 
deliver a parcel to someone known to be in great need but who dare not 
come to the union base to collect one because, maybe, his brother was 
still working or his father blacklegged in 1926! Many union schemes felt 
they had to treat everyone equally, or could only give extra resources to 
those who did picket duty, but the church was felt to be able to be more 
discriminating than the NUM and give more help to those with least 
support from families and friends. Thus the union and church schemes 
complemented one another. 
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A Vicar in South Yorkshire received several thousand pounds as the result 
of a letter placed in the 'Church Times'. Much of this he turned into 
food vouchers or used to pay off electricity bills. He had a close 
relationship with the union, to the extent that they had developed a 
system of coded phrases in letters of referral so the Vicar was able to 
discriminate between those whose need the union saw as urgent, giving 
them material help, and others who received only advice in the first 
instance. 
Overall, there was very little opposition within the congregations to 
attempts to alleviate hardship, though one church reported that the box at 
the back for food and clothes was occasionally hidden and another said 
that there were a group of people who moaned about the box cluttering up 
the church! But many church-goers were already supporting their friends 
and relations with gifts of food and money. Grandparents gave their 
children and grandchildren 'proper' meals, helped with the washing, even 
providing hot water for a bath, for in a coal dispute the supply of free 
NCB coal stops and there is little money to spend on electricity to heat 
water, even if the house has an immersion heater! 
So the church, in providing parcels and vouchers, extended the extended 
family network that bit further. However, where the church's response 
was channelled through lay people taking out food parcels or offering to 
help in the kitchen it was rarely perceived in the community as 'help from 
the church'. One NUM secretary claimed that his local church did 
virtually nothing for the miners. In fact this church had a well-developed 
food parcel scheme which was run through its house groups, but because it 
was not the Vicar taking the parcels around, nor did people have to come 
to the church or the vicarage to sign for parcels, those on the receiving 
end claimed, "That nice Mrs from number 18 brought us a parcel," 
rather than "St. 's sent us a parcel." 
On the whole the need was great. One Vicar was particularly struck by 
the total cessation in demand for parcels the day the strike ended; he saw 
this as indicative of how great the hardship was, and also how difficult it 
was for people to accept charity. 
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As harvest gifts were distributed some noticed the difference between the 
mining families and the regular recipients of harvest gifts. Many of the 
latter 11 complained as usual that there was not enough, they didn't eat 
bananas, they would rather have something else. But mining families were 
grateful for the tiniest offering" (Guinness, p212), though the last 
statement needs some qualification as often the menfolk were reluctant to 
receive handouts from the church. Their wives, however, soon persuaded 
them otherwise; 'for the sake of the children,' was a powerful argument. 
The profile of the local church was considerably raised if their hall was 
being used as a canteen. Rent was rarely, if ever, charged and given that 
providing hot, two course meals, several times a week for maybe a few 
hundred people uses a fair amount of gas and electricity this proved to be 
a costly venture for the churches concerned. On the whole it was 
representatives of the union who approached the churches for use of their 
premises. For some union men this took a fair amount of courage as they 
were very unsure of the reception that they would receive: 
11 I went to the vicarage to ask for the use of the hall. was a bit 
scared of the Vicar. I knew who he was but I didn't know him as a 
person and I didn't think that he would agree to the hall being used. 
asked the Vicar what I should call him and he said 'Peter'. I thought that 
was all right and since then we've got on very well 11 (An NUM activist). 
That particular hall was used to provide meals for 700 people once or 
twice a week, as well as tea for the pickets every day. When meals were 
being produced every socket in the hall had a boiler or cooker plugged into 
it and by the end of the strike the hall needed to be rewired. 
When approached by the miners for the use of the church hall the vast 
majority of clergy gave their immediate assent without consulting their 
church wardens or the PCC. The minister of one church explained this 
thus, "We felt that if we said 'No' then we would lose all credibility 
with the mining community." He was fairly sure that the PCC would not 
have given unanimous assen.t to the request and may even have turned it 
down. This feeling did occur in parishes where mining was still the 
dominant industry, but was more prevalent where there was a wider socio-
economic mix. The presence of the canteen in the hall went on to cause 
certain tensions, for instance the playgroup resented miners' children 
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playing with their toys, and the Women 1s Support Group complained that 
the playgroup had left sand in the sink. 
The one clergyman I spoke to who did raise the matter of the church hall 
with his PCC before allowing it to be used did get their agreement, though 
he admitted that he put his weight firmly behind the request and thus did 
not enable the PCC to discuss the issue through; had he not backed the 
request so strongly he felt the PCC could well have voted against it. In 
this case it was an informal women 1 s support group which approached the 
church. The local branch of the NUM was doing a good job of looking 
after their activists but these women were wanting to be serve a wider 
need. None were church-goers, but they allowed the local Council of 
Churches to keep a watching brief on their funds and to give them an 
initial fifty pounds. After that they raised their own funds and as they 
were very resourceful and efficient there was rarely a shortfall. 
These women were not particularly politically motivated and by the end of 
the strike no longer supported Arthur Scargill. This meant that the church 
became distanced from the political aspect of the dispute, so although the 
local community thought that the church was wonderful as it was seen to 
feed the needy, the local Labour Party paid little attention to it and the 
local NUM felt that they did not have the church 1 s political support. 
Where did the money and resources come from to support all these 
ventures? Much of it came from the local congregations and meant 
11 considerable personal sacrifice, echoing the extended family generosity all 
around them 11 (C. of E., Diocese of Sheffield, p12). The little people had, 
they were willing to share with those around them. 
Some churches received help from churches further afield. Often there 
was some sort of personal link between the churches; churches where 
vicars had served curacies would write and ask their former curate how 
they could help, or would send money and clothes. Occasionally money 
was designated for a specific purpose such as milk tokens for the children. 
In this instance this was too complicated to administer and the money was 
put into the general hardship fund, and the sending church informed of 
this. No more money was received, perhaps indicative of a fairly general 
trend of people wanting to help those in need, particularly children who 
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were seen as innocent victims, but not wanting to give any form of 
support to the miners' cause. 
Letters in the press, particularly in the church press raised considerable 
sums of money. Much of this came as small donations, many from 
pensioners, but adding up to several thousand pounds in total. "It was 
incredible - the vast majority came from the South in £5 's, £10 's - mostly 
in £1 's. Somebody sent £150, it was all very moving - OAPs sending £1 
and saying I can't afford more, wish I could send more!" (C. of E., 
Diocese of Sheffield, p15). 
Some individual clergy administered the funds directly themselves, others 
set up a specific hardship fund. The Northumbrian Industrial Mission (NIM) 
Hardship Fund was started after a Quaker sent the coal chaplain an initial 
£100 to help miners' families, and then had a letter published in 'The 
Friend', the Quaker newspaper, saying that the chaplain would be pleased 
to receive donations (Kendal, page 28)! Help was also at hand from 
further afield. The Bishop of Durham, acting on behalf of the NIM 
Hardship fund, received £15,000 from the Synod of Moers, part of the 
churches of the Rhine, just before Christmas 1984. Thereafter, these 
German churches sent a constant supply of food and clothing until the 
dispute ended. 
In the Dearne Valley in South Yorkshire the Roman Catholic, Anglican and 
Methodist churches there grouped together and set up 'The Dearne Valley 
Churches Hardship Fund' which was designed to serve not just the Dearne 
Valley but all those in need in South Yorkshire because of the dispute. 
On the whole all these funds were raised by personal subscription. Very 
little money was taken from church accounts and given directly to 
alleviate the hardship of miners. During our interviewing, when we asked 
what would have been the reaction of individual PCCs if someone had 
proposed that a sum of church funds be given to the miners, the answer 
was always that there would have been considerable opposition to such a 
move. Special collections for miners and their families were, however, 
acceptable since they could be supported by those who wished to 
contribute and ignored by those who did not. 
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There was also tension over whether money should be given to church 
funds when there was so much obvious need in the community, but very 
few churches were able to debate these issues through. When church 
collections fell it was understood, but not questioned, that the church, like 
local businesses, was yet another victim in the community of the dispute. 
In one church there was a suggestion that fund raising for the church 
renovations be suspended until the dispute was resolved but they decided to 
continue with the church fund raising, partly to counter the feeling in the 
community that if the pit never opened again the community would die. 
Work being done on the church was seen as a sign of hope for that 
particular village. 
Another source of income was from local trust funds, many of which had 
lain dormant for years. Often local clergy were amongst the trustees and 
were instrumental in releasing the funds, sometimes having to overcome 
the reluctance of Labour councillors who were also amongst the trustees 
and were hesitant about using the funds directly to provide food, and 
therefore to support the strike. 
The effect of the clergy having this money at their disposal was much 
greater than just enabling the relief of some hardship. The money was 
symbolic of the fact that the people behind the money cared. Michele 
Guinness, an author married to a clergyman working in a Yorkshire mining 
village received a cheque for £1,000 from a person in Surrey. She 
commented, "It was not the amount that mattered though it helped. It 
was the knowledge that someone had remembered us, and cared" ( Guinness, 
p233). Another comment illustrating this point came from a man who had 
reluctantly received a food parcel from the church, " "I'm just thinking, it 
is nice to know that someone cares" " (Guinness, p213). 
It is hard to appreciate the depth of the feeling of isolation in many of 
the mining communities. They thought that almost the whole of the 
establishment, the coal board, the government, the police, the press, the 
vast majority of the general public and even some of their neighbours were 
against them. They felt that they were beleaguered communities and as 
the dispute continued their sense of lack of worth grew. A gesture of 
concern and practical care was worth far more than its financial value. 
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The funds raised by the NIM Hardship Fund enabled the local Coal Chaplain 
to get alongside the people at the centre of the dispute on the miners' 
side. He tells with sadness of the reply he received from a lady at a 
food centre when he went to give some money ••• '"I didn't think people 
like you were interested in people like us"' (Kendal, p29). He goes on, 
"At times it must have seemed to those watching my activities that 
had become nothing but an ambulance service distributing help. There 
were times when I did feel like 'Lady Bountiful' giving help to the well 
meaning poor. In fact it really was not like that at all. • ••• the fund 
opened doors and I was able to have very meaningful relationships with 
many people whom I would never have met. These relationships educated 
me about the industry, the church and political life in a way that would 
have not been possible otherwise" (Kendal, p29). 
Having funds available to distribute to food centres, to provide food 
vouchers and parcels, gave the clergy considerable opportunities to minister 
to those most involved with and affected by the dispute. The local 
community felt the church was doing its job properly and the church's 
credibility as an important and relevant force within the community rose. 
Also greater heed was taken of the voice of the national and regional 
church (see section 6.2.3), although one clergyman felt that the voice of 
the national church further confused a complicated situation as the 
situation was different in every mining community. Alas, where the 
church was seen to do very little in providing tangible help to alleviate 
the hardship it was perceived as being part of the forces of the 
establishment against which the miners were fighting, and it was dismissed 
as an irrelevance except for those (not us) who like that type of thing! 
Often, those churches which did little were attempting to remain neutral 
in a situation of intense tension. They did not want to be seen to be 
helping some and not others, and there is a body of opinion which regards 
the giving of money, food, and clothing to those on strike as a political 
act which helps to prolong any dispute and compromises the neutrality of 
the benefactor. Some national charities received considerable criticism 
along these lines when they offered assistance to miners' families (see 
section 4.7). Indeed it was such thinking which led, in 1980, to the 
reduction in supplementary benefit for the families of those on strike (see 
sections 3.2 and 3.4). The clergy who did enable vast quantities of aid to 
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be given, did not regard their actions as implying that they were 
definitely taking sides in the dispute and enabling the miners to continue 
the strike. One replied that such an argument is blackmail! His attitude 
was that if people are hungry they should be fed, and the question 1 Why? 1 
should not be asked (at least not at that initial stage). He pointed out 
that it is often the least deserving who are in greatest need; it is the 
people who drink, smoke, gamble and who generally cannot manage their 
money well who are the first to experience hardship and their families 
need more support, not less. This view was echoed by others (though 
perhaps not always with the same force) but many took a pragmatic view 
towards the hardship; feed those who are hungry and never mind the 
politics. This point will be taken up again in section 6.3. 
5.6 Ministry to those directly involved in the dispute 
Ministry to those who were involved in the dispute included visiting the 
picket lines, and crossing the picket to visit those still working at the 
colliery. Standing at the colliery gate brought the clergy into contact 
with ordinary miners, trade union leaders and activists, and the police. 
Inside most collieries, pit deputies and managers were the only people to 
be found. Normal parochial visiting continued as usual, and this brought 
the clergy into contact with those on strike and those who continued 
working. Occasionally, someone would turn up at the vicarage to discuss a 
particular problem, such as whether to return to work or the strain being 
on strike put on a marriage, and, infrequently, the vicar would be asked to 
visit an individual who was known to be having problems stemming from 
the dispute. 
5.6.1 On the picket line 
Many of the clergy who took an active role in the dispute made a point of 
regularly visiting the local picket lines. Some made twice-weekly visits, 
others once a month or slightly less. All said that their presence was 
welcome, though one Vicar pointed out that, for most of the time, there 
was very little for the pickets to do, so they were grateful of anything 
which relieved the boredom. The clergy also shared a common purpose in 
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visiting the picket line; that of being with their people in their hardship, 
to show concern and, most importantly, to listen to their understanding of 
events. Quotations from two clergy illustrate this point; "I'm here 
because you are here and I want to be beside you if I can", and "The job 
of a parish priest is to be with his people". 
Some were rather unsure about precisely what they could and should be 
doing, particularly when the situation outside the pit gates seemed volatile, 
but ignore it they could not. "I did not know what to do. And yet there 
was a sense in my heart and in my mind that I could not stand on the 
edge of this potential disaster, wringing my hands and uttering platitudes; 
that what was happening deeply involved my people, and, in some way, I 
had to be there •••••• Everytime there was a major picket ••• ! would drive 
out and walk in front of the pit and around the paths leading to the 
colliery. • ••• I had no clear plan; what I simply wanted to do was to be 
with my people in their agony, in their fear, in their confusion" 
(Barrodale, p3). 
Most of the clergy had their dog-collars clearly visible so that people 
knew who they were. "If it was right that I should be there then it was 
right that I should be seen to be there" (Barrodale, p3). However, one 
clergyman deliberately did not have any clerical identification, much to the 
concern of the police who were somewhat worried that they might arrest 
him by mistake. He argued that he did not want any special treatment, 
and if he deserved to be arrested then he should be, and if not then they 
should not be arresting him. 
Most of the clergy found that their presence with the pickets helped to 
defuse any violence, and several said that they attempted to keep up 
morale and foster an element of humour, both of which reduced hostile 
tension. One commented that when he was with the pickets there was 
never any violence. Indeed, the local trade union leader used to call him 
out if he suspected that there may be some trouble brewing. Another said 
that at times of increased tension he tried to defuse the situation by 
walking slowly, speaking calmly and by getting to the front and acting as 
a block. When the dispute was over a union steward thanked him for 
visiting regularly, 
' "because when you were here, those bastards", he said, pointing to the 
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police, "kept their truncheons in their pockets, whilst those bastards", he 
said, pointing to his own pickets, "kept their stones in their pockets" ' 
(Barrodale, p6). 
However, some clergy did get caught up in violent clashes between the 
police and pickets. One, whilst on a routine visit to the picket line, was 
chased by police dogs though woodland surrounding the colliery. This was 
in the early days of the return to work and the police had laid an ambush 
for the pickets. By letting their dogs loose, the police appeared to be 
making no attempt to discriminate between those who had a legitimate 
right to be in the vicinity, and those who could possibly have been accused 
of attempting a breach of the peace. This was a very frightening 
experience for all who were chased, but it enabled the Vicar concerned to 
experience what the pickets were going through and so share with them. 
Of all the actions of the clergy during the dispute, their presence on the 
picket line was probably the most effective. Since, on occasions, there 
was the risk of danger to anyone amongst the picket, the personal 
estimation of the clergy rose in the eyes of the miners. Many miners who 
had no active contact with the church felt that the church, and the clergy 
in particular, did not regard them as important. The presence of the 
clergy at the colliery gate showed that the church did care for the 
working miner. "It certainly made the Vicar highly visible in the 
community, almost restored to him the status of Parson of the whole 
village, not just Pastor of the gathered congregation" (C. of E., Diocese of 
Sheffield, p15). 
Clergy who never visited the pickets were perceived as not caring about 
miners, and even to be against them. However, these perceptions did not 
accurately reflect the motives of these clergy for most of the clergy who 
did not join the pickets were desperately trying to appear neutral. They 
felt that their presence amongst the pickets would appear as positive 
support for the miners, both their case and their methods. To a certain 
extent this fear was reasonable for "visiting the pickets was perceived by 
many miners (often wrongly) as implied support" (op. cit., p15), but many 
clergy found that as time went on and they had established a relationship 
of trust with the local leaders of the striking miners, they were able to 
discuss the dispute and question some of the miners' methods and help the 
119 
miners start to understand other points of view about the dispute. "The 
more these Vicars became involved in community groups, the more they 
could state their own judgements, and express their sense of neutrality" 
(op. cit., p22). One even managed to draw individual miners and 
policemen together to discuss what the dispute was doing to their families. 
But it did take time before this could start to happen. If challenging 
questions were asked too early then clergy presence was seen as a threat 
and interpreted as hostility. 
Everyone we spoke to recognised that the church should, and must, be able 
to minister to all sections of the community during a major industrial 
dispute, and this meant the church taking some sort of neutral or non-
aligned stance. The key dilemma that the clergy faced was how to do 
this. For those people who were only marginally affected by the dispute, 
silence from the clergy was seen as neutrality. But for those heavily 
involved, a silent church and vicar meant that the church had deserted 
them and was therefore aligned with the forces against them. This was 
particularly so in areas where some parishes were providing a lot in the 
way of relief of hardship and their clergy had many contacts with the 
striking miners. Then the silent churches, or less active ones, were 
compared with the active ones and it was concluded that the former were 
against the miners' cause. This issue of how the church can best minister 
to the whole community, and how it can maintain some form of neutrality 
will be followed up in section 6.2.3. 
5.6 .2 Police 
Contact with the police was mainly limited to the picket lines, and many 
clergy felt that it was important for them to be seen by the pickets to 
talk with the police. This was a symbol of their ministry being to all 
people. 
In one village in Nottinghamshire, early on in the dispute, the officer in 
cou.lcl 
charge approached the local clergyman to ask whether the church haUL be 
used to provide rest, warmth and refreshment facilities for the police on 
picket duty. Agreement was given, but with the stipulation that whenever 
the police left the picket line and came down to the hall they offered a 
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lift and the opportunity of warmth and a drink to the pickets. The Vicar 
commented 11 I felt it terribly important that at the outset the Church 
should not be seen as being identified with one group, whoever they may 
be, against another. The offer was made and the police accepted on those 
terms and I went out to the picket line to make sure that the pickets also 
understood the nature of what was on offer. In fact, none of them ever 
did come down with the police, but I felt that it was very important that 
what we were doing should be clearly seen to have been done, and my 
attempts at even-handedness be understood 11 (Barrodale, p3). 
On various occasions the clergy acted as spokesmen either for a group of 
pickets or for the community as whole. One NUM activist reported that 
their Vicar had accompanied them on a visit to London to lobby their MP 
and also to form a local delegation to Hobart House (NCB Headquarters). 
The Vicar became their unofficial spokesmen as he was calmer than the 
miners, spoke well and his collar commanded respect. Outside Hobart 
House the police would almost certainly have moved the miners on had 
they not had their Vicar with them. 
When a hostile barricade had been built outside a South Yorkshire colliery, 
trapping about six members of management inside, following rumours that 
the police were bussing in miners from outside in unmarked vans, it was 
the Vicar who visited the police and emphasised that there were many 
women and children assembled close to the barricade and that there would 
almost certainly be people seriously injured or killed if the police 
attempted to clear the road. After several hours, when much of the 
crowd had dispersed peacefully, a single police van was allowed into the 
colliery to rescue the management. Then those on the barricade (many of 
whom were not miners) entered the colliery yard and destroyed buildings. 
There was no attempt by the police to regain control. 
In another village, when the Vicar heard that there was a likelihood of a 
riot in the area that evening, he, along with some local councillors and 
trade union leaders visited the police station and pleaded that the riot 
police be kept away. They had seen the damage that had resulted when 
riot police were brought in to control a situation in a nearby village and 
felt that the presence of the riot police had escalated the situation. The 
result was that the miners, along with various gangs of young men with a 
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reputation for trouble-making, lined up on one side of the village green, 
the police were on the other side and the Vicar and his colleagues sat in 
the middle. They sat there until the crowd dispersed at around three in 
the morning. 
During the time when there were many violent clashes outside the coking 
plant at Orgreave, tensions in many of the South Yorkshire communities 
were running very high. Street violence occurred in one small town centre 
late on Friday and Saturday nights with shops being damaged and raided, 
including those belonging to people supporting the strike relief efforts. 
The police acted swiftly and effectively to curb the violence and some of 
those charged were released on bail on the condition that they did not 
visit public houses and were indoors at certain times. This led to rumours 
that a curfew was operating in the town, and there was considerable 
unease, both about this and, also, the way in which the police controlled 
the violence. One of the local clergy was a Vice-chairman of the Police 
Liaison Surgery and he was particularly concerned to dispel these rumours, 
so he and other representatives from the community, including a trade 
union leader and another clergyman, met with the police and a poster was 
designed and distributed which claimed that there were no curfews in 
operation and that only South Yorkshire Police were present in the town. 
The behaviour of the police, in particular that of outside police forces 
which were called in to assist local forces in controlling large pickets, and 
their lack of public accountability caused considerable unease. In an 
attempt to monitor what was happening on picket lines Sheffield 
Policewatch was established early in April 1984. Three groups were 
established and, by working on a rota, sent out two or three voluntary 
monitors with the pickets on a daily basis. The monitors were clearly 
identified by marked badges and at the picket lines asked the officer in 
charge for an independent position, standing neither with the police nor the 
pickets (Field, p208). The volunteers included two of the chaplains from 
Sheffield Industrial Mission. 
It is difficult to assess overall how the clergy related to the police as 
every situation was different. No doubt, in the same way that many of 
the union leaders were grateful for clergy presence on picket lines as it 
helped reduce tensions, the police were glad to see anyone whose presence 
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lessened the likelihood of violence. On occasion the clergy were able to 
speak out on behalf of the police and remind people, that although there 
were times when the behaviour of the police left much to be desired, on 
the whole they were there because it was their job to be there and they 
were doing their job well. However, many clergy did have bad experiences 
with the police. One minister said that they fed him a pack of lies. 
Others spoke of being eye-witnesses to unnecessary violence and 
authoritarianism and themselves being treated with open hostility. One 
even discovered (much to the particular police officer's embarrassment) 
that a policeman had been instructed to tail him "and see that I didn't 
get up to too much trouble" (Barrodale, p8). 
5.6.3 Working miners 
Contact with working miners was considerably less than with those on 
strike, as they were at work and, therefore, less available. Many clergy 
who regularly visited the picket line often crossed them, usually having 
asked permission from the pickets, and visited those who were still at 
work. Their reception was not as welcoming as from those on the picket 
line, but those within the colliery, particularly management, had a job to 
do and had less time to talk to visitors. One Vicar who had had a good 
relationship with the local management before the dispute found that he 
was rebuffed during the strike. The regular management he had known 
well was replaced by new men and these people were not prepared to 
enter any form of dialogue; they just reiterated the official NCB line. 
On the whole, it was accepted that it was the job of deputies and 
management to work during the dispute and there was little intimidation of 
such people, although there was considerable resentment towards the 
deputies, particularly after they settled their grievances with the Coal 
Board and called off their industrial action before it commenced. Men 
who were NUM members but who continued to work were not so fortunate 
and both they and their families suffered various forms of intimidation. In 
Nottinghamshire, where whole communities were split, one minister 
reported that he spent many hours sitting in his study, listening to miners 
tell how frightened they were of going to work because others had been 
beaten up, or they had received threatening telephone calls and their 
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windows had been smashed. He saw that his task was to give a 
confidential ear to those whose self-image of the strong male made it 
very difficult to admit to being genuinely afraid. The wives of miners 
also came and voiced their concerns for their husbands, grateful merely for 
a sympathetic and confidential reception. 
Working miners and their families were visited in the normal course of 
duty, as the dispute did not stop the usual demands for baptisms, weddings 
and funerals. Occasionally, there were specific requests that a working 
miner be visited and these were followed up and support given. One Vicar 
commented that it was rare for the miners to open up in their own homes; 
discussions about the dispute more often occurred on a one-to-one basis, 
when he met someone whilst out shopping. Then he would usually ask how 
they felt about the dispute, but was always careful not to express his 
personal opinion. 
Some miners sought out their local Vicar to discuss whether to return to 
work before the dispute ended. One clergyman who was sought out in this 
way later explained that he was very careful not to give direct advice but, 
rather, he tried to get the man to talk through the reasons why he should 
return. In particular, he attempted to get the man to see how the 
community would view his actions if he did go back. 11 I also wanted to 
say (to him) that if he went back I would honour that as being a decision 
which had been taken for conscientious reasons - for good reasons - and 
that I certainly wasn't going to criticise him for going back 11 • 
An engineer, who returned to work just before the strike ended, said he 
felt it necessary to talk over his decision to return to work with his Vicar 
because people around knew that he was a churchgoer. 
In one South Yorkshire community, the strike was broken by a group of 
contractors who were sinking the shaft to a new coal face. Despite being 
independent contractors, they had been required to become members of the 
NUM before commencing the work and for the first six months of the 
dispute had honoured the picket line. In September, feeling very much 
victims of the dispute, they returned to work and several violent clashes 
between the police and the pickets resulted. Anger against those 
contractors in the local community was fuelled by the fact that some 
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months prior to the dispute the contractors had their own jobs secured in 
a separate, unrelated dispute by the same union secretary whose picket 
they were now flouting! One of the local clergy did visit them, though he 
went feeling that their actions had put at stake the sense of community, 
solidarity and trust within the village. However, he heard their view that 
since they were doing development work they were helping to safeguard 
the future of the community. 
In all this we see clergy attempting to foster opportunities for 
reconciliation by encouraging those on opposite sides of the picket line to 
start to understand the point of view of the other. Their 11 presence 
created tiny islands of peace, laughter and at-one-ment 11 (Barrodale, p7). 
Merely by their presence, the clergy helped to keep the flame of hope 
flickering amongst the darkness of bitterness, violence and futility which so 
often engulfed those caught up in all sides of the dispute. 
5.7 Some Preliminary Conclusions 
Chapter 6 will analyse the national, regional and local responses to the 
coal dispute in a systematic way, however, there are some significant 
findings which arise from the responses of the local churches. 
First, there was an enormous amount of appreciation for the support the 
churches gave to the communities during the dispute. This was despite the 
fact that most of the parishes could be described as 11 a mining parish but 
not a mining congregation 11 (C. of E., Diocese of Sheffield, p6). 
Secondly, co-operation between the church and the community during the 
dispute flowed that much earlier and more easily where the church was 
already seen to be there to be serving the whole community, eg at Maltby 
(section 5.2) and where local clergy had enjoyed regular contact with the 
colliery. Churches which operated strict baptism policies or where the 
vicar had maintained a low public profile were taken 11 to imply a 
deliberate distancing of the church from the miners' community 11 (op. cit., 
p7). 
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Thirdly, the socio-economic mix of the parish did seem to affect the way 
the local church responded to the strike. Where the parish was 
dominated by the mining industry the church usually got involved with 
little hesitation. If there was a greater socio-economic mix, particularly 
if the mining population was concentrated in one section of the parish, 
then the church response was more hesitant, though, in many cases, still 
considerable. Part of this was due to geography; the estates housing the 
miners were often furthest from the church, thus making the establishment 
of a canteen for the miners impractical. 
Finally, the actions of the clergy during the dispute were judged relative 
to one another by the miners. If one clergyman in an area became highly 
involved and maintained a high public profile then his fame spread rapidly 
and others were compared unfavorably with him, despite the fact that they 
might be almost as heavily involved. Instances of this occurred in both 
the South Yorkshire and the Durham areas. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Analysis and Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
All those who responded to the 1984-5 dispute, and there could have been 
few church members who at the very least did not hope and pray for a 
peaceful settlement to it, were attempting to put their Christian principles 
into action. Particularly in situations which are as complex as was this 
industrial dispute, there are bound to be times when the same Christian 
principles suggest very different courses of action. This point was 
acknowledged by the report 'Perspectives on Economics' (see section 4.3.2) 
and was illustrated by the many different ways in which Christians did 
respond to the pit strike. The task now is to attempt some sort of 
classification of these responses in order to analyse the situation more 
fully (section 6.2). 
Attention will then be turned to two particularly problematic areas in the 
churches' response to a major industrial conflict. The first is the role of 
church leaders who, whenever they speak out on anything verging on the 
fields of economics or politics, arouse loud cries that they are meddling in 
affairs about which they know nothing and that these matters are beyond 
the legitimate sphere of comment by Christian leaders. Given that many 
church leaders made comments about the dispute during its lengthy course 
and received criticism for so doing, the case for church statements and 
the mechanisms by which they are made will be examined (section 6.3). 
Secondly, the tension that exists between peace (i.e. settling the dispute as 
quickly as possible) and justice (i.e. reaching a settlement which is fair to 
all parties) in a major industrial conflict will be scrutinised (section 6.4). 
Finally, lessons which can be learnt from the response of the churches to 
the coal dispute will be highlighted, including areas where there was room 
for improvement, but also drawing considerable encouragement from the 
part the churches did play (section 6.5). 
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6.2 Classification of church responses to the dispute 
6.2.1 Background to the typology 
In attempting this classification, the typology devised by Drs D.G.A. 
Koelega in the project 'Unemployment: work for the churches' will be 
used. Koelega argues that looking at unemployment should not be an 
isolated activity. Borrowing phrases from the World Council of Churches, 
he claims the churches' concern is for a 'Just, Participatory and 
Sustainable Society' (JPSS) or, as the phrase was later revised, for 
'Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation'. This means that it is 
important "to discern which measures and ideas are appropriate for the 
relief of unemployment problems as part of this comprehensive concern" 
(Koelega, p6). Similarly, an industrial dispute, particularly one which had 
as many dimensions as the 1984-5 coal dispute, should not be treated as 
an isolated dispute, but needs to be understood and responded to in a much 
wider context, for it may well have roots which lie deep in the past, and 
the manner in which it is resolved will have implications for the future. 
Koelega 's typology has been devised "in order to enable a structural 
description and comparative analysis of the wide variety of church 
statements and projects. The typology consists of three types. Their 
differences lie in the degree to which they pay attention to structural and 
long-term aspects of the unemployment crisis or - in the words of the 
World Council of Churches - in the degree to which actual church 
responses imply a concern for 'justice, participation and sustainability"' 
(Koelega,p9). 
Koelega then goes on to suggest amplifications of JPSS in this context; a 
church reflects concern if it addresses not just unemployment itself but 
also "the relationship between the unemployment crisis and the more 
comprehensive issues of: 
a just national and world-wide distribution of income and the benefit 
from natural resources, (1) 
just and participative working conditions, (2) 
the production of socially useful commodities and services answering 
real human needs, (3) 
criticism towards the dominant belief in the need for economic 
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growth as the way out of the crisis, ( 4) 
the (sic) criticism towards the dominant work-ethic which stresses 
duty, discipline, achievement and consumption, (5) 
types of production which do not pollute our environment, (6) 
a sustainable social order, that is a social order which can be 
perceived as legitimate and lawful by the people involved, (7) 
criticism of the dominant confidence in technocratic solutions for 
socio-economic problems and of the (sic) technological science and 
its influence on society (8)" (Koelega, p10). 
Whilst it could be argued that all these issues have implications for the 
running of the mining industry, some seem to be more pertinent than 
others. Also a strike, even one as long as the 1984-5 coal dispute, is a 
much shorter crisis than unemployment as a whole, and consequently there 
is less opportunity for long-term issues to be addressed. would therefore 
wish to comment on and modify Koelega 1 s list as follows: 
(1) unaltered 
the just distribution of income is highly relevant since the closing of 
pits means a considerable reduction in income for those made 
redundant and also for the community as a whole, as there is less 
work available for the next generation, and reduced spending power 
threatens other businesses. More crucial is the just benefit from 
natural resources since coal is a non-renewable resource and the 
ethics of rendering coal seams sterile on the grounds of short-term 
economics is highly questionable (see section 1.3). 
(2) unaltered and (5) unaltered 
Both these issues are highly relevant. The right of management to 
manage as understood by the NCB (see sections 3.2. and 3.4) implies 
a reduction of worker participation in working conditions and places 
considerable emphasis on workers 1 duties and discipline. 
(3) and ( 4) 
The case against coal, either as a raw material or as a source of 
energy, not being socially useful or answering real human needs is 
not strong, at least, not in the first instance. Similarly, the 
132 
criticism of economic growth is not an immediate issue raised by 
the coal strike. Perhaps, what is more relevant is the need for 
decisions about the coal industry to be taken in the context of an 
integrated energy policy. Such a policy, in turn, should take 
account of the wider issues of (3) and (4). For the purposes of this 
study (3) and (4) will be replaced by: 
the need for an integrated energy policy. 
(6) unaltered 
This relates to (1) above and the careful husbandry of coal 
resources and also relates to an integrated energy policy which must 
give prime consideration to the dangers and polluting effects of the 
various forms of energy. 
(7) unaltered 
The way the miners' strike was policed was regarded by some as 
neither legitimate nor lawful so this issue is of great relevance (see 
section 3.5). 
( 8) unaltered 
The shedding of labour in the coal industry as a whole, in line with 
the introduction of new technology and the integration of collieries 
into 'super-pits,' was one of the factors which led to the onset of 
the strike, so again, this is a relevant issue (see section 3.2). 
Comparison of how churches responded to the coal dispute and to the 
issues raised by this list suggests that three types of response can be 
distinguished (after Koelega, pl0-11): 
a 'relief response' which focussed on the hardship suffered by those 
affected by the strike and sought to offer welfare assistance. 
a 'reformist response' which too offered relief but also began to 
address the social, economic and ethical questions raised by the 
dispute, and attempted to provide assistance in the formulation of a 
negotiated settlement. 
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a 'transformative response• which pressed for a negotiated settlement 
but in the wider context of an integrated energy policy, and with full 
realisation of the social costs involved in closing pits and taking into 
account the non-renewable nature of coal i.e. there was some effort 
11 to achieve a transformation of the existing social and economic 
system so that it may answer the criteria of JPSS as much as 
possible" (Koelega pll). This response also delved more deeply into 
the ethical issues raised by the dispute. 
As Koelega points out (pll-12), any typology overemphasizes some 
characteristics at the expense of others, but this is necessary in order for 
the different types to be distinguished. Furthermore, no typology can be 
exhaustive; there is always the possibility that more types can be 
discerned. It should also be stressed that it is unlikely that, in the real 
world, a response which exactly matches any one of these 'types' will be 
encountered, but some will tend more to one 'type' than another. There 
may also be a shift of response from one 'type' to another as time 
elapses. Finally, it should be noted that a typology is an analytical tool 
and as such is non-judgemental, though as conclusions are drawn from the 
analysis then value judgements about the appropriateness of the different 
responses are made. This will be done in section 6.2.3. 
Koelega 's typology has been adopted partly for practical reasons. As has 
been seen above, the basic criteria on which it is based have required 
little modification from their original context of responding to the issues 
of unemployment to the context of an industrial dispute in an extractive 
industry and they pick up many of the ethical dilemmas raised in chapter 
3. Also, the underlying theology (and Koelega (p13) makes clear that the 
participants in 'Unemployment: Work for the churches' favour the 
transformative response with its closeness to the criteria of JPSS) is in 
line with that of 'Perspectives on Economics', the report accepted by the 
General Synod of the Church of England in November 1984 when the coal 
dispute was at its height (see section 4.3.2). This report identified a gap 
11 which still needs to be bridged, between Christian insight and moral 
conviction on the one hand and economic problems and practical decisions 
on the other" (C. of E., BSR, Industrial Committee, p2). The issues on 
which Koelega 's typology has been based start to bridge this gap and go 
on to suggest actions which could be taken by the churches in order to 
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further the creation of a 1 Just, Participatory and Sustainable Society 1 in a 
particular situation. 
6.2.2 Constructing the Typology 
Koelega (p23) provides a summary diagram of the types he identifies. 
Since this work is drawing heavily on that of Koelega this diagram is 
reproduced (Figure 1). Figure 2 is a similar diagram illustrating the 
variations in the factors which make up the types of church responses to 
the coal dispute and providing a summary of this section. 
As can be seen from Figure 2, four factors have been used to distinguish 
the 'relief', 'reformist' and 'transformative' types. Further comment on 
each factor follows. 
6.2.2.1 Church Actions 
The starting point for classifying the responses of the churches is to 
attempt a distinction on the grounds of what they actually did during the 
dispute (see chapters 4 and 5). Unlike unemployment, for example, which 
manifests itself gradually within a community and thus gives the opportunity 
for considered analysis and reflection before any alleviating action is taken, 
a strike, particularly one which is highly localised, has very immediate 
effects on the local community and alleviating action is taken very quickly 
in an ad hoc fashion. In this dispute it became quickly obvious that many 
people were struggling to afford basic necessities. The close-knit character 
of mining villages, combined with the sense that not just the pit but the 
whole community was under threat, led to an enormous mobilisation of 
neighbourly spirit and mutual help. Virtually all Christian congregations in 
mining villages were caught up in this, in the sense that all contained 
people whose families and neighbours were suffering privation, and these 
people went on to help their loved ones in whatever way they could. This 
typified the 'relief response'; the pastoral care by individuals for those in 
need. This response was also seen well beyond the coalfields with many 
individual Christians giving to the various hardship funds and appeals on 
behalf of the miners (section 5.5). The dispute also impinged on worship 
with prayers being made for a speedy settlement. These were phrased in 
general terms with individuals rarely being named (section 5.2). 
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Figure 1: A Typology of Church Responses to unemployment 
(Koelega, p23) 
Types: 
Aspects of 
church 
responses 
Analysis 
Relief~ 
Aiming at direct help 
for the casualties of 
unemployment and at 
relief of the misery 
inflicted on them by 
unemp I oymen t 
Little analysis 
Short description of 
the bad unemployment 
situation 
No criticism of 
government, business, 
or other powerful 
policy makers 
Theological Charity 
ref! ect ion 
Reformist~ 
Aiming at reinte-
gration of the 
unemployed people 
in the employment 
system and at a 
reform of the 
existing socio-
economic system 
and policies 
Start of more 
structural analysis 
Extended descrip-
tion of the situ-
ation and its 
consequences 
Criticism of all 
policy makers 
Justice, 
solidarity 
Transformative ~ 
Aiming at a structunU 
and radical trans-
formation of the 
present socio-
economic and 
cultural system in 
the direction of 
JPSS 
Extensive analysis 
Long-term and 
complex character 
of unemp I oymen t 
crisis stressed 
Social and 
economic order 
criticized 
Justice participation 
a sustainability 
on values, 
the work-
ethic a the 
role of the 
church 
Traditional work-ethic Revised work-ethic New life-ethic. 
Recomnend-
ations on 
policies in 
general 
Recomnend-
ations on 
church 
action to 
fight unem-
ployment 
Church has primarily 
a diaconal and 
pastoral role 
Present policies 
must be more 
effective 
Particular pastoral 
care for individual 
unemployed people 
and extra diaconal 
help 
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Church must also 
ask attention for 
neglected problems 
Reform in existing 
socio-economic 
policies and 
system 
Schemes for unem-
ployed people 
(education, 
creation of work, 
training) 
Prophetic a political 
role for the church; 
organise the poor 
Radical structural 
changes 
Alternative activi-
ties aimed at struct-
ural and radical 
changes: political 
action without 
neglecting short-
term help to victims 
Figure 2: A Typology of Church Responses to the Coal Dispute 
(After Koelega, p23) 
Types: 
Factors 
Church 
Actions 
Analysis 
Aims of 
church 
responses 
Theological 
reflection 
on values, 
the work-
ethic a the 
role of the 
church. 
Relief~ 
Pastoral care for 
individuals and 
extra diaconal 
help. 
Little analysis. 
Description of 
hardship 
individuals 
are suffering. 
No criticism of 
participants in 
strike, except 
perpetrators of 
violence. 
Direct help to 
those caught up 
in the dispute. 
Charity 
Traditional 
work-ethic. 
Church has 
primarily 
a diaconal and 
pastoral role. 
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Reformist~ 
Organised relief and 
protest at local 
level, debate about 
community life. 
Start of more 
structural analysis. 
Description of 
effects of dispute on 
all parties to it. 
Criticism of all 
directly involved. 
Direct help plus a 
negotiated settlement 
which took account of 
social costs of pit 
closures. 
Justice, solidarity, 
peace. 
Revised work-ethic. 
Church role to high-
light neglected 
people and problems. 
Voice for the 
powerless. 
Transformative ~ 
Organised relief, 
political dimension 
to protest, debate on 
nature of work and 
stewardship of non-
renewable resources. 
Extensive analysis. 
Attempts to put 
dispute in historical, 
social a political 
perspective. 
Criticism of social a 
political order, 
especially energy 
consumption. 
Concern about wider 
issues raised e.g. 
policing policies. 
A negotiated settle-
ment, in the context of 
an integrated energy 
policy. 
Justice, participation 
a sustainability. 
New life-ethic. 
Prophetic and political 
role for the church. 
Organise the 
powerless. 
The 'reformist response' was characterised by organised church action such 
as the establishment of a church food parcel scheme or a hardship fund, or 
church premises being used for a canteen, or the local church giving active 
support to Miners' Wives Groups or Trade Union relief action (section 5.5). 
The church was also seen to care about the crisis in the community with 
clergy, including some regional and national church leaders, spending time 
with pickets (sections 4.5 and 5.6.1) or writing about its effects in the 
parish magazine or local paper (section 5.4). Public platforms, including 
pulpits, were used to express concern about community life with protest 
being made that the social costs of pit closures were not being given 
enough consideration (section 5.3 and 4.5). Many church leaders felt they 
had a duty to speak out on behalf of the people for whom they had 
pastoral responsibility. This will be discussed more in section 6.3. An 
urgency was felt about the need to resolve the dispute and many worked 
hard to attempt some sort of reconciliation between the various parties 
(section 4.6). Within worship prayers were regularly offered for those 
caught up in the dispute, for the cessation of violence and for a just and 
speedy settlement (section 5.2). 
The 'transformative response' included both individual and organised relief 
(section 4.7 and 5.5) but the emphasis was more on protest at the way the 
mining communities were being treated (sections 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 5.3). 
This protest included a strong political dimension and took a wider view of 
the issues including debate about the nature of work and stewardship of 
non-renewable natural resources. Prayers in worship reflected these wider 
concerns, and occasionally sermons were used to raise these issues (sections 
5.2 and 5.3). Attempts to bring about a negotiated settlement were felt to 
be a proper role for the church, but only in the context of coal being part 
of an integrated energy policy and stress was placed on proper negotiating 
and participating rights of the employees being retained (section 4.6) ; 
management's right to manage was seen as far from absolute (4.3.2, 4.4 
and 4.5). 
6.2.2.2 Church Analysis of the Situation 
As the coal dispute continued beyond the initial few weeks, the need for 
some sort of analysis of the situation from a Christian perspective was 
discerned within the church press, by industrial chaplains and by various 
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church boards concerned with industrial matters, as well as by some 
individual clergy. 
The 'relief response• was typified by a description of the situation, whether 
locally or nationally, with the emphasis placed on the suffering being caused 
by the dispute. There was little actual analysis of the issues involved and 
there was no criticism of the various parties to the dispute, except those 
seen to be committing acts of violence. Articles in 'The Tablet' and some 
in the 'Church Times' fell into this category (section 4.2). 
Articles, such as those which appeared in the 'Methodist Recorder' and 
papers by some industrial missions and church boards (section 4.2), which 
gave detailed descriptions of the effects of the dispute on different sections 
of the mining communities and which went on to give some analysis of the 
socio-economic background to it and to probe the many issues raised by it 
come under the 'reformist• category. Some criticism is made of 
Government and NUM policy as well as the behaviour of both striking and 
working miners and the police. It is believed that there are possibilities for 
all parties to reform their behaviour and attitudes in the interests of justice 
and the com man good. 
'Transformative• analysis goes that much further and particularly highlights 
the political dimensions to the dispute, with criticism being made of those 
using the situation to further their own political ends. The effects of the 
way the strike was policed and their implications for law and order within 
society are considered. Emphasis is placed on the need for responsible 
stewardship of coal and short-term economic policies are severely 
questioned. The morality of modern, highly technical, but wasteful, 
extraction techniques is raised and it is argued that decisions about sources 
of energy should not be taken in isolation but an integrated energy policy 
should be drawn up. Energy conservation should be encouraged and the 
assumption that there should be continued economic growth matched by 
increased output of energy is questioned. Reference is made to the 
underlying ethical criteria on which the analysis is based, and these criteria 
tend in the direction of a just, participatory and sustainable society. This 
type of analysis was made by the Kent and Croydon Industrial Chaplains 
Team, the Leeds Industrial Mission and the QSRE set of papers (section 
4.2). 
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6.2.2.3 Aims of church responses 
Because many of the church actions were ad hoc responses to a crisis 
situation the following can only be tentative suggestions about what were 
the underlying aims. However, it seems that the 'relief' response was 
attempting to offer direct help to those suffering during the dispute, 
irrespective of whether or not they were deemed to deserve help. Some 
argued that since the miners could solve all their immediate financial 
problems by abandoning their industrial action they did not deserve any 
assistance from others (see sections 4.7 and 5.5), however, the 'relief' 
response put aside the question of moral eligibility; the fact a neighbour 
was in need was sufficient to justify assistance from those able to offer 
such. There was, however, considerable concern that the church (local) try 
to remain totally neutral in the dispute, so it was left to individual 
Christians to make the relief response whilst the local church was careful 
not to make an organised response or to comment publicly on the dispute 
(see section 5.5). 
The 'reformist' response went that much further in its attitude to relief 
with churches organising relief or aligning themselves with local relief 
efforts (section 5.5). Considerable emphasis was placed on the need for the 
church to be seen, if not quite neutral, at least still concerned for all 
parties, particularly that it should not be seen to discriminate against 
anyone. Clergy were also aiming to act as agents of reconciliation both in 
the local community (section 5.6)and at a national level (section 4.6). To 
this extent many called for, and some actively tried to ease the path to, a 
negotiated settlement, particularly one which took account of the social 
cost of pit closures. 
Those aiming in a 'transformative' direction still worked in whatever way 
they could towards the dispute reaching a negotiated settlement but their 
prime concern was that the settlement be in the interests of Justice, 
Participation and Sustainability: this was more important than getting the 
coal industry working again as soon as possible. The peace proposals of the 
Welsh churches (section 4.6) most nearly mirror this response. 
6.2.2.4 Theological Reflection on values, the work-ethic and the role of the 
church 
Because of the crisis nature of an industrial dispute there is little time for 
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considered theological reflection before making an active response to the 
local situation. However, those interviewed stressed that much of what 
they did during the dispute was governed by concern for Christian principles. 
The Christian values which seemed to be most pertinent in this dispute all 
tended in the direction of JPSS and also included charity, human equality, 
concern for the powerless, and peace, both in the community and in the 
coal industry. There was also considerable concern that the church be seen 
as having a ministry to all, whether or not they be churchgoers and 
however they were caught up in the dispute (see especially sections 5.3 and 
5.5). As Koelega discovered, when studying unemployment, the differences 
between the various responses lie not so much in different responses 
espousing different Christian values, but in the emphasis that is placed on 
the various values (Koelega, p18). Furthermore, there is a high degree of 
similarity between the theological values which lie behind the various 
responses to unemployment and this industrial dispute. 
The 'relief response' was motivated particularly by a concern for charity, 
especially towards the powerless, in order to express the equality of 
humanity. Underlying this is an acceptance of the traditional protestant 
work-ethic and the desirability of continued economic growth. The church's 
main social role is that of a caring agency, offering assistance to those in 
need. This role is not seen as having a political dimension; indeed there is 
much concern that the church remain neutral in the face of a divided 
community, hence the reluctance of some churches to formally align 
themselves with a union relief effort (section 5.5). 
In the 'reformist response' motives of charity were significant but much of 
the organised relief effort was an attempt to serve the interests of justice. 
Considerable sections of the community were seen to be suffering unfairly 
and it was therefore proper that the church be seen to support them. 
However, lest the church be open to accusations of being partisan, many 
churches offered their premises for canteens on the basis that their 
facilities be available to the police, as well as to all striking miners and 
their families, whether or not they undertook picket duty. The interests of 
justice were also served by the churches drawing attention to the social 
costs of pit closures and calling for a revision of the closure programme, in 
which profit was not the main criterion of assessment (section 4.3 and 4.5). 
The desire for peace prompted many clergy to visit pickets and to try to 
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act as agents of reconciliation between the various factions, both in local 
communities and within the mining industry as a whole {sections 4.4, 4.5, 
4.6 and 5.6). 
Those tending towards a •transformative response• were clear that the role 
of the church includes a prophetic call, with a strong political dimension, to 
society to organise itself in a way that is just, participative and sustainable. 
Quality of life for all takes precedence over economic performance. Church 
action includes a strong defence of the oppressed and the powerless, and 
emphasises assistance which leads to self-help and increases self-respect. 
The church still stresses the importance of a ministry to all, but this does 
not take priority over the championing of a just cause. Many of these 
values underlie the issues raised and the questions posed by papers written 
by the industrial missions {section 4.2). 
6.2.3 Conclusions drawn from the typology 
In comparing the various responses of the church {chapters 4 6 5) with this 
typology it is noticeable that different levels of the church tended to 
respond in different ways. Those who most typified the 'relief' response 
were individual Christians; ordinary members of churches. Most lived in the 
mining communities or had some link with a particular community, though a 
considerable number were from other areas, even abroad, who responded 
with Christian charity to a perceived need. 
The response of many clergy in mining communities, together with sections 
of their congregations, could be categorised as •reformist•. These are the 
people who provided church relief in an organised fashion and attempted to 
act as local symbols of reconciliation and at-one-ment {atonement). They 
also used church magazines and the local press to try to probe the many 
issues involved in the dispute and give hints on Christian behaviour in these 
circumstances. A few church leaders were involved in relief funds, mainly 
as trustees rather than in the day-to-day administration of the fund. Many 
more took the trouble to provide carefully worded public statements about 
the rights and wrongs of the dispute, as they understood them, from their 
Christian perspective. These statements, together with the church pleas for 
negotiated settlements, have many of the hallmarks of the •reformist• 
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category. So too the various papers offering some description and analysis 
of the dispute produced by the various boards and committees of the 
differing denominations which were concerned with industrial matters and by 
some industrial missions (section 4.2). 
On the whole, the analysis of the industrial missions went further than that 
of the church boards and committees and tended towards the 
'transformative response'. Two examples of this are the paper produced by 
the Kent and Croydon Industrial Chaplains' Team and that by the Leeds 
Industrial Mission (section 4.2). Some church leaders also raised issues in 
the 'transformative' category; this was particularly so of those involved in 
aiding the resolution of the dispute, for instance the suggestion of the 
Welsh churches that an Independent Review Body be established, but to work 
in the context of a National Energy Policy (section 4.6). 
Of course, there are some exceptions to these generalisations, but in most 
cases it was the local church which typified the 'relief response', with 
some verging on a 'reformist response', the regional and national church 
bodies and leaders who typified the 'reformist responses' and, to a lesser 
extent 'transformative responses', with the work of some industrial 
chaplaincies illustrating many traits of the 'transformative response'. 
There thus seems to be considerable correlation between the type of 
response and the level of the church making the response. This is, perhaps, 
not too surprising for the level one occupies within the church has a 
bearing on the effectiveness of one's response. For instance, any individual 
so motivated can make a gesture of charity which will reach its target, and 
that, in essence, is the 'relief response'. However, those wishing to make 
a response which is either reformist or transformative soon find themselves 
needing to make some sort of criticism of organisations and structures, and 
here the position one occupies within society makes a great deal of 
difference to whether that criticism reaches its target. Any individual can 
write a letter to a newspaper, a trade union leader, a secretary of state, a 
chairman of a company, but the contents of that letter will have more 
impact if they are from someone in a position of authority, e.g. a bishop, 
rather than from a concerned member of the public. 
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The implications of this are twofold: first, this piece of research may have 
considerably underestimated the number of individuals within the church who 
espoused reformist and transformative responses as their voice was not 
heard. Secondly, it suggests that the various levels of the church are 
differently equipped and are, therefore> better suited to making different 
responses. However, there will be some overlap in the types of response 
because the response types, as identified by Koelega, are not mutually 
exclusive, but rather, to a considerable extent, cumulative; for instance, the 
reform type includes a considerable relief operation, and the transformative 
type extends the analysis of the reformist. This became particularly 
apparent in the coal dispute through the question of how the church chould 
maintain a ministry to all, whilst proclaiming justice and acting as an 
agent of reconciliation. 
Some local churches felt that the best way to maintain a ministry to all 
sections of the community was for the church to remain totally neutral and 
therefore, say virtually nothing about the rights and wrongs of the dispute 
(see sections 5.3 and 5.4). If they were not aligned they would be better 
equipped to serve as a symbol of reconciliation, particularly once the 
dispute had ended. This meant that their maximum response was that of 
'relief' by way of extending the family network. However, especially in 
areas where other churches were seen to be organising relief operations and 
clergy were known to be regular visitors to the picket line, the lack of 
action by these 1 neutral parishes 1 was interpreted as meaning that the 
church was against the striking miners. This was even the case where a 
considerable relief operation was mounted but carefully executed by 
members of the congregation, as individuals and via house-groups (section 
5.5). Only when clergy took a public lead, i.e. they made a reformist type 
response, was the relief perceived as being from the church. In such 
reformist parishes the proclamation of justice and concern for those in need 
seemed to be more important than remaining totally neutral. However, this 
public action actually enabled a considerable work of reconciliation within 
communities. It was rarely construed as a political act implying that the 
church was condemning the Coal Board or the working miners, rather, it 
was accepted that it was a proper role of the church to help those in need. 
Indeed, the church was often asked by the NUM to help those perceived to 
be in greatest need (section 5.5). Many new relationships between clergy 
and miners were forged and, as trust grew, it was possible for the deeper 
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issues of the strike to be discussed, for clergy to draw together those on 
both sides of the picket line for a few moments, so each could try to 
understand the effects the picketing was having on the families of the other 
(see section 5.6.1). 
Furthermore, the action of the local church gave authority and credibility 
to the regional and national church. For instance, where the local church 
was publicly engaged helping the community cope with the upheaval of the 
dispute, any church leaders who spoke out were listened to with great 
interest. They were less likely to be dismissed as 'pulpit pontificators', 
who operated in a different world from the miners. In some cases they 
were in danger of becoming folk heroes for, with so few establishment 
figures giving any support for the cause of the striking miners, those who 
did so were given a rapturous welcome. At times this meant that only part 
of their message was heard; it had to be emphasised to one group of miners 
that the Bishop of Durham had words of criticism for Arthur Scargill as 
well as for Ian MacGregor. However, where the local church was seen to 
be mounting an active response to the dispute, the pronouncements by the 
agents of the church at national and regional level were given that much 
more credibility. 
There were, however, those, as letters pages in many papers witnessed, who 
were troubled by the way many church leaders spoke out during the course 
of the coal dispute. Church leaders, it was argued, should be spiritual 
leaders and concentrate their energies less on matters political (section 
4.5). This argument is often used whenever church leaders stray into the 
field of matters political. Since senior clergy have such a public position in 
society and since they received considerable media coverage during the 
course of the coal dispute, it is worth considering what their proper role 
should be in circumstances such as a major industrial dispute. 
6.3 The Role of Church Leaders 
"I have no doubt at all of the right and duty of the church to speak out on 
political matters ••••• (and) for those from the Catholic tradition the Church 
speaks primarily through the bishops." That is the view of John Selwyn 
Gummer MP, as expressed in 'The Guardian', 29.4.85, but almost every 
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time a bishop does speak out, particularly on political matters, Mr Gummer 
is often among the first publicly to criticise the bishop's comments. 
Over the last ten years there seems to have been an increase in the 
outspokenness of bishops. This is happening not just in Britain but 
throughout the world (Lee and Stanford, plOO). In Britain, however, this 
has coincided with government by the Conservative party and the coal 
dispute is just one of many issues whereby some church leaders have 
criticised Government policy. Under Conservative rule the post-war 
political consensus has been challenged on many fronts (Lee and Stanford, 
p20). Furthermore, "a reappraisal of thinking and mood has taken place 
across a wide range of economic and social ideas leading to a depreciation 
of collective responsibility and enhancing the values of individualism" 
(Catholic Church, pl2). Given that the post-war political consensus 
embodied many Christian principles, particularly those concerning wealth 
redistribution, it is hardly surprising that church leaders have not allowed 
this to happen without voicing some protest. The bishops maintain that 
they are responding on behalf of their people and that they only speak out 
when an issue obliges them as Christian leaders so to do (Lee and 
Stanford, p20). 
But should church leaders speak out in this way? Since apostolic times 
the task of bishop has involved caring for, guiding and leading the church 
(Lee and Stanford, pl25). Particularly in order to lead, but also in order 
to guide and care for their people, bishops need to have a public voice. It 
also means being concerned about their concerns and speaking out on their 
behalf. David Sheppard (Bishop of Liverpool) feels that belief in a creator 
God who cares about the quality of life that all human beings experience, 
means that providing a voice for those "with very little clout", when 
damaging things are happening to them, is part of his job as bishop (Lee 
and Stanford, p134). Similarly, the Bishop of Durham explained why he 
touched on the coal dispute in his enthronement sermon, "It seemed to me 
clear, quite apart from the long tradition of the bishops of Durham with 
the mining community, that if you're going to speak in a great and 
ancient cathedral you cannot avoid addressing one of the most painful 
living issues that we are in the midst of" (Lee and Stanford, p21). 
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Recent Roman Catholic teaching concurs with this. In 1980, Bishop Kelly, 
speaking during the run-up to an election in America said, "Human dignity 
is the criterion of a just economy and a humane world. It is protected by 
a set of fundamental human rights. These include the right to basic 
necessities without which full human development is impossible" (Lee and 
Stanford, plOO). Pope John Paul II, in enumerating basic rights to human 
dignity included the rights to employment, food, housing, health care and 
education. He added that all persons have a right to these, and the 
Government, as provider of last resort has the responsibility to ensure that 
they are made available to all (lac. cit.). 
There does seem to be a strong case for bishops speaking out in 
circumstances such as the announcement of a major programme of pit 
closures which will cause severe unemployment in many small communities. 
But what should the bishops say and how should it be said? 
An important ground rule is that courtesy must be maintained (Gummer, 
op. cit.). Any remark which can be deemed as even mildly offensive 
makes the headlines and detracts from the substance of the message. The 
Bishop of Durham soon discovered this when he referred to Mr MacGregor 
as an "imported elderly American" in his enthronement sermon (Jenkins, 
p5). Church leaders need to be aware that they, by their very position, 
possess considerable 'star quality' and the media are all too ready to make 
headlines out of anything they may say or do. 
Gummer (op. cit.) is also right to stress that bishops should be committed 
to the truth otherwise their message will be lost amid the argument. 
However, this may not be as simple as it seems. In a strike, the situation 
is perceived very differently by various parties and it is often difficult to 
get to the true heart of the situation. Advice must be sought on many 
sides and evidence weighed carefully before a bishop expresses his view. 
It is no bad thing if church leaders are seen to be taking advice, talking 
to those at the pit gate and those within the pit yard, and assessing the 
situation for themselves, as did the leader of the Methodist Conference 
(see chapter 4.5). This helps prevent what the church leaders might say 
as being dismissed as 'pulpit pontification.' It also visibly expresses the 
church's concern for those caught up in the situation and it portrays the 
church leaders as reconcilers. In the old Roman Catholic rite of 
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consecration the bishop was anointed with oil as a sign of his ministry of 
peacemaking and reconciliation (Lee and Stanford, p14). Society still 
perceives reconciliation as a right and proper role for bishops. Paul 
Routledge, when commenting on the bishops 1 peacemaking attempts, pointed 
out that they have the advantage of starting from scratch; they have no 
entrenched position to defend nor political face to lose (Routledge, 'The 
Times'). Also, because bishops are thought to be above personal interest, 
and because their very office carries considerable weight, they command 
attention from all parties. Furthermore, since they do not have to be re-
elected every few years, they have nothing to lose by speaking out. 
So, it seems that what is needed are church leaders who are committed to 
reconciliation, who can speak up, particularly on behalf of those with little 
voice, with politeness and accuracy. On the specific issue of the coal 
dispute, there appeared to be a strong moral obligation for church leaders 
to take up the cause of the threatened communities, to point out the 
social costs of the pit closure policies and also to be agents of 
reconciliation. 
In general, Lee and Stanford, would go further than this and see a role for 
bishops as Her Majesty's opposition, not quite in the political sense, "but 
because good government requires good opposition, it needs to be called to 
account, it needs to have its conscience pricked" (pl04). Unlike political 
opposition, which can be accused of being partisan, church leaders are well 
placed above party politics to probe the human costs of government policy 
and also to give appreciation to the benefits brought by it (p104). The 
key to doing this successfully is for church leaders not to allow themselves 
to be pressed for concrete solutions to every legal and political problem 
(p99) but, when making any contribution to the political arena, they press 
hard the theological dimension of what they are saying. The Roman 
Catholic publication 'A threefold knot; a Christian Approach to Trade 
Unionism', did this with a fair degree of success, for whilst making very 
specific criticism of Conservative policy of restricting workers' rights to 
organise, did so in the context of Catholic moral teaching. The reaction 
of the Department of Employment was to take the report seriously, for 
the bishops had changed the nature of the debate (Lee and Stanford, p32). 
The Church of England's report 'Faith in the City' was less successful, for 
as the Archbishop of York admitted when urging the Government to take 
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notice of the report's sociological insights, "theology was not the 
document's strongest point''Ooc. cit.). Section 6.4 gives some suggestions 
on how the church could have employed its theology during the coal 
dispute. 
Church leaders also have an important role to play in lobbying politicians 
and this can be a very effective role as Cardinal Hume 's efforts on behalf 
of those convicted of the Guildford pub bombings have proved. "Given 
that the majority of the present Government are Christians, and to 
different degrees practise their faith, they have a natural predisposition to 
listen rather more attentively to bishops than the general public is led to 
believe" (Lee and Stanford, p29). 
Anglican bishops have an advantage over other church leaders when it 
comes to lobbying; their twenty-six seats in the House of Lords can make 
them a real threat to the Government of the day. On the other hand, the 
leaders of the free churches are at a disadvantage for their office does 
not carry the status and symbolism of bishop, and, also, they are elected 
to office and serve only for short periods of time in senior positions (Lee 
and Stanford, p24). However, where there is ecumenical co-operation, and 
church leaders speak out together, the impact of what is said is that much 
greater. Since the mid-1970's the combined voice of the Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Liverpool and the Anglican Bishop of Liverpool, often joined 
by the Moderator of the Free Churches on Merseyside, has made the 
church in that city a force which is taken very seriously. 
What emerges from this is that there is a fairly general consensus, both 
within church circles and within the nation as a whole, that church leaders 
have an important role to play in matters such as major industrial 
disputes. Many of the church leaders, themselves, lacked neither the will 
nor the effort to take on this role during the 1984-5 coal dispute. Where 
things started to falter was over the organisation of their response. 
There was a considerable degree of underlying unity, in that many church 
leaders were attempting to act as agents of reconciliation and to enable a 
negotiated settlement to the dispute as they saw fit, however there was 
virtually no co-ordination of their action. As has been shown in section 
4.6, senior officials in the NUM, in the Coal Board and in the Government 
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all received letters and visits from a whole succession of Christian leaders. 
Some acted as individuals representing one denomination, whilst others 
came together as an ecumenical delegation representing a specific region 
such as the Welsh Churches. Each had their own suggestions on how best 
the dispute be resolved but the amount of common ground contained in the 
various proposals was considerable. Those on the receiving end of these 
suggestions cannot help but have been confused by the various church 
groupings who kept claiming their attention for their similar, but different, 
proposals. How much more effective their effort would have been if it 
had been channelled through one representative group, as had been 
suggested by the Coal Chaplains Network (section 4.4). 
Most denominations lack the necessary mechanisms to make a corporate 
response to a crisis affecting the country, whether it be a major industrial 
dispute, or something even greater, such as the threat or event of war. It 
has already been shown (section 4.3.2) that the General Synod of the 
Church of England failed to debate the coal dispute, and similarly, its 
predetermined time-table meant that in November 1990 discussion of the 
crisis caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was minimal. 
Furthermore, there are few opportunities for bishops to consult, one with 
another, about how to make a corporate response to such matters. More 
often than not they find themselves having to make an individual response 
either to the press, or at a local event, such as preaching at the funeral 
of a picket. Likewise, structures for ecumenical co-operation on such 
matters are lacking; there are no formal channels of communication 
between the boards and committees on industrial matters of the various 
denominations. 
It is perhaps at the level of the industrial chaplains that there is greatest 
co-ordination of response and also ecumenical co-operation. Most 
industrial chaplains work as part of an ecumenical industrial mission team 
and are seen as ecumenical representatives within the individual workplaces 
that they serve. This means that any papers they produce contain 
reflections by members of the denominations party to that mission. 
Within the coal industry there also exists a Network of Coal Chaplains 
which meets regularly and comprises representatives of the coal chaplains. 
This Network proved to be a valuable communication channel between the 
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various coal chaplains during the coal dispute, and enabled those at the 
very heart of the Christian involvement within the industry to make some 
co-ordinated statements during the course of the dispute. However, the 
response of the Network was limited, partly due to lack of funds which 
meant that travelling costs could not be met for frequent meetings, and 
partly as there was no established route by which the deliberations of the 
coal chaplains could benefit the wider church. It was up to individuals to 
make personal approaches to the Network for information and guidance; 
the Archbishop of York was one of very few to do this. 
If the church is to respond more adequately to major industrial disputes it 
needs to be more ready to listen to the expertise of its chaplains. It also 
needs to provide the chaplains with the resources to build up their 
expertise and to provide channels by which it can be imparted to others, 
both to those ministering at the local level and those in positions of 
leadership and public prominence. The Sheffield Diocesan Social 
Responsibility Committee, by commissioning the report 'The Church in the 
Mining Communities; a reflection on the experiences of parishes in the 
Diocese of Sheffield during the Mining Dispute 1984/5' has begun this 
process. The Report has been followed up by the organisation of training 
days for clergy in mining parishes by Sheffield Industrial Mission. 
It is nothing less than a scandal that the timetable of the General Synod 
of the Church of England is such that major industrial and political events 
of the day cannot be debated. What witness is this to society, that events 
which dominate the daily news and affect a considerable proportion of the 
congregations, receive barely passing reference? What support does this 
give to those who are attempting to minister to those directly caught up 
in the events of the day? The argument that a hole would have been 
created in the Synod timetable had a debate been scheduled and then the 
dispute resolved in the interim is feeble. It had already been pointed out 
(C. of E., General Synod, July 1984, p389) that because the agenda was so 
crowded there was no slot for motions from Private Members or the 
Dioceses. Surely, these could have been debated had such a hole emerged? 
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6.4 Peace and Justice 
Whenever a major industrial conflict occurs, the most urgent task seems to 
be to resolve it as soon as possible. The coal dispute meant enormous 
suffering to those on strike, it was highly stressful for those who remained 
at work, many coal faces were lost by lack of maintenance, and the effect 
on the economy was by no means negligible. In the light of this a speedy 
settlement, which brings peace to the industry as soon as possible, seems 
to be a worthy aim. Against this is the recognition that a hasty peace 
formula which fails adequately to redress the feeling of injustice which 
prompted the dispute can lead to industrial relations which are far from 
harmonious, to the detriment of the industry and the wider community. 
In any industrial dispute there seems to be a tension between peace and 
justice. Because strikes are highly newsworthy, particularly if there is 
violence, there is an enormous pressure to get the workers back to work 
and to stop the violence. It is then assumed that because there is lack of 
conflict, peace has prevailed and all will be well. Justice, however, is not 
given the same priority as peace and is all too easily neglected. 
The Christian understanding of peace goes a good deal deeper than the 
absence of conflict. It recognises that peace without justice is a false 
peace, for either it will be only a matter of time before conflict will 
break out again, or it involves the oppression of one of the parties. Peace 
must include justice if it is to be true peace (Dowell). 
Over and over again church leaders made pleas for a negotiated settlement 
to end the coal dispute (see chapter 4). They recognised that any 
settlement which was imposed rather than negotiated would be doomed to 
failure; it would bring a false peace, lacking justice. They acknowledged 
that the miners' cause was, to a considerable extent, a just cause, but 
they also recognised it was unrealistic to keep pits open until every coal 
seam was exhausted. However, some public appeals for a negotiated 
settlement contained little more than an appeal to negotiate, eg. that of 
the coal chaplains (section 4.4) and the statement issued by the Roman 
Catholic Bishops (section 4.3.3). In some the cause of justice appeared to 
be secondary to that of peace e.g. the resolution passed by the Methodist 
Conference (section 4.3.1) and the Bishop of Llandaff's call for an 
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immediate return to work, followed by the setting up of an impartial board 
to consider the wider issues of the dispute (section 4.5). 
Despite the many pleas for a negotiated settlement, from many other 
quarters as well as church leaders, no such settlement was reached. The 
miners eventually returned to work having gained none of their aims. The 
Coal Board then went on to close many pits and to make thousands of 
miners redundant. The coal industry has been streamlined and made much 
more economically efficient and it has been the pit communities which 
have borne the brunt of the cost of this. 
There is little doubt that the coal dispute was not merely an economic 
dispute. It was also a highly political dispute, in which the stakes were 
high. The personalities of Ian MacGregor and Arthur Scargiil were such 
that a spirit of negotiation was not fostered; both scented victory and 
were unwilling to compromise. 
It is easy to be wise after the event, but the political complexities of the 
dispute do seem to have been underestimated by the church authorities, as 
was the absence of a desire to compromise amongst the protagonists. 
Francis Bridger feels the church leaders failed to grasp that the strike was 
about a power struggle as well as about jobs and communities. The church 
peace proposals were based on the view that the dispute could be settled 
by concessions from either side but this view failed to recognise that, 
given Scargill' s marxist ideology, reconciliation was impossible. The church 
leaders were well meaning but politically marginal and concerned with the 
effects of the dispute rather than its deeper dimensions (Bridger, p108-
115). However, Bridger's analysis stems from his viewpoint that the 
miners' prime motive was that of furthering the class struggle and the 
state was morally right to use its full power against this struggle. Many 
would disagree with this viewpoint. 
However, this raises the point that in disputes of this nature Christians, as 
much as any other group of people are politically divided and this is a 
factor in the response they make to the situation. Stephen Kendal has 
already pointed out (section 4.4) that the chaplains underestimated the 
different political understandings of the dispute which were held by the 
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church leaders and this, in turn, affected their ability to take notice of 
what the chaplains were saying. 
Given this and given that there were many groups of people, other than 
the churches, calling for peace, perhaps the churches would have been 
more effective had they concentrated their efforts on debating the 
grievances and demands which lay behind the dispute in the light of a 
Christian understanding of justice, exposing instances of injustice and 
exploring more thoroughly the many ethical dilemmas that faced the 
different parties to the dispute. This may have enabled the political 
complexities of the strike to have been more clearly exposed and assessed 
in the light of Christian values. It would have meant the church grappling 
more thoroughly with the moral issues within the dispute and ensured that 
Christian theology made a contribution to the practical decisions that had 
to be taken during the course of the dispute. 
These tasks tended to be neglected, with the causes of the strike being 
pushed into the background by media concentration on the conduct of the 
dispute and the prevalent feeling that the most urgent task was to get the 
coal industry working normally again. The churches might have done 
better to have given greater priority to pressing for justice and fostering 
greater understanding which, in turn, could have opened the way to the 
possibilities of a true peace. Furthermore, this could have been a 
distinctly Christian contribution to the situation which no other 
organisations were in a position to offer, unlike some of the peace 
proposals which bore close similarities to those advocated by the politically 
central ground. It may, too, have changed the nature of the debate. In 
the course of this process it may have appeared that the church was 
aligning itself with one side against the others, but the theological reasons 
for any such alignment would have been made clear for all to see, and 
critics would have had to counter these arguments rather than rely on the 
argument that the church should remain non-aligned. 
The only peace proposal to have received a certain amount of backing by 
both the NUM and the NCB was that of the Welsh Churches (see section 
4.6). This included the suggestion that an Independent Review Body be set 
up whose purpose would be: -
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11 to examine the future of the coal industry in the context of a long-
term energy policy. 
to note the needs of the coal industry and its customers - the receiving 
and producing communities. 
to analyse the issues of development, unemployment and the nature of 
community 11 (Beales, February 1985, p7). 
Perhaps the relative success of the Welsh churches' package and its 
greater emphasis on considering the justice of the wider issues are not 
merely coincidental. 
6.5 Conclusions 
The position of the churches in situations of conflict is that of tightrope 
walkers. If they do nothing they are accused of not caring; if they take 
an interest they are accused of meddling in affairs of which they know 
nothing; if they promote peace they are accused of papering over deep 
cracks; if they attempt to promote justice and they are accused of being 
partisan! 
However, there are lessons to be learnt from the considerable effort that 
the churches made in ministering to those caught up in the 1984-5 coal 
dispute: -
1. First and foremost, the contribution of the church was greatly valued 
by many who came into contact with it during the dispute. In many 
pit communities the church (or chapel) was no longer a mere 
building, but came to mean people who cared for their neighbours 
who were suffering. People who cared and acted, in turn, pointed to 
a God who cared and was relevant to their situation. The church 
also offered a sense of stability and security in a situation of great 
turmoil. This enabled many people, both churchgoers and non-
churchgoers, to find sufficient inner peace to cope with the stress of 
the conflict. 
2. The relief work of the church gave credibility to the voice of the 
church. Where tangible help had been mobilised by local clergy and 
congregations, the comments of the bishops and senior ministers were 
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listened to with interest and sympathy. Once the church had proved 
itself to be a caring agency, criticism of the conduct and causes of 
the dispute was more likely to be taken seriously and the steps 
towards reconciliation, at least at local levels, became possible. 
3. Clergy serving in parishes where the mining industry dominated tended 
to make a greater response to the dispute, particularly where they 
had a close relationship with the mining community before the start 
of the strike. Some who became heavily involved in the relief 
operation and who were well known on the picket-line achieved 
almost 'folk hero' status in mining circles. This led to the 
accusation that other clergy, who kept a lower public profile but who 
were still doing their utmost to minister to the whole community, 
and especially, those suffering because of the dispute, did not care or 
were against the miners. 
4. Church leaders were welcomed by all parties to the dispute as having 
an important enabling role in the peace-making process; however, 
lack of communication between the various leaders, and their church 
boards and committees on industrial matters, led to much duplication 
of effort and weakened their peace-making role. Furthermore, they 
were seen by society as having a moral duty to speak out on events 
of national importance, particularly where people were seen to be 
suffering and justice was in danger of being compromised. 
5. The church may have made a more distinctly Christian contribution to 
the debate, and been able to give new insights into the situation, had 
she probed more strongly the ethical issues raised by the dispute and 
commented on them in the light of Christian values, particularly 
those of justice, participation and sustainability. 
6. The industrial chaplains have a vital contribution to make in major 
industrial disputes; however they are heavily under-resourced and 
under-valued by the church as a whole. 
7. The inability of the General Synod of the Church of England to make 
space in its timetable to respond to current events of national 
importance, such as the coal dispute and more recently the Gulf 
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Crisis, deprives both the church and the nation of a specifically 
Christian debate on the issue. Other denominations are similarly 
unable to have a wide-ranging debate about such events, with the 
possible exception of the Methodists when the crisis co-incides with 
their annual (summer) conference. 
8. Compared with the rest of the media, the church press offered the 
least sensational coverage of the dispute. It probed the effects of 
the dispute in human terms and was careful to offer commentary 
from many different points of view, thus offering its readers the 
fullest and most accurate coverage available. 
At a time when the trend in church membership, at least of many of the 
main-stream churches, has been steadily downwards for many years, the 
fact that the church was able to respond in so many different ways to the 
dispute and that this was welcomed and taken seriously by so many should 
serve as an encouragement to those who comprise the church. The church 
within Britain still has a great deal of influence and power within society. 
This is because of its local presence through church buildings and active 
congregations throughout the country, its respected position in industries 
such as the coal industry through the work of industrial missions, and its 
national and regional voice which is loud enough to receive media attention 
and hold sway in Government circles. The church needs to recognise this 
and build upon it, in order to further its mission. Its response to the coal 
dispute was considerable, although very much ad hoc. It is only when the 
various aspects of the response are pieced together that the complexity of 
the response and the size of it can be appreciated. 
So often the Christian Church is accused of being irrelevant to modern 
society, of fossilising the past, of being so heavenly minded that is of no 
earthly use. The response the churches made during the 1984-5 coal 
dispute is a testimony to a church which is very much alive, a church 
which still has an enormous contribution to make to society, and a church 
which , both at its institutional level and at the level of the individual 
Christian, is earnestly struggling to make the connections between her faith 
and the events which surround her which are necessary in order that 
Christian values be promoted and society be ordered according to them. 
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APPENDIX A 
lists of questions were working documents used by the 
committee. They were not issued as questionnaires.) 
Parish 
Date 
The Church in the Mining Communites 
To the Clergy 
1. How would you characterise the relations between yourself and the 
mining community in this parish before the strike? 
2. Did it change during the strike? Can you give us examples? 
Did you welcome the change? What were the pressure points? 
3. What did you actually do during the strike? 
visiting homes 
NUM office 
pickets police 
canteens 
managers 
4. In what ways were members of the church involved in the strike? 
How was that related to the life of the church? 
5. How did the congregation react to your activities? 
How did you help them understand? 
How were the inevitable disagreements within the parish handled? 
6. Have any of the changes during the strike had a lasting effect on 
your relationships with the mining community in the parish? 
7. Did you need any particular ministerial skills during the strike? 
Did you have any help in developing and using them? 
B. How did you inform yourself about the issues and events of the 
strike? 
Was it difficult to discover the truth of the situation for yourself? 
Was it difficult to pass this on to your congregation? 
9. Were there any theological issues that became important to you at 
the time? 
Was it a new theological territory? Has it caused you to rethink 
some of your beliefs about how God relates to people and 
communities? 
10. Is there anything in what happened that made you rethink your 
ministry? 
Is this relevant to others in similar situations? 
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Parish 
Date 
The Church in the Mining Com munites 
To the PCC members 
1. How many of you work in, have relatives in mining? Are there any 
mining families in the congregation? 
2. What did the church do during the strike to help these families? (not 
just welfare - help in understanding the issues etc.) 
3. What did the church do for the whole community and for non church 
members during the strike? Did you join in? What did you think? 
4. Were you helped to think about the issues in the strike, and to 
connect them with your Christian faith? (Preaching, groups, individual 
counselling, articles in magazines etc.) 
5. Did the people who do not attend church see the church in a new 
way? Has that made a lasting effect on the place of the church in 
the community? 
6. Have these experiences caused you to think about the future of the 
the church here? How could the church's ministry and mission be 
better in the coal communities? 
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Parish 
Date 
The Church in the Mining Communites 
To the NUM representatives 
1. What was the place of the church in the community before the 
strike? 
2. In what ways did the relations between the church, the miners and 
the whole community change during the strike? If the answer is 
about the clergy, then ask about the church congregation. 
3. In what ways did the church (churches: we should know about the 
presence of the other denominations in the place we are visiting) 
help miners and their families during the strike? 
Financial - from church funds, and by passing on other funds 
Individual welfare other than money 
Use of buildings for canteens and offices 
Support for sacked and charged miners 
Public support for the campaign against pit closures 
4. Has all this changed the way the miners think of the clergy? the 
church? 
5. What do you think the church should do to improve its work/ministry 
in mining communities? 
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APPENDIX B 
Questions I prepared as a guide whilst conducting interviews 
Parish 
Clergy 
To the Clergy 
Date 
1. How would you characterise the relations between yourself and the 
mining community in this parish before the strike? 
When was the church built? Was it a mining church? 
What is the socio-economic structure of the community? Has it 
changed much recently? 
How long have you been in the parish? 
2. Did your relationship between you and the mmmg community change 
during the strike? Can you give examples? 
Did you welcome the change? What were the pressure points? 
3. What did you do during the strike? 
visiting homes 
NUM ofice 
When? 
pickets 
canteens 
police managers 
4. In what ways were members of the church involved in the strike? 
How was that related to the life of the church? 
Were just a few active or most/all? 
Did other churches (both nearby and further afield) offer assistance? 
5. How did the congregation react to your activities? 
How did you help them understand? 
How were any disagreements handled? 
6. Did the strike have any impact on your worship? 
If prayers, what was prayed for? 
7. Have any of the changes during the strike had a lasting effect on 
your relationships with the mining community? 
8. How did you inform yourself about the issues and events of the 
strike? Was it difficult to discover the truth of the situation for 
yourself? Was it difficult to pass this on to the congregation? 
9. What did you perceive the national church was saying, especially the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, and your diocesan bishop. 
10 Were there any theological issues that became important to you at 
the time? 
What basic theological model do you base your ministry on? 
Did this change? 
How can the church handle conflict?! 
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